Confronting contradictions

For a Congress revival, howsoever minimal, will not be only at the cost of the regional parties which currently form the core of the Third Force. It may also cause a dent in the BJP8217;s support base. It was the continued decline of the Congress, coupled with the fragmentation of the social justice parties the JD-Samata Party and SP-BSP break-ups in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh respectively 8212; that gave the BJP its new-found strength in the 11th Lok Sabha even though its national vote share of 21.34 per cent did not show any dramatic upward swing from 20 per cent in the 1991 elections.

And its gains were mostly from the northern 86 out of 145 seats and western 76 out of 118 states of UP, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. It could bag only six out of 130 seats in the south and 26 out of 141 in the east see chart.

In fact, in its strongholds in the north and the west, the BJP8217;s increased seat share is directly related to the decline of the Congress vote share and the inability of the Third Front outfits to offer a cohesive challenge to it. In its areas of expansion like Karnataka, Orissa and Assam, which are traditionally characterised by bi-party politics, the BJP itself is trying to emerge as a third forceand may take sometime to translate its increasing public support into tangible electoral gains.

In Karnataka, the only state in the south where the BJP did increase its seat tally from four in 1991 to six in 1996, its vote share actually went down from 28.8 per cent in 1991 to 24.8 per cent in 1996. It could win more seats in the State only because the anti-incumbency factor led to a massive swing away from the Congress to the JD. It remains to be seen whether the truncation of the ruling JD in the State will now favour the Congress or the BJP-Lok Shakti combine.

Orissa presents another side of the same coin to an ascendant BJP. Though it increased its vote share from 9.5 per cent to 16 per cent between 1991-1996, it failed to bag a single seat. There is evidence that though the BJP gained some ground in the State at the cost of Biju Patnaik8217;s JD, its accedence worked to the advantage of the Congress here which increased its seat tally in the State from 12 in 1991 to 16 in 1996 while maintaining its vote share of around 44 per cent.

There are other areas where the BJP has expanded its support. In Arunachal Pradesh, it polled 17 per cent votes last time, an up-swing of seven per cent. In Assam, it8217;s vote share went up from 6.1 per cent to 17.4 per cent, even though it could bag only one seat. Its presence in smaller northern States like Haryana and Punjab also become tangible primarily due to its ability to forge with influential local outfits like Bansi Lal8217;s Haryana Vikas Party and Parkash Singh Badal8217;s Shiromani Akali Dal before the 1996 elections.

In most of these States, however, the BJP does not claim to be the party of ruling establishment and its alliances were forged with the sole intention of keeping the Congress down. A minor reconfiguration of political forces there can upset the BJP8217;s applecart.

On the eve of the Lok Sabha elections, the BJP has tried to wriggle out of it8217;s self-imposed limitation of the absence of a pan-Indian support. It8217;s new alliances with Ramakrishna Hegde8217;s Lok ShaktiManch in Karnataka and Jayalalitha8217;s AIADMK in Tamil Nadu may create an illusion that it has shed off the stigma of untouchability.

However, its inability to cash in on the splits in the Congress in Bihar and West Bengal shows that its search for new and dependable allies is still fraught with difficulties. Part of the explanation for the BJP8217;s agony lies in what Bruce Graham describes as the 8220;limitations of its origin8221;. It has been identified with the issues and concerns of the Hindi belt for too long and its support for an activist role of Hindu nationalism drawing on the values of Brahminical Hinduism inhibits the religious minorities and the lower castes from accepting it unequivocally.

That the caste factor, the most fundamental characteristic of the Hindu social organisation, remains its bane in its strongholds in the Hindi belt proves this. The unceremonious end of the two BJP-BSP alliances in UP and the increasingly shriller sounds made by its ally Samata Party in Bihar lately indicate that its efforts to overcome this caste barrier suffer from inherent contradictions.

Compared to 1996, however, the situation is somewhat more favourable for the BJP now. The United Front, formed to keep the BJP out of power with the outside support from the Congress, is in a shambles and most of its erstwhile constituents have not been able to reconcile themselves to sharing power with the Congress, which is still their main political opponent in their own regions of strength.

Then, there is a growing realisation among the electorate, including a section of minorities, that BJP8217;s portrayal is somewhat exaggerated. The alliances with a Dravidian outfit like the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and Lok Shakti in Karnataka will further help dispelling this impression.

However, there is a real possibility that its wish to grow wings and fly over new territories could affect its internal cohesion. Its phenomenal electoral success is largely due to the support it received from the RSS family organisations like the VHP.

And a strong lobby within the RSS family is not exactly enamoured by the BJP prime minister-designate Atal Behari Vajpayee8217;s mask of liberal Hinduism. A new-look BJP might bring it closer to electoral success and power. But such 8220;ideological philandering8221; could also alienate other votaries of Hindutva.

However, its inability to cash in on the splits in the Congress in Bihar and West Bengal shows that its search for new and dependable allies is still fraught with difficulties. Part of the explanation for the BJP8217;s agony lies in what Bruce Graham describes as the 8220;limitations of its origin8221;. It has been identified with the issues and concerns of the Hindi belt for too long and its support for an activist role of Hindu nationalism drawing on the values of Brahminical Hinduism inhibits the religious minorities and the lower castes from accepting it unequivocally.

That the caste factor, the most fundamental characteristic of the Hindu social organisation, remains its bane in its strongholds in the Hindi belt proves this. The unceremonious end of the two BJP-BSP alliances in UP and the increasingly shriller sounds made by its ally Samata Party in Bihar lately indicate that its efforts to overcome this caste barrier suffer from inherent contradictions.

Compared to 1996, however, the situation is somewhat more favourable for the BJP now. The United Front, formed to keep the BJP out of power with the outside support from the Congress, is in a shambles and most of its erstwhile constituents have not been able to reconcile themselves to sharing power with the Congress, which is still their main political opponent in their own regions of strength. Then, there is a growing realisation among the electorate, including a section of minorities, that BJP8217;s portrayal is somewhat exaggerated. The alliances with a Dravidian outfit like the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and Lok Shakti in Karnataka will further help dispelling this impression.

However, there is a real possibility that its wish to grow wings and fly over new territoriescould affect its internal cohesion. Its phenomenal electoral success is largely due to the support it received from the RSS family organisations like the VHP. And a strong lobby within the RSS family is not exactly enamoured by the BJP prime minister-designate Atal Behari Vajpayee8217;s mask of liberal Hinduism. A new-look BJP might bring it closer to electoral success and power. But such 8220;ideological philandering8221; could also alienate other votaries of Hindutva.