Dealing with the two-front8217; nightmare

For years, we have been catering to a balanced military posture on both Northern and Western borders with China and Pakistan in mind. Given the size of the border and the allocation of men and material for the two theatres, the task of winning a full-scale war on both fronts has been an impossible proposition. The course of events since the 1962 debacle has proved the futility of such a posture, which resulted in committing troops on both frontiers over the years.

This military mode was debatable beyond a point. Whether it was due to its own border problems with neighbours or other reasons, most of the Chinese actions towards India since 1962 have been marginal, localised and reactionary. Be itthe 1965 or the 1971 conflicts with Pakistan, Nathu La incident 1967 or the Sumdorang incident later, Chinese reaction cannot be termed as militarily offensive. Even the minor intrusions in certain areas since then have been easily resolved.

Similarly, though China did not accept Sikkim8217;s integration with India in 1975, it made no overt military move to forestall the move. Nor did it actively gang up against India while being critical of India8217;s atomic explosion in May, 1974 and later.

Despite this background and the main thrust of our defence strategy being on Pakistan, the China fixation8217; has been the underlying factor in our military strategy. There was a thaw of sorts when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988 but unfortunately it was not followed up in ample measure due to persisting suspicion.

China has been viewed since 1962 in most military studies as a long-term threat8217;, major adversary8217; and a threat in being to India8217;. This was basically due to China having occupied hugechunks of Indian territory.

Since then the military build-up with China has been as if another attack similar to the one in 1962 was imminent. At the same time, no long-term strategy to deal with the Chinese conundrum has been forthcoming.

Unfortunately, efforts to shed the historical biases and to forge a fresh and realistic military policy on China have been invariably pulled back by distress signals from time to time.

Even after 1980 when there was a softening of foreign relations, India was actively pursuing a forward8217; defence posture. This despite the fact that the bulk of troops China has had in Tibet during the last two decades were reportedly deployed or committed to ground defences and were located in garrisons in various towns of Tibet. Even the troops deployed near the border were in a posture ad-opted for peacetime border control.

Interestingly, way back in 1991, when the military strategy and troop deployment on the borders were being reviewed, there was considerable opposition tothinning out of troops from the Northern Theatre. The protagonists of this policy argued that the so-called thaw in relations was misplaced and the soft-posturing by China could be due to its criticism of the Tiananmen episode in June, 1989. It was pointed out that thinning of troops in east Sikkim was unwise, since the area provides a platform for a successful limited counter-offensive. Thinning out would heighten the vulnerability of Siliguri corridor in the light of Chinese claims of the territory in Western Bhutan, it was stated. It was further asserted that Chinese border settlement with India should not be taken in isolation from the settlement of its border dispute with Bhutan.

But the events in the past few years indicate that these fears may have been unfounded. This is not to suggest that there is no disagreement with China. Besides China being in occupation of Indian territory and a continuing border dispute, there is a serious difference in perception over Tibet.

Yet, the fact remains thatthere is no immediate threat from China, which should necessitate continuation of a build-up. A stand-off posture with China would allow concentration of troops in the Western Theatre. Of course during this time, there may be low level threats from China and minor intrusions, for which we should be adequately prepared. Moreover, in the light of the recently acquired nuclear umbrella, India should try and settle its disputes with Pakistan. The low intensity war with Pakistan is taking a heavy toll of the defence services.

Certain recent statements on China being India8217;s enemy number one8217; are unfortunate and preemptive in nature. For the coming decades, there is need for a two-pronged strategy, spread out over the next two decades. While preparing for the long haul with China, we need to befriend small neighbours and enhance our strength vis-a-vis the island territories. Meanwhile, there should be total concentration 8212; diplomatic and military 8212; in resolving the disputes with Pakistan. A two-front war witha Sino-Pakistan combination is a nightmare India cannot afford to live with anymore.