After Kilinochchi

Victory for government, blow to LTTE. But what happens now?

The Sri Lankan armed forces fought their way and managed to capture Kilinochchi, the LTTE8217;s de facto 8220;capital8221; on January 2. Significantly, it was the same day last year that the government of Sri Lanka decided to pull out of the ceasefire agreement CFA that was preventing them from declaring an all-out war against the LTTE. Since then, the advance of the Sri Lankan army has been good despite fierce resistance from the Tigers. How significant is the fall of Kilinochchi? Is this the beginning of the end of the LTTE? What is the way ahead?

The fall of Kilinochchi, situated on the strategic A-9 road, is significant for the Sri Lankan government and in turn a blow to the LTTE. Wresting Kilinochchi after a decade of its loss to the Tigers is a dream come true for the Sri Lankan forces. It is indeed a big morale boosting victory for the forces, especially after suffering huge casualties in the process. Credit for the capture partly goes to the Sri Lankan Air Force SLAF and the Sri Lankan Navy SLN that ably supported the army in the advancement. Unrelenting air strikes were being used to support the ground troops as well as to destroy the LTTE defences and installations. The navy was used to mainly cut the LTTE8217;s supply lines, and at the same time to weaken the 8220;Sea Tigers8221; as much as possible to trim down their capability to launch amphibious operations.

On the other hand, the loss of Kilinochchi is considered a huge blow to the LTTE. Militarily, the LTTE may opt out of conventional fighting after its withdrawal from Kilinochchi. Given the numerical superiority of the government forces and the nature of the terrain of the remaining Mullaitivu, guerrilla tactics would be found a better means of resistance. Politically, it was in Kilinochchi that the Tigers had been building their future state structures like 8220;courts8221; and 8220;ministries8221;. Kilinochchi is also centrally located to serve as the administrative capital, with Jaffna to act as the symbolic political capital for a future Eelam.

Despite the loss, it is not the end of everything for the Tigers. As indicated by the LTTE political wing8217;s chief Nadesan, the Tigers will continue to fight. Most of the LTTE formations have already moved to the east of the Kilinochchi town, into the jungles of neighbouring Mullaitivu district. In that case, the LTTE will have an edge to inflict casualties on the security forces, although in a gradual manner, using hit-and-run tactics. The past suggests that the LTTE bounced back from dire situations. What should the government do to prevent this?

At the outset, it is vital for the government to isolate the Tigers from the civilian population. Without popular support the LTTE cannot sustain guerrilla warfare for long. The government may announce local elections for the Northern Province and set up a provincial council as it did in the Eastern Province last year. But, this is not enough to win over the Tamil community. A credible political package is missing despite the fact that the All Party Representative Committee was formed for this purpose three years ago. Ironically, important parties like the main opposition United National Party, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and Tamil National Alliance are not constituents of the APRC. The credibility of the committee itself is in question. It is doubtful, therefore, whether such a non-consensual body could deliver a document acceptable to all communities. The so-called 8220;Eastern Model8221; is also not worth emulating. Violence continues in the East despite the LTTE being out of the picture. The faction-ridden and powerless provincial government is not in a position to deliver even a fraction of what was promised during the election campaign. Colombo does not seem sincere in rebuilding the East, but to use it as a showpiece to the outside world as a model of its 8220;war for peace programme8221;. If the same model is envisaged for the North as well, the people cannot be won over.

nbsp;

The writer is senior fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Delhi

expressexpressindia.com