General146;s orders not our orders

But why has the figure been kept at 50,000 and not 100,000, or more? Normally staff officers baulk over reduction of even one man. Does it look like a Bata Shoe sales gimmick? 50,000 is a good, round, eye-catching and impressive figure8212;less than 1 lakh, neither too small to dismay reluctant enthusiasts nor too large to alarm the critics or the buyers, the Indians in this case. Of course, statesmen are serious people, but so are salespeople. The Indian manpower cut was quietly rolled back as the ground reality seeped in post-Kargil War, 1999. Perhaps Pakistan means to stay the course whether India follows suit or not.

Troop reduction was an important Confidence Building Measure CBM in an earlier era. In the period up to the Second World War, the balance of power was often negotiated and achieved on the basis of troop strength, number of guns and major armaments, and on sea, on the number of destroyers and frigates. With the advent of nuclear weapons, traditional arms control measures are no longer in vogue or hold any importance.

There are other good reasons for not playing the Pakistani game. Even if India were to agree to reduce manpower by 50,000, the ante is likely to be upped. According to The Military Balance, 2002-2003 International Institute of Strategic Studies, UK, the Indian Army is 11 lakh strong and the Pakistani Army 5.5 lakh. A cut of 50,000 men would amount to 9.09 per cent of the Pakistani Army. In percentage terms, the Indian Army would have to cut 99,990 men to match Pakistan8217;s large-heartedness.

Besides, analysts ought to question the rationale of the 11 lakh ceiling imposed on the Indian Army post-1962. The country8217;s strategic situation and operational requirements have undergone a sea change.

What has been the basis for the ceiling of 11 lakh? 8216;8216;8230;It was formulated primarily to meet a diplomatic and external requirement,8217;8217; writes D S Nakra in the USI United Service Institution of India Journal, July-September 1976. 8216;8216;It was evolved after our inglorious reverses on our northern and north-eastern borders 19628230;There was an American Mission in Delhi, and our requirements had to be projected to it. The acceptable basis was an Army large enough for successful defence but without capacity for aggression.8217;8217;

There is no denying the need for modern weapons, weapon platforms, including satellites and satellite-based systems. While effectiveness of modern weapon systems has increased manifold, it necessarily does not lead to the inference that men and machines are mutually exchangeable or bear an inverse relationship.

At the simplest level, the defence forces remain an organisational aggregate of human resources, weapons and weapon platforms. A healthy mix of all depending upon the tasks at hand. Numbers in weapon systems and manpower have a basic minimum that cannot be substituted by the other.

The US predicament in Iraq post-Fallujah disturbances and the Muqtada al Sadr-led uprising in March-April this year should be ample proof of the need to weigh operational considerations while considering manpower cuts. America won the hot war with just four divisions but is finding it hard to keep peace in Iraq with over 1.35 lakh American and 28,000 allied troops.

Military downsizing ought to relate to operational environment and not competitive manpower cuts vis-a-vis Pakistan. In dealing with Pakistan, sound commonsense and not competitive rhetoric must rule.