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Journalism of Courage
As much as September 11 changed the world in many ways, so did two days last year 8212; October 1 and December 13 8212; fundamentally alter the future of the subcontinent. Direct attacks on the seat of democracy while a global war against terrorism was in full swing was not just a simple escalation, but a conscious targeting of the political leadership of the largest democracy in the world. If it had succeeded, the country would have been plunged into an unprecedented crisis, the consequences of which would have been cataclysmic. The military mobilisation and deployment for possible war thus became an imperative. But the political diplomatic steps signalled a willingness to exercise the non-military options first.
This did lead to General Musharraf making a public commitment on January 12 to give up jihad-e Asghari militant jihad, clamp down on jehadi organisations, infrastructure, training camps, and proclaiming that no terrorism of any kind would be permitted from Pakistani territory in which he includes PoK. But four months later there is little evidence of a change in the ground realities and there is evidence of the worsening situation. A majority of the militants and radicals arrested in January have been released. As Jaswant Singh said, 8220;Their jehadi leadership is now freed, it lives in houses and gets paid an allowance by the government of Pakistan.8221;
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The answer lies in what may be termed as 8216;discriminate strikes8217; across the Line of Control limited to the territory of the Jammu and Kashmir state
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If there is no visible reduction in cross-border terrorism what would be India8217;s options? At the end of the road, the military option will be available, but it must remain the instrument of last resort, and very carefully employed even then. Taking the last point first, the way to look at it is not in terms of the traditional use of military power, that is, in a full-scale war. That is what the world is worried about and, more important, it carries numerous risks, including escalation to the nuclear level. We must avoid that. This is also why the US is concerned about the potential for conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbours. But they need to understand that after Al-Qaeda were dispersed from Afghanistan, US-India counter-terrorism interests have nearly started to overlap. The American war against terrorism, like ours, has to zero in on Pakistan. But the US does not appear to be ready to deal with terrorist infrastructure in PoK which is being built up. At the same time the problem is that Musharraf would not take serious action to fulfil his own commitments unless the pressure increases.
It is often forgotten that we have many options well below the military one. Political signals would need to go out to highlight our increasing concern. A special ambassador for counter-terrorism could be the focus as well as the pointsman of diplomatic efforts. Our diplomatic staff in Islamabad could be further cut down and trade, what little exists, stopped. These would not hurt Pakistan in any serious way. But they would convey a political resolve that the status quo, where hundreds of innocents are being killed every month in India by jehadi terrorists from across the borders, will not be acceptable for long, especially in the context of December 13. But the more substantive option would be to re-examine our commitment to the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistani elites know the importance of this treaty to its own economic well-being.
Two decades of cross-border terrorism has changed the parameters of relationship between the two countries. The incongruity of unabated terrorist killing of innocents in India by Pakistani jehadis while the water lifeline flows uninterrupted to Pakistan from India stares us in the face. Pakistan has not honoured any of the agreements and treaties that entered into with us. If our security and supreme national interests require, we should be willing to seek modifications to the old treaties. We are facing increasing shortage of water for agriculture in Punjab and Haryana. J038;K itself needs more water. We may not opt to withdraw from the Indus Waters Treaty in the first instance; but we should seriously aim to renegotiate the terms to ensure that a greater share of the river waters is available to us. And failing that we should be prepared to act unilaterally.
But if this does not produce the desirable change, what would be the contours of military option if it becomes inescapable? Sending the land forces across the border would be counter-productive in the overall analysis and hence must not be resorted to. Such forces, including the armoured formations, would need to play a defensive role on the borders to counter Pakistan8217;s conventional escalation. The answer lies in what may be termed as 8220;discriminate strikes8221; across the Line of Control limited to the territory of J038;K state. In principle, we would be attacking territory that is part of India and which even under the UN resolution August 13, 1948 Pakistan had agreed to vacate as a first step. We had emphasised the 8220;sanctity8221; of the Line of Control, especially at the time of Kargil War. We need to change that to insist on 8220;defensible frontiers8221; till the occupied territories in J038;K are recovered.
Such strikes would be layered and involve extended artillery bombardment, surgical strikes with special forces beyond the area of artillery strikes, and air strikes on selected targets beyond that range. Such strikes would need to follow political and diplomatic preparations and target training camps in PoK and army units along the Line of Control. Even more important, they will need to be carefully planned and executed so that Islamabad does not have a rational, reasonable cause to reach for the nuclear button after each strike. This would require a graduated, calibrated and controlled process with the aim that it should hurt but limit the option of retaliation. In a way, the goal would be to put the Pakistani strategy on its head.
