
Maj. Gen. Hussein al-Awadi, a former official in Saddam Hussein8217;s Baath Party, became the commander of the Iraqi National Police despite a 2003 law barring the party from government. But now, under new legislation promoted as way to return former Baathists to public life, the 56-year-old and thousands like him could be forced out of jobs they have been allowed to hold, according to Iraqi lawmakers and the government agency that oversees ex-Baathists.
8220;This new law is very confusing,8221; al-Awadi said. 8220;I don8217;t really know what it means for me.8221;
He is not alone. More than a dozen Iraqi lawmakers, US sofsficials and former Baathists in Baghdad and in exile expressed concern that the law could set off a new purge of ex-Baathists, the opposite of US hopes for the legislation. Approved by parliament this month under pressure from US officials, the law was heralded by President George Bush and Iraqi leaders as a way to soothe the deep anger of many ex-Baathists 8212; primarily Sunnis but also many Shiites such as al-Awadi 8212; toward the Shiite-led government.
Yet US officials and even legislators who voted for the measure, which still requires approval by Iraq8217;s presidency council, acknowledge that its impact is hard to assess from its text and will depend on how it is implemented. Some say the law8217;s primary aim is not to return ex-Baathists to work, but to recognise and compensate those harmed by the party. Of the law8217;s eight stated justifications, none mentions reinstating ex-Baathists to their jobs.
8220;The law is about as clear as mud,8221; said one US senior diplomat. The confusion has been compounded because the information on former party members comes from the de-Baathification commission headed by Ahmed Chalabi, the former deputy prime minister who as an Iraqi exile sought to convince U.S. officials that Saddam8217;s government had weapons of mass destruction. In light of the absence of such weapons, many Iraqi and U.S. officials are suspicious of his commission8217;s statistics.
At his lavish home in the Mansour district, Chalabi said the new legislation would drive out some of the former Baathists his commission had allowed to return to government. The new measure, he said, is much harsher than the existing policy and a draft of the law that the United States had encouraged parliament to pass.
The new law was supposed to ease the homeward passage of former Baathists such as Muhammed Kareem. After 35 years as a civil servant, Kareem fled his home in Basra after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. Kareem, 53, and his family moved to Amman, Jordan. He has one abiding wish: to return to Iraq. But sitting at his kitchen table last week, flipping through a draft of the law, he was despondent.
8220;This is a bomb on the road of reconciliation,8221; said Kareem, a former director general in the oil ministry. 8220;This law does not bring anything new. This does not serve national reconciliation that all Iraqis are hoping for.8221;
The very first decree of the U.S.-led occupation government was to disband the Baath Party and purge its members from the government. Issued May 16, 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1 also banned the top four ranks of the Baath Party from public-sector jobs. US officials believed the order would remove about 20,000 Baathists, or 1 percent of the 2 million people in Iraq said to be party members, according to Paul Bremer, then the occupation administrator.
In an interview, Bremer said the decree was meant to retain the core of the bureaucracy and allow those who joined the party out of necessity during Saddam8217;s rule to keep their jobs. Because it was difficult for non-Iraqis to discern who was or was not a true believer, Bremer said, he turned the implementation over to the Iraqis on the appointed Governing Council. 8220;And there I made my mistake,8221; Bremer said.
He blamed the Iraqi politicians who oversaw the de-Baathification process in mid-2003 for going beyond the intention of the order and purging thousands of additional people, including about 11,000 teachers.
The Iraqis tell a different story. According to Ali Faisal al-Lami, executive director of the de-Baathification commission, Bremer8217;s order pushed 140,000 Iraqis out of their jobs. In addition to banning all members of the top four ranks of the party, it also forced out the senior government managers who belonged to the next two levels of the party.
When the de-Baathification commission started work in January 2004, it decided that Bremer8217;s original order had gone too far, al-Lami said. He said the commission immediately allowed all ex-Baathists from the two lower levels to return to government, a group that included 102,000 people. But many Sunnis and Western diplomats question those statistics and accuse Chalabi, a secular Shiite, of treating fellow Shiites more favourably than Sunnis.
US officials say they believe the law is likely to result in more ex-Baathists returning to government and hope none will be removed. But they recognise that the outcome depends on implementation, which will be overseen largely by a seven-member commission nominated by the Iraqi cabinet and confirmed by parliament.
8220;Will they name people who are liberal and nonpartisan, or is it going to be perceived as in the control of the people who have an agenda to purge Sunni Arab influence?8221; said a US official. 8220;That8217;s the first thing people will look at.8221;