
The capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the self-proclaimed head of the Al-Qaeda Military Committee, from a house in a posh Rawalpindi locality, by USA8217;s FBI with assistance from Pakistan8217;s law enforcement agencies, once again highlights the nature of terrorist networks deeply entrenched in Pakistan. It is important to remember that this is really only the second arrest of a top Al-Qaeda leader 8212; after Abu Zubaidah from Faisalabad last March 8212; since the US started its war against terrorism and General Pervez Musharraf promised co-operation with the US, asserting that no terrorists would be allowed to operate from Pakistani soil. At this rate, the US may take decades to neutralise the Al-Qaeda, leave alone capture its men. Yet it is clear that Khalid was recently planning major attacks on the US even as he moved around in Pakistan.
Khalid8217;s arrest throws up important questions regarding the linkages Al-Qaeda have with Islamist movements and militant/jihadi groups in Pakistan. Attempts to get him in Karachi last September failed in spite of a four-hour gunfight since his hosts facilitated his escape. He then found sanctuary in the house of a local woman leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, whose son has also been arrested now. She has asserted that her son is innocent and his arrest 8220;illogical8221;. What no one is asking, even in Pakistan, is why she hasn8217;t been questioned, leave alone arrested, since Khalid was captured from her home. The reason may well be that Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami and parliamentary leader of the Islamist party, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal MMA, was lecturing on invitation senior brass of the Pakistani foreign office that day. The foreign minister and foreign secretary were listening to him in rapt attention, while a 8220;million strong8221; march organised by the MMA had paralysed life in Karachi.
It should be clear to anyone who cares to see facts that Khalid8217;s arrest only underlines the deep linkages between jihadi terrorists, Islamic political movements, militant groups and the ISI, often called a state within the state. There is simply no way jihadi terrorism can be rolled back, leave alone stopped, without taking this fundamental reality into account. Given the rise of resistance in Pakistan to US policies of launching war against Iraq, the worse fall-out could well be on Pakistan. Rising anti-liberal sentiments could fuel further jihadi violence in the name of religion. Our own thinking on counter-terrorism has acknowledged that we would have to fight our terrorism by ourselves while pressing for international politico-diplomatic cooperation. But we need to factor in the challenges that are likely to emerge from the increasing radicalisation of Pakistan in the coming months and years.