
There is, tragically, no such thing as free trade. Governments that have a declared policy of favouring freer trade sometimes cut tariffs, but bolster domestic subsidies that will have identical effects; prices in many essential commodities are set by international cartels of governments or by political bargaining. The WTO exists supposedly for a single reason: to streamline this procedure, to reduce coordination problems, so that all countries gain advantages from the unquestionable benefits of freer trade. Endless delays and refusals to negotiate in good faith do not only delay the flow of these benefits to those who desperately need them, but undercut the WTO8217;s very rationale as well.
The news that pressure is being applied to the Brazilian government to abandon multilateral negotiations in favour of bilateral agreements with major agricultural producers is both a symptom of the problem and part of what is causing it. A symptom, because this would not have been a problem but for deadlocked talks; a cause, because it is emblematic of the sort of short-sighted domestic political manoeuvring that deadlocks those talks. Brazil and India are crucial parts of the G20 group of developing countries, and a unity of purpose is essential if the global north is to be forced to address ballooning subsidies, and if the Doha round is to come to a satisfactory conclusion.
Brazil8217;s domestic agribusinesses are doing extremely well, with exports surging; they want permanent agreements and market access quickly. But breaking the G20 on the basis of an ephemeral boom in bio-fuels would be vastly myopic. To its credit, the Brazilian government of Luiz Inaacute;cio Lula da Silva seems to have shown increased and not decreased interest in ensuring the success of multilateral talks. This contrasts positively with supposedly more enlightened regimes that continue to let pressure groups dictate terms: Peter Mandelson of the EU was attacked again by the Irish this week for not 8220;defending Europe8217;s farms8221;. All sides need negotiators who can insulate themselves from domestic pressure and political will to agree on a settlement that is overdue by four years and the final outlines of which are already known.