
With the American legislation enabling global nuclear cooperation with India in place and a divisive Parliamentary debate on it behind us, the Department of Atomic Energy DAE must now dare to imagine a forward-leaning agenda for itself. The DAE leadership has rightly brought to the attention of the public and the government many questions relating to the US legislation called the Hyde Act. George Bush has made it clear that many of the offensive provisions of the bill will not be operative. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has reassured the nation that the remaining difficulties will be ironed out in the negotiation of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington. Leaving nuclear diplomacy to the foreign office, the DAE should focus on taking advantage of the impending end to its long international isolation.
Homi Bhabha founded India8217;s nuclear programme with a clear-cut strategy of using international cooperation to enhance India8217;s capabilities and options. His successors have responded well when international cooperation began to dry up amidst expanding nuclear sanctions against the nation since 1974. As the Indo-US nuclear deal restores the option of external cooperation, the DAE need no longer feel besieged. If our scientists could do reasonably well under international pressure, think of the new possibilities when India returns to the global nuclear mainstream.
As it separates its military and civilian nuclear programmes, the DAE8217;s primary responsibility must be the former 8212; the building of a credible nuclear deterrent. Questions have been raised in the past on the quality and quantity of India8217;s nuclear arsenal. Some retired DAE scientists had challenged the Department8217;s claim that the Hydrogen bomb test in 1998 May was a success. Having got assurances from the government on its concerns, the DAE owes the nation credible promises to keep the nuclear arsenal in good trim. So it must shed responsibility for a lot of industrial activity, from uranium mining to power generation. The DAE had good reason to undertake these tasks decades ago. Private sector options will be available now. It must now focus on high-end science with national security implications. For far too long the DAE has focused on the non-scientific activities while treating nuclear weapons as a secondary business. Time to reverse the priorities.