
I once headed ISRO8217;s Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre. So, India8217;s launch vehicles is a subject of my interest. Which causes me to ask: after America sorts out the nuclear deal with India, what next? Launch vehicles?
My apprehension stems from one crucial invariant. The two totally diverse mindsets. Some historical events in the nuclear area will throw light on the western mindset and methodology. The facts are freely available in the public domain and I have only put them together.
8220;On July 24, I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force,8221; says Harry Truman in his book, Year of Decisions 1955. Yes, the momentous test that led to the actual bombing of Hiroshima was only casually mentioned to an ally. The British foreign minister, Anthony Eden, tells just a wee bit more: 8220;On the question of when Stalin was to be told, it was agreed that President Truman should do this after conclusion of one of our meetings. He did so on July 24th so briefly that Mr Churchill and I, who were covertly watching, had some doubts whether Stalin had taken it in. His Mr Stalin8217;s response was a nod of the head and a brief 8216;Thank you8217;. No comment.8217;8217; The Reckoning: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, 1965.
To Eden8217;s observation, Chur-chill adds: 8216;8216;As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. 8216;How did it go?8217; I asked. 8216;He never asked a question,8217; he replied. I was certain therefore that at that date Stalin had no special knowledge of the vast process of research upon which the United States and Britain had been engaged for so long.8217;8217; Triumph and Tragedy, 1953.
However, Soviet Marshal Zhukov8217;s comments speak volumes for the western wheel and deal strategy: 8220;Truman informed Stalin that the United States now possessed a bomb of exceptional power without, however, naming it the atomic bomb8230; Both Churchill and many other Anglo-American authors subsequently assumed that Stalin had really failed to fathom the significance of what he had heard. In actual fact, on returning to his quarters after this meeting, Stalin, in my presence, told Molotov about his conversation with Truman. Molotov reacted almost immediately, 8216;Let them. We will have to talk it over with Kurchatov and get him to speed things up.8217; I realised that they were talking about research on the atomic bomb.8217;8217; The Memories of Marshal Zhukov, 1971.
Truman sounded very casual and brief while speaking to Stalin. But, he effervesces in his diary the next day where he records that the US had discovered the most terrible and destructive bomb ever in human history.
Most American scientists, academicians, intellectuals and politicians supported the use of atom bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki as it was 8216;8216;in the best interest of the US8217;8217;. The corollary is obvious: if, for instance, protecting American interests requires crossing international borders, cross international borders! Even the international law contained in the Hague Convention that 8216;8216;the right of belligerent to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited8217;8217; was scrutinised by the US Senate from the same consideration of American interests, taking three long years to ratify it.
Is the Indian mindset any different? Let us see. The then US president, Bill Clintion, visited India in 2000. While addressing the Indian Parliament, he said that his country had realised one thing 8212; that this whole business of nuclear weapons is a dreadful affair. So, he said, America destroyed 13,000 atomic weapons between 1988 and 2000. The American action was certainly laudable as these weapons could have reduced to ashes the entire planet several times over!
But how come America allowed 13,000 nuclear weapons to be accumulated in the first place, only to be subsequently destroyed? Wasn8217;t the political leadership aware of the stockpile? Bill Clinton8217;s energy secretary, Hazel O8217;Leary, answered this in a press conference. She said that people like her tend to get immersed in an atmosphere of secrecy, so much and for so long, that many times the government itself remains in the dark about many secrets of this nation. Insofar as the plutonium stock is concerned, she said, she will have to keep revising the figure she just released, as more and more plutonium comes to light. The New York Times, December 7, 1993.
From 1945 to 1988, out of whatever plutonium America produced, less than half was used in the 13,000 atomic weapons Clinton said America destroyed. That means more than 13,000 nuclear weapons are still in the magazine out of the 1945-1988 production lot. What about after 1988? Have they stopped plutonium production? There is no report of the seven plutonium plants in the US having stopped production. In such a situation, the stockpile of the weapons must now be going through the roof of the US magazine! No wonder the energy secretary confessed she didn8217;t 8212; and wouldn8217;t 8212; know the exact figures.
When Clinton said that America destroyed 13,000 weapons, many of our parliamentarians, as good hosts, applauded. That8217;s a part of our culture, our mindset. Wherever the president went, people jostled to shake hands with him. What was not realised was that destroying 13,000 weapons in 12 years without a break meant America was getting rid of three bombs every day. What it destroyed in just two days was what India produced, just for proto-testing, in 26 years. And yet, each of our nuclear reactors is asked to be subjected to international inspection.
In the midst of the technological complexity and the two diverse mindsets, nuclear issues are best left to the concerned scientists. This is precisely what Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi consistently did. If the political leadership doesn8217;t firmly protect the sovereignty of Indian science, who will?
Vasant Gowariker is Satish Dhawan Distinguished Professor at ISRO