Implications for India

In the initial stages, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Slovenia are to be brought under the NATO umbrella. There are reports that Rumania also is interested in being included in this arrangement. So is Ukraine. The Russian Federation has strong objections to Ukraine getting involved with NATO because of its size, resources and its geostrategic importance. Russia has indicated equally strong reservations about any attempt at Baltic states being brought under the NATO umbrella. Though it has equally strong objections to its former East European allies becoming part of NATO, Russia does not have the political and economic strength to prevent the inclusion of East European countries mentioned above.

The successive erosion of Russian influence in East Europe, in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia would remove these states as a buffer between Russia and the West in competitive or politically confrontationist stands. It should also be noted that simultaneously with the expansion of the NATO umbrella over East Europe, this parallel arrangement of 8220;partnership for peace8221; would establish linkages with the former Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union. These arrangements have received a positive response from the important Central Asian Republics led by Uzbekistan.

While these arrangements are getting consolidated on Russia8217;s western and southern flanks, the US8217;s having signed a new security treaty with Japan, the US8217;s formal security arrangements with Australia and New Zealand and the US8217;s linkages with the ARF Asean security arrangement counter the Russian strategic position and actions on its eastern and south-eastern planks. In a manner, a circle of politico-security containment is being put in place, perhaps, to ensure that the Russian Federation does not re-emerge as a super power despite its resources and nuclear weapons capacities. It is logical for the Russians to have reservations about this evolving adverse strategic environment.

East European countries being invited to join NATO are enthusiastic about the prospect because it will result in greater economic integration of these countries with the prosperous and technologically advanced West. The NATO umbrella covering the east would also be a formal institutional arrangement against any revival of Russian influence in and domination of those countries, which is the basic objective of the foreign policy of these countries. Since the US is the dominant NATO partner, these countries feel safe about not being subject to any domineering tendencies on the part of Germany.

Motivations of the US and the Western democracies in expanding NATO and structuring links between NATO and the Central Asian Republics are a to prevent revival of direct Russian political influence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; b to pre-empt possibilities of Russia8217;s emergence as a super power in its more cohesive nationalist incarnation; c to expand economic and technological influence in Eastern Europe; and d to get a foothold in the Central Asian Republics on the basis of a political and security arrangement which would enable the West to have access to the enormous natural resources in the Central Asian Republics.

Another dimension of the impulses supporting the expansion of the NATO-related arrangements is the desire of, perhaps, all European countries to ensure a continuing US political and security presence in Europe to counter German domination of European affairs which still causes sub-conscious apprehensions among European countries. Germany itself justifies the US8217;s over-arching presence in Europe, as it safeguards Germany from suspicions and apprehensions to its European neighbours.

It is in this context that one has to assess the significance of Chinese President Jiang Zemin8217;s pronouncements in Moscow in March after his meetings with Yeltsin where he talked about the desirability of a strategic equation between the Russian Federation and China to counter the undercurrents in the evolving international situation which could militate against the interests of Russia and China. The Government of India has not responded to this development in any focussed manner so far. Our attention is on the regional situation and more immediate problems concerning disarmament and non-proliferation. But India cannot be indifferent to these developments.

The continuance of the logical and inevitable linkages between India and the Russian Federation and the evolving equations with China would result in the US viewing us with an amount of political uncertainty in their strategic planning. It is, therefore, logical that there is a parallelism between the manner in which Russia and China view NATO expansion and related developments and the manner in which India should and would view these developments. Though, given the asymmetry in the power status of Russia and China on the one hand and India on the other, prospects of strategic understanding of equations are limited, it would be pertinent for India to evolve political equations with Russia and China to counter the strategic implications of NATO expansion to the extent we can. In the regional dimension of this exercise, we should become more active in establishing meaningful relations with the Central Asian Republics and Iran. We must move away from the purely uni-dimensional sub-regional orientations of our foreign policy of the last 18 months.