If General Pervez Musharraf expected Pakistan to turn on his command like a military parade, he must now learn the difference between a parade and a nation the hard way. From jehadis to officially approved university graduates who now populate the Punjab Provincial Assembly, there is hardly a civilian who is following the General’s script. The General wants Jaish-e-Mohammed founder Maulana Masood Azhar to lower his profile but he keeps appearing in public defying these instructions. The Punjab Assembly was expected to pass a resolution to endorse the nation’s ‘‘need’’ for a uniformed President but the Opposition turned it into a fiasco. And the debate over the Legal Framework Order (LFO) refuses to go away. Pakistan’s Generals and their drawing room-dwelling supporters lament that Pakistan is not ready for democracy. But, in fact, it is the Generals’ failure to understand the dynamics of politics that obstruct Pakistan’s evolution into a mature State. No nation can have discipline without law. And there can be no rule of law unless laws are made in a transparent manner, with complete observance of a constitutional scheme that enjoys broad consensus. Pakistani military’s conventional wisdom is that the country’s only tragedy is lack of leadership. From Ayub Khan to Musharraf, the Generals have tried to fill this leadership vacuum. But their rejection of the process of politics has harmed the country more than the alleged mediocrity of our political leadership. Let us examine each one of the tempests in teapots that the country is facing. First, the matter of jehadi leaders. If Pakistan followed the rule of law, it would be a matter of law whether organising jehadi militias was lawful or not. Then, people like Masood Azhar would either have complete freedom or none at all, depending on their conduct. A few years ago, Pakistan’s establishment thought jehad was a good instrument of strategy. Now, the same officials who asked religious leaders to mobilise followers for jehad are asking them to keep quiet or drop out of public view to save Musharraf international embarrassment over militants. The jehadi leaders refuse to be handled like puppets, hence their refusal to comply. Next, the brouhaha in the Punjab Assembly. Since the elections of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures last October, the government has shown only contempt for the elected Assemblies. Instead of letting Parliament vote on his constitutional amendments, and negotiating with leaders to secure an outcome of that vote favourable to him, Musharraf chose to act aloof. His interlocutors with politicians, serving and retired intelligence officers, threatened or bribed every politician failing to get a deal. In the process, they undermined the potential for political compromise among politicians who survived the hurdles during elections. Political negotiation, after all, is not taught at the Pakistan Military Academy or at the School of Intelligence. The Legislatures have not been entrusted with any legislation so far and have not even met frequently. The regime’s penchant for secrecy is so pervasive that it hasn’t shared details of its cooperation with US in the war against terrorism, even urging the press to ignore information on the subject published on the CENTCOM website. (Questions: If cooperation with US is good for Pakistan, why hide its details from Pakistanis? If it is something to be ashamed of, why do it?) Under such circumstances, the government’s effort to use the Punjab Assembly to demonstrate support for Musharraf remaining in uniform was clearly a provocation for the Opposition. Even then, pro-government politicians knew their side would be better off by allowing the Opposition its say. But the provincial Home Secretary, an ex-intelligence official and retired military officer who boasts of his friendship with ‘‘the Chief’’, strong-armed the Opposition. The result was the police attack on Opposition members of the Provincial Assembly. Now, the military is trying its best to ‘‘spin’’ its failure in managing proceedings of Punjab Assembly into the traditional ‘‘our politicians are irresponsible’’ line of propaganda. The argument of the uniformed ones can best be found in an article by a former four-star General and Vice-Chief of Army Staff published in a Karachi English daily. The General begins by saying, ‘‘The political rhetoric by our parliamentarians in meetings, in print media and the loud and rowdy rumpus by them inside the House reflects the disorder ailing our society.’’ He argues that ‘‘indiscipline and chaos are part of our political milieu’’ before launching into a list of issues he sees as causes of our national malaise. Ironically, this list includes the nuisance of plastic bags and wall chalking but skips over the absence of constitutional governance or military’s usurpation of civilian power. Pakistan’s Generals have tried repeatedly to make the nation walk in a straight line but in vain. It is time for them to realise that it is not ‘‘bloody civilians’’ who keep setting the nation back but their own tendency to consider themselves a solution to every problem. Last year, Musharraf argued that restricting the electoral process to graduates would ensure better quality of representatives. After the recent clashes in Parliament and Punjab Assembly, that argument seems hollow. Similarly, the National Security Council was introduced into the Constitution as the body that would serve as a bridge between the military and civilian leadership. But now Musharraf argues that he must continue as President in uniform to be that bridge. Surely, one of these bridges is redundant. Making an entire nation walk in a straight line is impossible, which is why mature nations respect dissent and evolve procedures for allowing the minority to have its say while the majority gets its way. Military training is insufficient preparation for leading a nation, which requires multi-faceted talents usually provided by a team of experienced politicians. All of Pakistan’s General-rulers thought they had laid the foundations of economic prosperity and political stability. But their limited knowledge kept their focus on a few aspects, leading them to drop the ball on other crucial issues. Right now, too, General Musharraf is pleased with the improvements in the government’s finances with external assistance, ignoring that Pakistan averages seven suicides a day because of poverty and the number of those living below the poverty line has risen to 31 (possibly 34) per cent of the population. His political ‘‘strategy’’ of total control is likely to backfire as different political forces, from jehadis to democrats, seek to mobilise an unhappy populace. Pakistan would be better off if constitutional and political mechanisms were allowed to run their course and Musharraf, and his team of serving and retired military officers, reverted to doing what they know best: obeying their superiors and ordering their subordinates. — The writer is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC. He served as ambassador to Sri Lanka and as adviser to Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto