Bioterror Fears

Wimmer intended to sound a warning, to show that science had crossed a threshold into an era in which genetically altered and made-from-scratch germ weapons were feasible. But in the four years since, other scientists have made advances faster than Wimmer imagined possible. Government officials, and scientists such as Wimmer, are only beginning to grasp the implications. 8216;8216;The future,8217;8217; he said, 8216;8216;has already come.8217;8217;

New technology opens the door to new tools for defeating disease and saving lives. But today, in hundreds of labs worldwide, it is also possible to transform common intestinal microbes into killers. Or to make deadly strains even more lethal. Or to resurrect bygone killers, such the 1918 influenza. Or to manipulate a person8217;s hormones by switching genes on or off. Or to craft cheap, efficient delivery systems that can infect large numbers of people. 8216;8216;The biological weapons threat is multiplying and will do so regardless of the countermeasures we try to take,8217;8217; said Steven M. Block, a Stanford University biophysicist and former president of the Biophysical Society.

Bioterrorism experts say traditional biodefense approaches, such as stockpiling antibiotics or locking up well-known strains such as the smallpox virus, remain important. But they are not enough. 8216;8216;There8217;s a name for fixed defences that can easily be outflanked: They are called Maginot lines,8217;8217; said Roger Brent, a California molecular biologist and former biodefense adviser to the Defense Department, referring to the elaborate but short-sighted network of border fortifications built by France after World War I to prevent future invasions by Germany.

Wimmer8217;s artificial virus looks and behaves like its natural cousin8212;but with a far reduced ability to maim or kill8212;and could be used to make a safer polio vaccine. But it was Wimmer8217;s techniques, not his aims, that sparked controversy when news of his achievement hit the scientific journals. As the creator of the world8217;s first 8216;8216;de novo8217;8217; virus8212;a human virus, at that8212;Wimmer came under attack from other scientists who said his experiment was a dangerous stunt. He was accused of giving ideas to terrorists, or, even worse, of inviting a backlash that could result in new laws restricting scientific freedom.

Wimmer says he didn8217;t invent the technology that made his experiment possible, only drew attention to it. 8216;8216;To most scientists and lay people, the reality that viruses could be synthesised was surprising, if not shocking,8217;8217; he said. 8216;8216;We consider it imperative to inform society of this new reality, which bears far-reaching consequences.8217;8217;

New techniques developed by other scientists allow the creation of synthetic viruses in mere days. Hardware unveiled last year by a Harvard genetics professor can churn out synthetic genes by the thousands, for a few pennies each. But Wimmer continues to use methods available to any modestly funded university biology lab.

There are additional steps to making effective bioweapons besides acquiring microbes. Like many scientists and a sizable number of biodefense experts, Wimmer believes traditional terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda will stick with easier methods. Yet al-Qaeda is known to have sought bioweapons and has recruited experts, including microbiologists. And for any skilled microbiologist trained in modern techniques, Wimmer acknowledged, synthetic viruses are well within reach and getting easier. 8216;8216;This,8217;8217; he said, 8216;8216;is a wake-up call.8217;8217;

Joby Warrick