123, and why we don146;t go

There8217;s no way the US can accept some of India8217;s demands without violating NPT commitments

If the recent story in a major paper, quoting high level government sources as saying that there is no division between the Delhi and Mumbai on the 123 agreement negotiations, then there is no scope for an agreement. It may be better, then, if all the parties 8212; India, the US, the Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG and the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA 8212; were to formally end all negotiations for making possible civil nuclear cooperation between India and NSG members. While the Indians do have a case for getting some clear commitments under the 123 agreement, some of India8217;s demands are of such a nature that there is no way either the US or the NSG members can accept them without directly violating their NPT commitments.

This is especially so in the case of the demand for the right to obtain enrichment and reprocessing technologies. India operates one enrichment pilot plant and has two reprocessing facilities. None of them are under IAEA safeguards. The Tarapur reprocessing plant is put under IAEA safeguards when it has safeguarded spent fuel in that facility. The reprocessing plants produce fissile material for India8217;s nuclear weapon programme. The end use of the enriched uranium from the enrichment plant is not known. And India has not declared any moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes either.

While rejecting any proposal to put either the enrichment facilities or the reprocessing plants under IAEA safeguards, India is demanding that it be provided technologies, equipment and components for using these facilities reportedly for 8220;civilian8221; purposes. The difficulty in accepting these demands is as follows: if such technologies are given by NSG/NPT members to India for ostensible 8220;civil8221; purposes, there is nothing that prevents it from using the technologies, equipment and components provided, for the production of fissile material for weapons purposes as the facilities are not under safeguards. Even if they are put under safeguards, there is still the possibility of India using the technology supplied, for weapons purposes by building another facility incorporating the imported technology and not declaring it as 8220;civil8221;.

Thus, unless India signs a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, there is no guarantee it will not divert the supplied technology for weapons purposes. A supply by the US or any of the NPT nuclear weapon states, therefore, of any enrichment or reprocessing technology to India would be in direct violation of their obligation under Article I of the NPT, which states that 8220;Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.8221;

The point is this: India can import enrichment and reprocessing technologies ostensibly for 8220;civilian8221; purposes, and then proceed to build new facilities using these technologies or indigenously produced equipment or components based on the experience of the imported ones and then not declare them as civil, claiming that it is allowed full freedom under the Indo-US agreement to declare what facilities will be considered as civil. The new facilities can then be used to produce fissile materials for its nuclear weapon programme.

Is such a thing possible? Yes. India initially imported pressurised heavy water reactors PHWR from Canada 8212; RAPS I and II. These were put under IAEA safeguards. Then India, given its scientific capabilities, mastered PHWR technology and proceeded to construct a series of such reactors, which are today the mainstay of its civil nuclear programme. None of the indigenously built reactors are under safeguards. Subsequently, given the Indian experience, the IAEA modified its safeguards agreements to include that in case of imported reactors the safeguards would apply not only on the imported reactor but also on 8220;reactor facilities produced therefrom or as a result of their utilization.8221; The US and the members of the NSG would, thus, be justified in rejecting India8217;s claim for enrichment and reprocessing technologies under the Indo-US agreement.

Therefore, if the demand for enrichment and reprocessing technologies is made by Mumbai with the full understanding of Delhi, not only is there no chance of the deal coming through, given the suspicions about Indian motives, the country will face increasing difficulties in either getting easier access to high technologies or being able to avoid the restrictions of the export control regimes.

The writer is a security analyst