Concessions and gains

One does not have to be conversant every element in the nuclear alphabet soup 8212; PHWR, LWR, PFBR, FBTR 8212; to figure out that both Talbott and Mishra cannot be right. Talbott and Mishra, who oversaw the nuclear talks in the years after the Pokharan tests of 1998, are bound to have their own judgments on how their successors have handled the nuclear negotiations between the two nations. But they need not necessarily be right.

Then there are the experts. Expertise, which by definition is about knowing a lot about very little, is not the same as strategic judgment, that statesmen are often called to make. Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush have arrived at a political decision that the two countries as well as the non-proliferation regime could benefit from.

That there are scientists, lawyers, liberals and literalists on both sides quibbling with every minor detail in the separation plan might in fact suggest that Manmohan Singh and Bush have come to a reasonable understanding on the question of implementing the July nuclear pact.

No negotiations, except surrender pacts from defeated nations, are without give and take. There is no question that both sides have made important concessions and gains. These must be evaluated against the larger political objectives India and the US set for themselves on July 18, 2005.

India wanted to end its nuclear isolation and regain access to the global nuclear energy market. In return, India was prepared to separate its civilian and military programmes and place the former under international safeguards. The US, which was willing to live the reality of India8217;s nuclear weapons programme, recognised that bringing India into the nuclear mainstream would strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

Washington8217;s conditions for letting New Delhi into the nuclear club were a credible separation plan and permanent safeguards on India8217;s civilian reactors. The discussion since July 2005 has been on the terms of implementing these political objectives.

On the separation plan the challenge was to bridge the distance between what the two sides considered reasonable. In the end putting 14 out of the 22 power reactors in operation and under construction was the sensible middle path the two sides settled on. This would amount to expanding the safeguarded nuclear power programme from the present 19 per cent to 65 per cent. This would take place in a phased manner in an eight-year period starting this year.

From the beginning the charge from Mishra and the BJP that India has agreed to 8220;cap8221; the nuclear programme was a red-herring. Unless the BJP has invented a new meaning for the word 8220;cap8221;, leaving 35 per cent of the nuclear capacity for military purposes would leave India enough and more options to sustain a credible, minimum deterrent for many decades to come and deal with even the worst possible security developments in our neighbourhood.

India has also done the right thing in deciding to shut down the Cirus reactor and shift the Apsara reactor out of the sensitive Bhabha Atomic Research Centre campus and place it under safeguards by 2010.

Nehru gave assurances on the peaceful use of Cirus in 1960 to Canada amidst India8217;s search for international nuclear cooperation. Critics in the US and Canada have argued that India has violated this commitment. India in turn said the reactor has been completely refurbished and is no longer the same. Under the eventual compromise, India would shut down Cirus and the international community would ask no questions on the past material flows from the reactor.

On the much talked about breeder reactors, the US has agreed that India could keep its fast breeder test reactor and the prototype fast breeder reactors outside the civilian list. India has in turn offered to keep all 8220;future civilian breeder reactors8221; under international safeguards.

With this flexibility, India gives itself the option of future cooperation with the international community on a new generation of plutonium technologies.

A major issue that stalled the negotiations in recent weeks was the American formulation on keeping 8220;all future reactors8221; under safeguards. India had insisted that it had the right to choose to construct some future military reactors outside safeguards.

They settled on a sensible compromise. In the PM8217;s words, 8220;India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian. This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements.8221;

Another sticking point was the question of safeguards 8220;in perpetuity8221; on the civilian reactors. Even as prime minister was receiving Bush on the Palam tarmac, he was told by Condoleezza Rice there could be no deal without safeguards 8220;in perpetuity8221;.

India said it was prepared to put reactors under permanent safeguards only if there were credible guarantees on fuel supply for these reactors. India bargained hard and got an unprecedented set of supply guarantees which would be incorporated into bilateral and multilateral agreements that India and the US would sign in the near future.

Literalists in India would object that permanent safeguards would deny India the flexibility which the five nuclear weapon states enjoy today on switching nuclear facilities between civilian and military categories under a national security clause.

For India, the purpose of these negotiations has never been gaining international legal certification of its nuclear weapon status or parity with nuclear weapon states on all issues. New Delhi8217;s emphasis since May 1998 was to get the international legal restrictions on civil nuclear energy cooperation with India lifted. Under the agreement, India fully achieves that important political objective. The iron clad fuel supply guarantees are a bonus.

If the agreement goes through the US Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, India would finally be out of the nuclear no-man8217;s land that it has been trapped in for three decades and more.

While experts will probably never stop quibbling on detail, the separation plan is a credible framework to realise the long-awaited and mutually beneficial nuclear reconciliation between India and the international community. Making that case in Washington and other capitals is now the immediate task before New Delhi.