No control on Durand Line

The White House spokesman did say the dinner talks were 8220;constructive8221; and that Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf committed themselves to 8220;supporting moderation and defeating extremism through greater intelligence sharing, coordinated action against terrorists, and common efforts to enhance the prosperity of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan8221;.

Barring the implicit reference to the idea of special economic zones across the Durand Line, there is little new in the White House statement that would generate confidence that Bush has found a way forward in Afghanistan after a week of intensive diplomacy with Karzai and Musharraf. To be sure, the special economic zones could help bring development and governance to the tribal areas across the Pak-Afghan frontier for the first time in centuries. Most people, however, know that for development to take place, there must first be peace. The three-way dinner at the White House gives us no clue to how peace is going to be established on the Durand Line.

For many months now the US has sought to promote greater cooperation between Kabul and Islamabad by setting up a trilateral commission of force commanders and senior officials from the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite many meetings and even joint exercises, the prospects for either peace on the Pak-Afghan border or greater mutual trust between Kabul and Islamabad have not improved. The attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have become ever more brazen all across Afghanistan. Even the once tranquil Kabul is no longer immune from routine violence.

In the last few days Karzai has made it clear that the sources of Afghanistan8217;s current troubles lie in Pakistan. Musharraf has responded with aggression and the disdainful advice that Karzai should know more about his own country. Musharraf has also warned that if Karzai does not act, Afghanistan will soon be consumed by what he calls a people8217;s war. The explicit suggestion from Musharraf was that the Pushtuns, among which the Taliban have ethnic roots, are dissatisfied with the present government in Kabul and might well be gathering to overthrow it.

Where does this leave the Bush administration? Or the international community, which has deployed a large number of troops in Afghanistan? Or for that matter India, whose stakes across the Durand Line have so dramatically risen since 9/11?

As casualties mount in the new war against the Taliban, opposition parties in many western democracies that have sent troops to Afghanistan are demanding withdrawal of their military presence. When Musharraf struck a deal with the tribal leaders in Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, allegedly with the help of the Taliban, there was a furious reaction in Kabul, Washington and the European capitals.

While the suspicion that Musharraf has made a truce with the Taliban is strong around the world, western countries are reluctant to criticise Pakistan for fear of losing the support they get from Islamabad in countering Al-Qaeda.

In the wake of the Waziristan deal, according to western media reports, the UK, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands considered issuing an ultimatum to Musharraf to either crack down on the Taliban or face the consequences. They apparently held back in the hope of Bush sorting out the issue with Musharraf this week.

From what we have heard from Bush, at his public appearances with Karzai and Musharraf in the last few days, there is no reason to believe that the US has indeed confronted Musharraf with some final choices. When the US did that in the wake of 9/11, Musharraf had no option but to comply. Assuming that the US cannot afford to let the Taliban destabilise the Karzai regime, one should expect the Bush administration to ratchet up the pressure against Musharraf. On the other hand, if the US decides that the fight against Al-Qaeda is more important than defeating the Taliban, Washington might be tempted to cede to the Pakistan army primacy in Afghanistan.

It is precisely this outcome that Musharraf has been hoping for since 9/11. His strategy since 9/11 has been to play on the competing imperatives in Washington on fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. He has bet that the US would vacate Afghanistan sooner than later. If he returns from Washington convinced that his bet is about to pay off, he will have every incentive to accelerate his effort to play the Pushtun card and re-establish Pakistan8217;s influence in Afghanistan.

For sixty years since partition, India has been in favour of a strong Afghan state and Pakistan a weak entity across the Durand Line. If the threats to the Karzai regime mount and the perception that the West cannot defeat the Taliban gathers strength, India must be prepared to take some hard decisions on Afghanistan. Irrespective of where the US and the West are headed in Afghanistan, New Delhi needs to evolve its own strategy towards the northwestern parts of the Subcontinent.