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This is an archive article published on November 4, 1998

As good as it gets

We don't have to go too far to learn the fundamental principle of all diplomacy. It lies in one of our own classics, Kautalya's Arthashastra...

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We don8217;t have to go too far to learn the fundamental principle of all diplomacy. It lies in one of our own classics, Kautalya8217;s Arthashastra. Nor do you have to wait for Murli Manohar Joshi8217;s new Sanskritised generation to translate it for you.

You can find it in an old Penguin publication in black and white, and in English: only he who controls the assumptions can hope to determine the conclusions. What it means, quite simply, is that all diplomacy, particularly when practised by a state, is by definition an activist pursuit. It follows that wait-and-watch diplomacy is an oxymoron. It is the hallmark of a leadership unsure of its mind and on its feet.

Post Durban, there are welcome signs that Vajpayee too seems to have realised that. The immediate result is some movement on the negotiations with Pakistan. But can he now build on this phase to evolve and unravel a Vajpayee doctrine?

There are several reasons why he is uniquely qualified 8212; and well placed 8212; to do so. Like Narasimha Rao and I.K.Gujral, he brings to the Prime Minister8217;s office not only old expertise, but also interest in foreign affairs. But he has many other advantages. First of all, he doesn8217;t have to look over his shoulder to see what a BJP in the Opposition would make of any tactical concessions he seems to be making in negotiating with the rest of the world, particularly Pakistan and the US. Certainly, the Congress will criticise everything he does, but the charge of bartering away national interest is unlikely to stick on a BJP government. Besides, Vajpayee has personal credibility and respect unmatched in our political system.

That isn8217;t his only advantage over Gujral and Rao, the two leaders who made activist shifts from our old foreign policy positions. Rao was a scholar, intellectual and visionary but had no mass appeal and, as time passed, less credibility. He was seen as a cynical political manipulator and no leader of men or nations. His politics, or to be fair to him the politics of his era, belittled his intellect.Besides, even his own party, still servile to the Gandhi legacy, was loathe to confer the mantle of statesmanship on a lightweight quot;pretenderquot; like him. This was Rao8217;s tragedy. And the reason why we have been unwilling to judge him less kindly than the history of India ultimately would.

Gujral8217;s was a markedly different case. He was a statesman, intellectual, but totally devoid of mass appeal and politically rootless, a fact confirmed by his subsequent election with the help of the Akali Dal. He had strong belief in himself and his long-held views. Contrary to the image his detractors projected, his understanding of India8217;s neighbours and its interests in the region was quite sharp. It was his understanding of big-power politics that was woolly-headed. Re-member that most forgettable hug with Saddam Hussain, the continuing and abiding faith in NAM, Third Worldism and the nostalgic trip to quot;Gandhi8217;s South Africaquot;? Gujral, however, had the courage of his convictions on foreign policy and was better networkedinternationally than any other Indian leader. He employed all these strengths to create the doctrine named after him. You can love it or hate it. But this is his lasting legacy, despite his short innings and political rootlessness.

Look at Vajpayee8217;s advantages in comparison. He is personally respected and trusted in the entire region. His own party cannot hinder him beyond a point, particularly if he is determined to change things around. He did indicate at Durban, following the fiasco of name-calling at Colombo, that he wasn8217;t going to put up with the old South Block doctrine of diplomacy as trench warfare. That is why the mood was so different in New York and that is why the Delhi-Lahore bus service may be underway later this week. It is also reasonable to presume that if this conciliatory mood continues, defying the disturbing headlines on new clashes in Siachen, it must be because Vajpayee does not want to be deflected from the course he has set for his diplomacy.

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Some contours of a Vajpayee doctrineare, therefore, emerging. He has to chisel these a bit and state his intent more clearly. Three clear elements of his doctrine are already visible. He has engaged the US in the longest and so far the most meaningful dialogue in our post-cold war history. He has stopped all jingoistic trumpeting over nuclear weapons. Ditto on China-bashing. Finally, there is a clear opening out to Pakistan along the same policy axis as Gujral had identified, but this time the movement seems more firm-footed for obvious reasons.

Reconciliation with Pakistan will be a long haul. But never have the elements combined so well to create a positive climate. The Rajiv-Benazir honeymoon of 1988 was marred by the fact that Benazir was then merely a bonsai prime minister. The ISI had even bugged the room where she talked to Rajiv and the tapes were later freely used to justify her dismissal. In the Gujral phase, the problem was that two well-meaning leaders were unsure of the political ground under their feet. All that has changednow. Contrary to the usual quot;Pakistan is going down the tube8230;the generals are comingquot; picture that South Block perennially loves to portray, that nation has shown surprising resilience. Further, using some of the tricks from Indira Gandhi8217;s Emergency phase, Nawaz Sharif has emerged as the strongest Pakistani leader since Zia. From all evidence, he too wants to bury the hatchet with India unlike Benazir in her second innings.

Since Vajpayee is so self-effacing as to be sometimes almost defeatist, he may be tempted to believe that his lack of a majority would make it an unequal equation with Nawaz. He must junk this entirely fallacious notion. His own credibility and moral standing make him the tallest individual on the subcontinent8217;s political scene. He is armed with a political consensus on de-escalating tensions in a nuclearised South Asia. Besides, given the size and resilience of its economy and the political system today, no one in the world equates India with Pakistan. It is for him now to seize theopportunity, to persist despite clashes in Siachen, the odd bus-bomb and massacre. He has to personally ensure that this is understood at all levels of his government. So nobody in the commerce ministry should be able to slow down movement on trade. The plans to purchase power from Pakistan, if they make so much financial sense for India, should not get caught up in bureaucratic wrangles. MEA should actually begin to issue more visas. And his partymen should help improve the climate for the dialogue and forget their rabble-rousing ways. In short, he should be setting the agenda. Vajpayee, it seems by now, has a pretty good understanding of the conclusion he wishes to achieve. So the time to get a hold of the assumptions is now.

 

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