Eschew perverse restraint

Then it becomes 8220;responsible8221;. Usually this means factoring in the sensitivities of the world8217;s leading powers in domestic decisions concerning national security. Otherwise there is no reason why acquiring missiles should be any different from, say, getting hold of field guns for which our prime ministers, defence ministers, and chiefs of staff do not have to look over their shoulder.

The world8217;s big boys are touchy about nuclear weapons and missiles because, developed to sufficient levels of sophistication, these can potentially target even them. So they have put in place regimes the world is invited to adhere to on pain of economic isolation or even military punishment.

Of course, no restraint applies to the big players themselves when they frame the rules and guidelines. All the world is their stage to roam freely and exploit economically for their own citizens even if others get hurt. That, the argument goes, is critical to savingdemocracy from duly 8220;certified8221; demons. The ghoul-list undergoes modifications depending on political exigency. The majority of the world is not consulted. Sometimes, infringements are allowed to pass, perhaps even encouraged tacitly. To most Indians this would appear to be the case with Ghauri. There was such to-do when India was testing the Agni8217; in the late 8217;80s and early 8217;90. This had the desired effect. Agni never could become an intermediate range missile proper for it was not put through the number of successful test-flights theoretically warranted to achieve that status. A full 12 years of indigenous effort, in the course of which our scientists sometimes had to rediscover the wheel, was put on virtual hold. The result: Agni hasn8217;t quite got off the block, whatever the patriotic propaganda, though it can easily soar into the skies with just that extra push. However, India is known to celebrate unilateral restraint.

While the testing of Agni was attended by orchestration of serious concern ininternational quarters with the purpose of deflecting this country from its ballistic-missiles programme, no such exercise has marked the launch of Ghauri. No chastisement of Islamabad is reported following the just-ended visit to the subcontinent of Bill Richardson, chief US representative in the UN and a member of the Clinton cabinet.

It is safe to assume that Richardson was in New Delhi not only to size up the new government but also, after Ghauri, to discreetly advise the Vajpayee regime not to be persuaded to start putting the much-needed coat of paint on Agni. If this were to happen President Clinton, slated to be here later this year, would be seriously embarrassed. He may not desire to be entertained by people who respond to a missile challenge posed by neighbours, for in official American eyes this would amount to fuelling the region8217;s arms race, regardless of how it started and accompanying events.

In return for continuing good behaviour, it appears that India has been promised revival ofAmerican cooperation in the civilian nuclear area, terminated following the 1974 Pokhran blast. This is truly an irony. The results of that explosion have not been erased from the record, but the US is prepared to 8220;forgive8221; a quarter century after the event. The rise in the American tolerance threshold is clearly a sign of the times 8212; the new world realities, particularly the proliferators8217; role in the nuclear field and distributors8217; role in medium- and long-range missiles played by some US allies, as well as China and North Korea. All the same, in order to claim the ex-ante 8220;reward8221; of civilian nuclear cooperation, this country would clearly have to promise not to be snotty.

What will the Vajpayee government do? Can it be different from its predecessors if this means disturbing the current Western perception of international security affairs? The BJP8217;s pronouncements when it was in the opposition do not provide much help. But the government8217;s first reactions when the news about Ghauri broke werehardly reassuring. Foremost, it was taken by surprise. This is a devastating comment on how parameters of direct relevance to national security are monitored in a country vulnerable from two sides. To compound the idiocy, full rein was given to the sterile debate on whether or not Ghauri was actually launched. This ceased only when the US confirmed the launch. Unlike India, it had not been surprised.

Leading the fruitless charge was the defence minister. Rather than concentrate on dealing with the post-Ghauri situation, Fernandes preferred public guessing about the source of the missile transfer. He named China. This could be true, but it may well have been North Korea, considering it appears to be liquid-fuel. The point is, so what? Whether Ghauri came pre-packaged or in knocked-down condition or whether it was indigenously made highly unlikely, the threat it poses to India does not change.

The leadership would do well to worry about how best to respond without altering the fact of engagement withIslamabad or Washington, rather than engage in idle speculation. Perhaps it8217;s time to break the sound barrier 8212; do it and come clean. That may be the only way to ensure that others remain engaged instead of offering us sops like a 8220;strategic dialogue8221; which sound nice but mean little.