Doctrine and deterrence

The announcement of a nuclear doctrine is an essential step that was long overdue, but it is far too tentative. Besides, its timing is extremely suspect. The fact that we have gone through fourteen months since Pokharan without any guidelines is sobering enough. But having waited this long, why did they have to be announced under a caretaker government on the eve of the elections? To question its motives is only natural. The document does direct policy in a specific direction, but nuclearisation is too important a step to proceed on general guidelines. Every phase and component of the process needs to be explicitly spelled out. Some of this information will be in the public domain, given the fact that the government seems to be keen on developing a consensus. The government has spelled out its intentions on dumping waste and the people of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh will mull over the issue, like the Americans did at the time when the acronym NIMBY8217; was coined: Not in my backyard.8217; But there is noindication of the expense of nuclearisation, though the bill will be footed by the public and debate will be particularly intense on this issue.

Apart from the nuclear submarines and installations that the doctrine has spoken of, the process calls for the establishment of a vast and sophisticated chain of communications and decision-making leading from intelligence sources to the little red button. The total cost is likely to force a fresh tax on a public that has just reconciled itself to the possibility of a Kargil tax. Besides, in the absence of further information, the document seems to indicate that civilians are to be treated as expendable targets. The original nuclear powers invested heavily in civilian survival infrastructure 8212; in shelters, warning systems, safe water supply and medical aid, for instance. If we are to repeat their mistakes, should we not also emulate their concern for civilians?

The decision to give control of the nuclear button to the Prime Minister also comes as a surprise.Unlike the US and the USSR, we do not have a system where both civilian and military authority vests with the chief executive. In India, there is a very wise division of powers and the President is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Logically, it is he who should launch a nuclear initiative, on the advice of the Prime Minister. It would be ridiculous to argue that a nuclear conflict will happen so fast that joint decision-making would be impossible. We have renounced the right to make a first strike and only retained that of retaliation. Since our arsenal is expected to be widely dispersed and difficult to neutralise completely, the timeframe for response is fairly large. Also, the Soviets divided responsibility between political and military officials while actually launching missiles to prevent accidental or criminal launches. There is no reason why India should not replicate this tried and tested model at the highest level. The system of checks and balances has worked very well in our polity. Itwould not hurt to use it in the nuclear establishment. All things considered, this doctrine seems to have been hastily drafted, and announced for interests other than security.