Dog fight

The pact for the multi-billion dollar PAK-FA is not yet signed, but Sukhoi has almost no competition from its Russian rival. If at all, Sukhoi may have to consider the offer of the United States to jointly produce the Multi-Machine Aircraft, a futuristic craft, with India. What India wants is a multi-role platfrom, advanced avionics, Active Electronically Scanned Array AESA radar, beyond visual range weapons and low radar signature that will act as a force multiplier for the current Indian Air Force8217;s Su-30MKI.

The PAK-FA project envisages the production of a such a fighter aircraft with next-generation features and missiles, with the craft rolling out in 2009. The Sukhoi8217;s project is already two years into the design stage. And with the MiG Corporation8217;s offering being just that8212;an offering without even a craft on the design board8212;the first dogfight may have ended in a kill for Sukhoi. The fight for Indian participation, with India also injecting a lot of crucial funding, in the development of a ultra modern fighter will, therefore, be without MiG for all practical purposes. For the fifth-gen project Sukhoi has proposed a craft that has advanced avionics, higher thrust vector from the 12 degrees in the current Su-30MKI to at least 15 degrees in the new fighter, low radar signature and, of course, stealth technology.

By choosing the Sukhoi PAK-FA fighter for the fifth-generation project, India has showed its inclination to go in for a heavier fighter that has the financial backing of Russia. MiG8217;s own fifth generation project is an 8220;unofficial8221; one with no funding from the Russian government. The PAK-FA is a stealth fighter with an unusual swept forward wing design to give it super manoeuvrability and greater stability at low speeds. The fighter, in the 20-tonne class, will have the ability to use beyond visual range weapons and will carry all weapons inside it to give it the ability to supercruise fly at supersonic speeds without using afterburners.

While the PAK FA will be the most manoeuvrable fifth generation aircraft, it remains to be seen how it will compete with its competitors8212;the F 22 and JSF 358212;in the avionics field.

Having missed the bus with its not-even-on the-drawing-board fifth-generation craft, its prospects of garnering the IAF order for the combat planes too is not very bright. MiG, almost desperate to ensure that it remains the active player in the Indian Air Force that it has been for decades, is now hoping that the multi billion-dollar search of the IAF for MRCAs will end with its brand new MiG 35 that it plans to present at the air show in Bangalore this month.

First, the product that MiG is offering: the MiG 35. The fighter uses the RD-33Mk engine and it has an enhanced fuel capacity that allows its use for longer-range sorties. Its prototype has flown in Europe, and if Indian officials are to be believed, they are not very impressed with it. MiG straightaway starts with a negative point.

The MiG35 is basically old wine in new bottle, that is to say it is the MiG29 in a new avatar. It is, after all, not planned to be built on an entirely new platform. Indeed, when it entered the fray for the IAF8217;s order, it was designated as the MiG29M2. It was only later that it got its more enticing next-gen nomenclature. Essentially, therefore, the MiG35 remains, in most Indian eyes, a revamped MiG29. Its engine continues to be the RD-33, now redesignated the RD-33MK. Defence experts say that this engine is nearing the period of obsolescence, and to have as its main combat machine a flier with engine technology that belongs to an earlier generation clearly does not enthuse the IAF.

MiG8217;s eagerness for the IAF contract can be seen in the promptness with which it has gone about integrating an AESA radar on the aircraft. Considered as essential by experts, the 8220;radar of the future8221; will have increased range and tracking capabilities and a lower failure rate besides applications in electronic warfare. The radar will have capabilities to simultaneously track and engage multiple ground and air targets. 8220;We will have a full scale presentation at the Bangalore air show and will also show it for the Russian Air Force shortly.,8221; says Vladimir Barkovskiy, director of MiG8217;s Mikoyan Design Bureau.

MiG is also harping on its proven track record of technology transfer to push its highly manoeuvrable thrust-vectoring fighter aircraft. 8220;The MiG35 has many features of a fifth generation aircraft and we will give India freedom to learn and produce the systems down to all required levels. This may not be the case of the other companies in the race,8221; Barkovskiy says.

MiG8217;s Russian competition is the Su-30. The Indian Air Force already has 140 Su-30s. Air experts say the Sukhois score over the other Russian offer on four points. The Su-30s have longer endurance, forcing MiG to try emulate this by enhancing the fuel capacity of the MiG35. While the MiG35 has a range of about 4,000 km, the Su-30MKI, with its refuelling capacity, can fly up to 10 hours with a range of 8,000 km. The Su-30s are also almost three times heavier than their rival. Besides they have the capability for air-to-air refuelling, a compelling reason why it is better than the MiG fighter. The MiG35 is basically seen as a light combat aircraft that could prove useful for ground attacks, air and area defence and point defence, while the Sukhois are multi-role fighters. Without these features, official rudely say 8220;not interested8221; in the MiG35.

The contract for the MRCA in all probability will bypass both the Russian products. While the MiG35 has not interested Indians, the IAF already has a good number of Su-30s. Given that China8217;s air force has the Su-30MKK variant, India would probably opt for a fighter other than a Sukhoi but with better or equivalent features. It is, therefore, quite likely that the American F16 and F18 will be favoured.

Beyond all this, the Indian government is also very interested in the after-sale scenario. India has always had problems with Russian defence companies where spares are concerned. The ready availability of spares and their cost will be a major factor. The Mirage, in this regard, could be a better option than even the Sukhoi.

However, MiG is pitching the MiG35 as the best option for India8217;s MRCA deal due to its similarity to the in-service MiG 29s of the IAF and the MiG 29K being inducted by the Indian Navy. Compatibility with infrastructure already installed in the country is also a plus point, it says. The corporation plans to hard-sell its upgrade by saying that Indian firms will manufacture a major part of the new components. This is an important factor. The Indian government would want the deal not for itself but also to boost the Indian aviation industry. While the deal may sound sweet a Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier is also being offered to tempt the Indian8212;but does India need it?, the government is worried about the years ahead. The option of manufacturing spares or upgrades in India will definitely be welcome.

8220;The Indian industry will be an important participant in the upgrade as a lot of systems will be developed in India,8221; promises Kavinsky Vladimir Valentinovich, Chief Designer, Ramenskoye Design Bureau, the main avionics design centre of Russia that would bear the major part of upgradation. He adds that costs can be kept down by in-house development of components. IN the ultimate analysis, in the two dogfights, MiG clearly is the loser in the fifth-generation contest, while both the Russian companies are likely losers in the MRCA stakes.

8212;Manu Pubby in Moscow with bureau reports

Growth engine? No
S. Krishnaswamy

The Indian Express wrote with enthusiasm about the first Indian Navy MiG-29K taking off in Russia on a cold winter morning, the 8220;tell-tale8221; black smoke trailing. While this sounded romantic, it got me thinking. Combat pilots often said you didn8217;t need the radar to pick a MiG-29 in air8212;just look for that black smoke! We heard of the Series-III and even later variants of the RD-33 engine that would end the smoke and improve time-between-overhauls and reliability. Possibly, we are in for disappointment. And now we hear the news about producing the engine under licence.

Museum technology

The Air Force and the Ministry of Defence would have done cost-benefit analysis in arriving at the decision to produce these engines but it8217;s so late in the life of the MiG-29s that need the engines. Possibly, the Indian naval MiG-29K could use the same engines but they are too few to impact on the decision. How does it happen that India ends up producing engines that are on their last lap of history? We are the last to produce and use Viper, Orpheus, R-11, R-25, R-19, Adour and now, the RD-33. Most of these are museum pieces. We could argue that since the aircraft on which these engines are fitted still fly in India. But still, it is not practical to produce 100 per cent in India. Certain vital components are imported from the Original Equipment Manufacturer OEM. Thus the OEM has to continually support our production lines. They are kept open at considerable cost to India since no one else in the world operates there.

The Russia experience

HAL Koraput produced a large number of R-11 and R-25 for the MiG-21 variants. Later came the licence to produce R-29 engines for MiG-23/27 variants. These lines have now practically closed. The next new venture is the licensed production of engines for the Su-30MKI. This would still leave a serious slack for work at Koraput. Obviously, licensed production of RD-33 would be good business for Koraput but not necessarily at the national level. Our experience with R-29 does bring out valuable lessons. Well after setting up the production facility in India, we continued to buy the engines from Russia since HAL could not meet the demands. Similarly, we sent engines to Russia for overhaul when facilities were available in India.

We have had massive time and cost overruns in establishing facilities for Russian overhaul and production projects. Majority of production facilities in Russia have been short on orders and in poor financial state. A large number had closed down. On occasion, the factories were not keen to sell components, only the whole engine. OEMs could offer better terms to overhaul engines as compared to HAL.

Business sense

A most important underlying issue is the business model. Russia never procured anything significantly from the production lines in India. Also, HAL could not undertake orders for customers abroad. This is not a model for success. In the 60s, licensed production was seen as ways to learn and gain hands-on experience. But this is not a good business model. The sensible way is that the OEM should include the licensed manufacturer in their supply-chain of their total business. The profits and benefits must be shared. Since India is among the last operators of these engines, there is very little incentive for the OEM to improve performance, reliability, supply-chain etc.

Air Chief Marshal Krishnaswamy is former chief of the IA