Do Naxals have a new gambit?

Naxal groups in future could target public property and officials, and spare ordinary people

Naxalism in India has become synonymous with terror, rather than revolution. However, in certain parts of Bharat, their ideology and tactics continue to be revolutionary, although the common man has become a victim of their revolutionary violence. This perhaps explains the expansion of the Naxal base in 13 states, although the various Maoist groups are far from united even in one state.

What is interesting, however, is a recent shift in Naxal strategy. They had virtually declared a war against the Salwa Judum peace organisation, a volunteer-based action by Adivasis sponsored by the Chhattisgarh government, and blew up a vehicle carrying its activists. More recently, they abducted six policemen in Chhattisgarh, but released them two days later with the reassurance that they had nothing personal against them. Coming soon after the brutal attack on the 8216;salwa judum8217; activists, the release of the abducted policemen was confusing. Then, on March 14 in Jharkhand, there was the release of a hijacked train, with its passengers unharmed.

Are Naxalites, then, making a distinction between the Indian state and ordinary people, including security personnel who fight them on behalf of the state? Difficult to say at this early stage. An analysis of their strategy over the past few years, however, does not indicate any such discernment. Lately, Naxal groups have been asserting their combative might and finesse, vis-a-vis security forces. Not surprisingly, their arms budget in Bihar alone is reported to be Rs 3 crore. Remember the precision with which attack was conducted on Chandrababu Naidu when he was Andhra CM in 2003? The military precision with which they attacked the Jehanabad prison in Bihar in December 2005, to free their jailed colleagues and abduct Ranvir Sena men, is another case in point. It showed that police establishments across India need to be much better equipped to take the Naxals. In order to instil fear Naxal groups without exception have also relied on the brutal execution of those who defy them. In Chhattisgarh, they identified the activists of Salwa Judum as enemies and have attacked them individually as well as in groups.

From their perspective, attacks on public property is the safest strategy to adopt. Despite a visible and symbolic security cover, most public buildings, including police stations in towns and villages across India, are not well-guarded. A spectacular attack on them throws the security apparatus into confusion for months to come. For the past few years, Naxalites have resorted to such attacks whenever security forces have mounted a concerted campaign against them. There was, for example, such an offensive launched by the Naxals in AP, MP and Bihar, when the AP police in 1999 began a campaign in which some very prominent Maoist leaders were killed in encounters under suspicious circumstances. Railway property has also been under attack since late 2005 in Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa. Since this dislocates rail traffic, such attacks have the additional impact of being disruptive.

Indeed, in India8217;s federal set-up, it is not easy to combat the Naxals. Apart from equipment and training Andhra Pradesh8217;s 8216;Girijan Greyhound8217; notwithstanding, the state security set-up has been facing two kinds of problems. First, that of coordination, because despite official pronouncements, neither the affected states nor the Centre have been able to set up a unified command to take them on. Second, the security establishment has also not been able to come up with a sound strategy of minimising human rights violations. In fact, even during routine policing, the police is completely oblivious of human rights while combating Naxalism. Any poor person suspected of being a Naxal sympathiser is brutally set upon. Such action only alienates the people from the police.

The moderate success of Salwa Judum, Orissa government8217;s plan to raise a tribal force, and and AP8217;s Girijan Greyhound, are a clear indication that Naxal ideologues too have begun thinking about a social audit of their movement8217;s human rights record. Is the recent 8220;soft attitude8221; towards the captured police personnel and the release of the hijacked train, an indication of such a shift? Certainly these developments are unusual. Should such discerning acts emerge as a trend, we could be seeing a distinct change of Naxal strategy. It could also mean that, in the future, Naxal groups will target public property and officials in greater number, while sparing common people. They might, also, as they have done in Chhattisgarh, differentiate between security personnel as individuals, and as part of the security set up. Certainly, it will take a while before we begin to decipher fully the significance of such a shift in strategy.

The writer is director, Centre for Public Affairs, Noida