Imperial China, neo-colonial India

Before they celebrate the new discomfiture of China, Indian Sinophobes should be aware that similar charges are also levelled against India. Beijing is the bigger target than New Delhi for Western liberalism, because China has been more aggressive than India in pursuing its economic interests in Africa and Latin America.

Western activists argue, not entirely accurately, that the unfolding rivalry between China and India is similar to the scramble for Africa among rival European colonial powers in the 19th century. Irrespective of the analogy, India is certainly competing with China for oil and mineral resources in Africa. New Delhi might be way behind Beijing; but it is on the same road.

Last week, Paul Wolfowitz, the president of World Bank, slammed Chinese and Indian economic policies towards Africa. Even as he quickly retracted at the storm of political reaction from China, Wolfowitz underscored the point that Beijing and New Delhi should not repeat the mistakes of the US and the West in bank-rolling for decades such unsavoury regimes as that of Mobutu Sese-seko in Zaire.

After decades of seeing themselves as victims of imperialism, China and India will find the tag of neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism shocking if not distasteful. Yet Beijing and New Delhi must confront a new reality. The greater their economic and political capacity to influence outcomes elsewhere in the world, the stronger will be international scrutiny of their policies.

Even more important is the need to acknowledge that the foreign policies of China and India are undergoing radical change. As high growth rates propel China and India, the two Asian giants are being compelled to design foreign policies for large economies that no longer are self-sufficient. Their rhetoric might be that of the Third World, but Chinese and Indian foreign policies might increasingly look like those of great powers, especially in the defence of the new economic interests way beyond their borders.

While their foreign policy traditionalists recoil at the charges of neo-colonialism, realists in Beijing and New Delhi must come to terms with some important factors. One is a historically proven trend: existing great powers attack rising powers for not respecting the old rules. Although there has been a lot of talk about the implications of global balance of power amidst the rise of China and India, Africa is perhaps the first place the new reality is being manifest. As China and India transform the geopolitical balance in Africa and threaten to push Europe and America from their privileged positions in the developing world, they are bound to face inevitable reaction from the major powers and liberal activists in the West.

Western liberals criticise China and India for being free riders in the international system and taking advantage of the order and stability being maintained by other great powers. They want Beijing and New Delhi to prove they are stake-holders in the global order and work for its maintenance.

The criticism of China and India is sharpest for supporting the government in Sudan, which is facing flak on the human rights front. Beijing and New Delhi, with their huge investments in Sudan8217;s oil fields, have no desire to sacrifice their energy interests to compel Khartoum to change its behaviour. Support from China and India has undoubtedly emboldened Sudan to defy the international system. The same is true in Burma, where both countries are competing for influence.

To be sure, they are not the only instances where major powers have 8220;elevated8221; interests above a presumed 8220;principle8221;. India can always point to the contradictions of US policy towards the military rule in Pakistan. But India cannot have it both ways. Of pretending injured innocence on the one hand and asserting that other powers do the same.

As its dependence on imported oil and mineral resources expands rapidly in the coming years, India, much like China, will be under pressure to defend these interests through the time tested means employed by great powers. These include large volumes of economic assistance, subsidising companies in capturing export markets, supporting governments that do business with us, and selling arms to such regimes which might use them against their internal and regional adversaries. In extremis, hold your breath, this might even involve sending troops to preserve order and stability to defend 8220;vital8221; national interests.

For India the challenge is two-fold. One is to immediately review the current policies towards Africa and devise a strategy that treats other developing nations as partners in the march towards shared prosperity rather than as mere sources of raw materials. The other and more difficult task is to shed the old rhetoric that pretends India is a weak Third World country and start debating the consequences of India8217;s rising power.

In the coming years, India will have to deal with new foreign policy burdens and more complex trade-offs between competing interests. In finding that difficult balance it cannot just dump its core democratic values. While the urge to compete with China is immense and might be integral to the Indian strategic calculus, a democratic India will need a different approach to economic engagement with Africa and the developing world.