
In a democracy, one has to accept the people8217;s wish. Even if that wish is a death wish. In Tripura, a party which has fostered the worst law and order situation in any state, has been voted back to power, winning a two-thirds majority which will keep it comfortably in office for the next five years. This feat has been achieved by spreading communal fears among the Bengalis, quite falsely portraying the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Twipra INPT as a party of terrorists and secessionists, in alliance with a Congress which cares less for India8217;s integrity than for opportunistic electoral advantage. Such rhetoric is par for the course in an election and is taken in one8217;s stride. It is the implication for the future that causes the deepest concern.
For the INPT is not a party of secessionists and terrorists. It is substantially a party of ex-secessionists and ex-terrorists. Therein lies the crucial difference. Having discovered over the decades that violence and the demand for independence were taking them nowhere, Bejoy Hrangkhawl and his colleagues made the bold decision to opt for democracy and India. Repeatedly, from every possible forum in the run-up to the election and during the campaign, Hrangkhawl clarified that while he had once believed in the bullet, he now believed in the ballot; that where once he saw his people8217;s liberation as lying in liberation from India, he now saw their liberation as lying in liberation from Left Front role. He pledged his loyalty to the Tricolour and the Constitution. He clarified that by 8216;8216;self-determination8217;8217; he meant 8216;8216;self-government8217;8217;, the concept that lies at the heart of Part IX of the Constitution.
A large-hearted Left Front would have seized this golden opportunity to integrate the former extremists with the political mainstream. That is how AASU/AGP were brought into the democratic process by Rajiv Gandhi in 1985. That is how the next year, Laldenga, the Hrangkhawl of Mizoram, became first the appointed, then the duly elected chief minister of the state he had spent the previous 20 years attempting to overthrow. That is how Subhas Ghising was reined in, becoming chairman of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hills Council. And that is how, most recently, the Bodo agitation has been contained. That is the enlightened way of dealing with reformed secessionists.
Tragically the CPIM, secular when it comes to Hindu-Muslim ties, prefers stoking the most vicious communal feelings when it comes to tribal-nontribal relations in Tripura. Good politics. Dreadful statesmanship. Now that the Left Front has won another poll victory, one can only pray that it will have the wisdom to abandon its politics of divide and rule and, instead of continuing down the Modi way, become as secular in promoting Bengali-tribal harmony as it has been in encouraging Hindu-Muslim brotherhood.
In Nagaland, S.C. Jamir has failed to win a majority on his own. At the time of writing, re-polling has been ordered in as many as four assembly segments. The Congress tally is, therefore, likely to rise above the present score of 21, nine short of an absolute majority. It is still possible that Jamir will succeed in putting together a viable coalition, but that is still to be seen. What is precariously in balance is the future of the peace process. For this has been less an election between the Congress and the parties fielded against it than a face-off between surrogates of the NSCN IM and S.C. Jamir. A non-Congress government in Nagaland would be, in effect, an NSCNIM state government. Such a government would not be able to play an independent role in advising the Centre on what is in the best interests of Nagaland. It would also not be in a position to carry the trust of the neighbouring state governments, particularly Manipur, where significant numbers of Naga tribes reside and which are, therefore, anxious for their territorial integrity. Also worrying is the encouragement a non-Congress government in Nagaland might give to the violence and intimidation that the NSCNIM have unleashed in neighbouring states, especially the Changlang and Tirap districts of Arunachal Pradesh. Moreover, where other insurgent groups, like NSCNK, have found an ear in Jamir to listen to their point-of-view, a non-Congress government in Nagaland dependent on the NSCNIM8217;s muscle power might not heed the voices of non-NSCNIM dissent.
All this could be crippling for the peace process. It needs to be recognised that the peace process can succeed only if it covers the spectrum of dissidence. Otherwise, any new agreement could go the way of the 1975 Shillong Accord. That agreement covered only some of the dissidents; therefore, the others took to arms in protest. If, indeed, a non-Congress government backed by the NSCNIM came into office in Kohima, it would be for the Centre to ensure that the ambit of the dialogue is extended to include the NSCNK, the NNC/Federal and others. Second, the negotiators need to remember at all times the explosion which followed the extension of the ceasefire of June 14, 2001, because without asking Nagaland8217;s neighbours, the ceasefire was extended to cover their domain. Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have a vital interest in the process; Meghalaya, which has become a kind of stock exchange for terrorism; Tripura, where related and mutually supporting insurgents are in full operation; and even Mizoram, as Manipur8217;s neighbour, have a stake in the Naga peace process.
The Centre has made the mistake of ignoring these neighbours in preparing its negotiating mandate. A non-Congress government in Nagaland would encourage the Centre to sideline them further. Statesmanship requires that it resist such pressures and take the neighbours into confidence. The Centre showed at the time of the 2001 extension that it knew how to twist the arms of those on its side, such as outgoing Assam chief minister, Prafulla Mahanta, who sacrificed his state8217;s interests to his party8217;s interests after allying with the BJP. The same mistake must not be repeated with a pliant non-Congress government in Nagaland 8212; if God forbid 8212; such a government were to come into existence. The negotiators must carry the nation with them.