Kashmiri tango

When talks between the Government of India and the Hizbul Mujahideen were abruptly terminated in July due to Pakistanacirc;euro;trade;s...

When talks between the Government of India and the Hizbul Mujahideen were abruptly terminated in July due to Pakistanacirc;euro;trade;s insistence on making this dialogue a trilateral exercise, there was much disappointment. Hizb leader Majid Dar, however, held out a ray of hope when he said that the talks had not been derailed, only delayed, and that he was hopeful about talks being resumed in two or three months. His anticipations appear to have been realised, given a series of initiatives which have been undertaken both through government and non-governmental channels over the last eight weeks to resume discussions on Kashmir and all related issues.

The latest round of overtures have to be assessed in terms of three benchmarks: The motivations animating the current initiatives, the policy stances of the Government of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri groups underpinning them, and the situation on the ground since November 28, when the unilateral ceasefire declared by the Government of India for the month of Ramzan came into being.Recalling contacts and discussions which led to the ceasefire decision and the subsequent developments would be relevant. Back-channel contacts between members of the National Security Advisory Board and representatives of Kashmiri dissident groups were continued even after the failure of the effort at dialogue in July. Delegations of former diplomats, retired armed forces officers and womenacirc;euro;trade;s organisations were exchanged between India and Pakistan over the last six months. Former foreign secretary Rasgotra had a lengthy discussion with General Pervez Musharraf in September. Subramanian Swamy and another retired Indian foreign secretary, Salman Haider, were invited for discussions by Musharraf in November. October and November were characterised by a series of seminars and discussions on the desirability of resuming Indo-Pak dialogue and a dialogue with Kashmiri dissident groups. Representatives of the Hurriyat and other Kashmiri groups from Jammu and Kashmir and from Europe and the United States participatedin these.

The point in recalling these details is that the Indian governmentacirc;euro;trade;s decision to offer a unilateral ceasefire and the indications it gave about a willingness to talk to Kashmiri dissidents did not occur in a vacuum but was, firstly, a consequence of Indiaacirc;euro;trade;s desire to come to terms with dissidence in Jamp;K through peaceful means. Secondly, it was a response to a groundswell of public opinion favouring negotiations. Thirdly, it was rooted in the exhaustion and weariness, with violence and political volatility, amongst our compatriots in Jamp;K.

What then are the motivations and pressures impelling the protagonists to move to the negotiating table? India is genuinely desirous of restoring normalcy in Jamp;K and strengthening democratic institutions in the state. It is equally interested in having a normal, peaceful relationship with Pakistan. India remains convinced that the political turmoil and violence in Jamp;K cannot be brought to an end through military means, confrontation or coercive force. India wants all political groups and entities representing the people of Jamp;K to return to the mainstream of democratic politics and disentangle themselves from extremist foreign entities.

As far as motivations of the dissident and militant groups in Jamp;K go, they are complex and politically ambiguous. They have perhaps come to the conclusion that armed confrontation will not achieve their objectives. They may also have sensed a decline in public support in Jamp;K for their violence and military approach. There is an incremental resentment among the people against the incursion of foreign mercenary cadres belonging to extremist religious groups what compounds this resentment is that these foreigners have more resources and they are attempting to dominate dissident politics in Jamp;K under instructions from Pakistan. The Hurriyat and Hizb cannot but be responsive to this resentment. Reasserting their credibility as the genuine representatives of the people of Jamp;K has perhaps become a necessity. But the point is, there is no clear-cut agreement amongst them on what status for Kashmir they should negotiate for: independence, joining Pakistan or remaining with India with greater autonomy.

As for Pakistan, it wants to find a way around Indiaacirc;euro;trade;s steady refusal to resume negotiations unless it stops cross-border terrorism and pulls back from giving material support to secessionists. Pakistanacirc;euro;trade;s success in scuttling the dialogue last July attracted criticism both from Jamp;K and the international community. So they have agreed this time to keep away from the dialogue in the initial stages. Pakistan hopes that these discussions could change the status quo in Jamp;K, particularly in terms of its political and constitutional status, which ultimately could become advantageous to Pakistan. Pakistanacirc;euro;trade;s support for the dialogue would also remedy its negative image as a disruptive neighbour.

One motivation animates all protagonists: To show responsiveness to international pressure to resume dialogue and scale down violence, which the international community feels could precipitate a nuclear confrontation.The policy stances of India, the Kashmiri dissident groups and Pakistan have to be differentiated from the motivations summed up above. Indiaacirc;euro;trade;s policy stance could be described as follows on the basis of recent statements by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Home Minister L.K. Advani. India wants a peaceful solution to all issues related to Kashmir, through a dialogue with Kashmiri dissidents, to deal with internal dimensions of the politics of Jamp;K. India is equally willing to resume a dialogue with Pakistan to resolve those aspects of the Kashmir issue in which Pakistani policies and activities are involved. India seems to be of the view that discussions on Kashmir have to be held separately with our own citizens of that state, and separately with Pakistan. India has no objection, however, if informal non-institutional consultations are undertaken by Kashmiri dissidents with their Pakistani patrons. India cannot and should not condone institutional or formal discussions between Kashmiri dissidents andPakistani authorities because it would legitimise Pakistanacirc;euro;trade;s locus standi in deciding the political status and the future of Jamp;K which would amount to re-opening issues which were decided upon at the time of Partition.

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There are two overriding factors which should influence these positive beginnings, which have led to a perceptible easing of tensions on the ground. First, there should be no dilution of Indiaacirc;euro;trade;s territorial integrity. And secondly, India should remain committed to reason both with Kashmiri dissidents and with Pakistan.