Expect the unexpected

The accident at the Defence Research and Development Organisation8217;s High Energy Materials Research Laboratory HEMRL in Pune, where si...

The accident at the Defence Research and Development Organisation8217;s High Energy Materials Research Laboratory HEMRL in Pune, where six persons were killed and a number of people wounded, once again holds out lessons so often forgotten: that accidents don8217;t happen, they are caused. They are caused mostly by individual failures each of which could well be minute and by itself not able to lead to a catastrophe, but in combination with other failures creates situations of disastrous proportions. This is the second accident leading to deaths in a DRDO laboratory. Last year a missile was accidentally launched when being shown to the defence secretary at the Hyderabad facility, which also manufactures missiles. The exact cause of the accident would no doubt be inquired into and corrective measures taken. But some basic issues need to be kept in mind even by those who would look into the tragic incident at Pune.

Defence establishments in all countries function at a level of technology which is very much higher than that generally available and operating in the country. The demands on manpower and infrastructure, therefore, are much higher than what most people would expect. This, by definition, becomes even more demanding for defence research establishments although they have the benefit, unlike the field formations of the defence forces, of employing highly qualified and trained personnel operating in what could be termed as controlled environments. Accidents in premier research development and manufacturing facilities, consequently, ought to be of even greater concern to the nation. The fire that burnt down the semi-conductor facility at Chandigarh had pushed us back by two decades. The complexities of the challenges to ensuring a safety regime can be gauged from the fact that HEMRL undertakes work on a vast range of activities, ranging from tear gas grenades for the civil police to propellants for heavy guns and even fuel-air explosives. The explosion at HEMRL apparently occurred when solid propellant processing work was being carried out. Such work would have implications for our missile programme and the element of sabotage, therefore, must not be ruled out without a thorough examination.

The only rational way to see that accidents don8217;t happen is to consistently ensure that operating procedures and personnel training are kept up at the highest standards possible. Murphy8217;s Law reminds us that if something can go wrong, it will go wrong. Accident prevention thus lies in expecting the unexpected and laying down procedures which reduce the possibility of the unexpected overtaking the situation. Even more important than procedures is the issue of safety culture. It is easy to conclude that we, as a nation, are not very security or safety conscious. But the reality of the country progressively moving toward greater industrialisation and technological advancement requires that such a culture must be inculcated at a very basic level, right from the education process itself. Self-discipline and self-monitoring appear to be values that seem to have been degraded in the rush for personal advancement. DRDO will have to ensure that these values are strengthened and a culture of safety and professionalism promoted.