Musharraf maelstrom and India

Given the historical burden, New Delhi is condemned to deal with whoever is in power in Islamabad; India also has no incentive to disturb the current relative tranquillity in the bilateral relationship. India is fully conscious of another tragic but enduring reality about Pakistan. The external geopolitical significance of our western neighbour has always taken precedence over the need for a more representative political system within. The Pakistan army’s extended dominance over civil society lay in leveraging its capacity to make a difference on a major global issue.

It is the recognition of this basic truth that allowed Musharraf to ignore the relentless pressure from the US to avoid the imposition of emergency. In August the Bush administration had apparently prevailed over Musharraf on the question of suspending constitutional rule and successfully coaxed him into a political deal with the long exiled leader of the People’s Party, Benazir Bhutto.

Amidst the prospect that the Supreme Court might declare his recent re-election to the presidency as null and void, Musharraf chose to act pre-emptively. Out of the 11 justifications trotted out for the suspension of constitution on Saturday, eight were accusations against the judiciary. As he promises to deliver more to the international community in the war against terror, Musharraf is confident that the Anglo-American powers will swallow his brazen actions.

Although India might be unwilling to admit it, this war against Islamic extremism across the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan could redefine the security politics of the subcontinent. Our political class has been too immersed in an increasingly trivialised nuclear debate to notice the profound transformation occurring along the Durand Line and its implications for India. The security establishment in New Delhi, in turn, finds it difficult to overcome the inertia of the recent preoccupations on J&K and cross-border terrorism.

Consider the following developments on the Durand Line. One, the war against terror is no longer limited to the territory of Afghanistan. It has spilled over across into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province. Two, the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have demonstrated their growing political and administrative control over four of the seven tribal agencies that constitute the FATA — North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, and now Swat.

Three, the attempts by Pakistani security forces to regain control over these provinces either through negotiated ceasefire arrangements or use of force have failed miserably. Four, there is a growing demoralisation within the Pakistan security forces, many of whose ranks are reluctant to fight fellow countrymen. This sentiment finds a larger echo in the Pakistani political spectrum, where many consider the war on the frontier as an American one rather than a national one against terrorism and extremism.

Five, the Al-Qaeda, which has long sought an unhindered territorial space for itself, has declared an open war against the Musharraf regime in Pakistan and has unleashed some bold suicide attacks, including on high value army targets. Six, the Taliban now has a credible sanctuary among fellow-Pashtun tribesmen in Pakistan and its resistance to an international military presence in Afghanistan has an Islamic as well as an ethnic dimension. Seven, and last, frustrated at the Pakistan Army’s inability or unwillingness to control the sources of terrorism inside its own territory, the international coalition has stepped up its cross-border attacks across the Durand Line. As a political failure looms large in Afghanistan, the Bush administration is under growing pressure to disregard Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. Last week’s offer by the chief of the US Central Command, Admiral William Fallon, to send US troops into Pakistan’s border is a taste of future scenarios in Pakistan.

Taken together, these trends point to Pakistan’s dangerous loss of territorial control over its tribal frontiers to the west. For the first time since independence, Pakistan faces an existential threat to its security from its western borders rather than the eastern frontier with India. It is this structural shift in Pakistan, rather than the question of democracy or the personal fortunes of General Musharraf, that is consequential for India. If the Pakistani army fails to regain control over its western borderlands, the entire subcontinent will pay for a region-wide surge of religious extremism and terrorism.

As it comes to terms with an unusual security challenge from its west, India must construct a different template for its Pakistan policy. New Delhi must move from a mere refusal to take advantage of Pakistan’s current internal crisis to a series of considered step — including troop reductions in J&K and greater cooperation across the international border — to signal India’s positive support for Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

Nearly three decades ago, when the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan then Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, sent her foreign minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to Islamabad to suggest a joint Indo-Pak response to the crisis. General Zia-ul Haq, who was all set to play a dramatic role in the new Great Game, dismissed that offer.

As the Great Game, in its latest incarnation, threatens to devour Pakistan’s territorial integrity, discreet offers of help from India might find a more receptive ear in the General Headquarters at Rawalpindi. As the Durand Line dissipates, India must contribute its bit to holding the line against resurgent extremism on the northwestern marches of the subcontinent. A democratic Pakistan would surely have been better positioned to win this war. India, however, does not have the luxury of choosing the political system in Pakistan.

The writer is a professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore