Court holds no magic wand

Two genuine and unexceptionable concerns are visible in the instructions issued by the SC for police reforms 8212; one, political interference in and politicisation of the police should be prevented; two, accountability structures within the police organisation need to be created and strengthened forthwith. Some introspection on the apex court8217;s role on governance issues, and on a technical subject like police reforms in particular, should precede a review of its substantive 8216;directives8217; for police reform. Often, this has led to confusion rather than a solution.

A prescription for police reform which touches just the surface of the police8217;s institutional anatomy is unlikely to cure the deep-rooted organisational ailments accumulated over the past two centuries if we take into consideration the reorganisation and restructuring of the police undertaken from the time of Lord Cornwallis. A non-pragmatic deadline for the implementation of directives that have not been discussed by experts and debated in public, has the potential of causing more problems than it can solve. Coming at a time when a distinguished panel is already on the job, the directive of the honourable court appears mistimed.

Further, in holding the Union government to be the sole authority responsible for police reforms, the judgment appears to ignore the federal principles that govern policing in India. Instead, it could have examined the Sorabjee panel proposal and directed the government to take action on it at the earliest.

In thinking of police reforms in India, categories like depoliticisation, accountability and autonomy need to be disaggregated further. Where does the faultline for politicisation lie? Are politicians alone responsible or has the police leadership faltered too? Having changed ten schools in eleven years of schooling as an SHO8217;s son in Bihar, this writer can vouch for the political games played by the police leadership that have encouraged politicians to cross institutional limits. The political nexus of the district officers with urbane politicians has created conditions which have in many cases pushed the lower rungs to seek political solutions to organisational anomalies. As the baton by the mid-8217;60s passed on to the rural leadership and its stakes in political power increased, the thana was the appropriate unit and the SHO was the appropriate person to patronise. No wonder by the late 8216;70s SHOs could have police chiefs removed.

Similarly, accountability and autonomy will be reduced to hollow words and institutional mechanisms rendered dysfunctional unless these questions are examined at each appropriate level. For example, while transfer of thana-level officers has been grossly misused by many superintendents of police across the country, giving a fixed term to them would take away departmental disciplinary mechanisms and make them more autonomous than several of them are with political patronage. Complicated multi-layered accountability structures with superannuated civilians, police persons and so-called eminent persons, many of whom are 8216;dominant8217; personalities in their areas, who would in turn be selected by another set of structures, are likely to create a fresh set of vested interests.

Finally, the local is emerging as the prominent site of politics and governance ever since the passage of the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments. Where does this reality figure in the apex court8217;s verdict and in the larger design recommended by the Sorabjee panel?

Police reform, howsoever urgent as it may be, cannot be effected in a jiffy on any directive. It requires a persistent and patient response.

The writer is director Centre for Public Affairs, Noida