
After the return of the Indian delegation from Cancun, one has seen a series of reports and analyses which sound more like the hosannas of the faithful and the loyal. It will be petty to cavil at credit being given where it is due 8212; and from accounts of several others non-Indian, non-media, there is no doubt that Arun Jaitley argued the case, and his brief, well.
However, one wonders why much of what is appearing in the print as well as the electronic media sounds like a PR exercise of the government. Since the Marrakesh treaty and its impact on our domestic economy, there has been more awareness in the media on the WTO and trade negotiations. Though lacking in in-depth analysis, it helps focus the issues in the public mind. But in several of the media reports from Cancun and after Jaitley8217;s return, there is a glossing over the apparent contradictions and some deliberate innuendo.
For instance, in many media reports and analyses, the leading role of the Brazilian delegation and its Foreign Minister Celso Amorim in initiating the G-17, then G-20 and then G-22 and sustaining the solidarity of the developing countries has been ignored or downplayed.
The discomfiture in which the Indian delegation found itself, particularly on agriculture, when Rev. 2 draft of Chairman Derbez Bautista was tabled has been virtually ignored.
The initial Indian strategy in Geneva since Doha had been of siding with EU on agriculture until the EU decided to do a deal with the US.
The Indian delegation chose to maintain silence on the crucial right to use QRs and satisfied itself with the false comfort of the tariff instrumentality alone, to safeguard the interests of Indian agriculture. It found itself in a quandary when Rev. 2 asked for a substantial
lowering of tariffs.
All this is overlooked in the anxiety to project the leader of the Indian delegation as the doughty defender of Indian kisans. If Brazil and Argentina had not seen through the game behind Rev. 2, India would have been in a mess.
Similarly, not much notice has been taken of the weak Indian stand on the Singapore issues. Even before Jaitley landed in Cancun, the 8220;fall-back8221; position if India was isolated, decided apparently at a meeting of group of ministers, was leaked to a part of the media, giving the signal to the US and EU that India would be prepared to negotiate on two of the four issues and even discuss modalities of negotiations on the other two.
This was in sharp contrast to the strong opposition to negotiations on the Singapore issues by the African, Caribbean and the least developed countries, the joint position of the group of 16, and the unambiguous Malaysian stand that all the four issues were 8220;non-negotiable8221; given in letter by Malaysian minister Rafidah Aziz on 12/13.
On the contrary, the reports in the media talked about a 8220;dream deal8221; that was about to be struck towards the end of the Cancun meeting. What is worse, some analyses hinted that, alas, the African, Caribbean, and the least developed countries spoiled it!
The writer is a former finance secretary to Government of India and India8217;s ambassador to GATT in Geneva