Suhas Palshikar: ‘Opposition parties don’t have a narrative that contrasts the BJP’s consistently’

It had pitched itself as a non-party movement and kept all political parties away. Although it didn’t have many seats in 2017, AAP capitalised on the disenchantment, disappointment and also the expectations which the farmers’ movement kindled in both Punjab and western UP. In Punjab, this angst had a particular vehicle in the form of a relative newcomer like AAP.

Every national combination will now have to take the AAP much more seriously as it is probably the only multi-state party of some heft at the moment. If it succeeds in Gujarat even partially to emerge as the main Opposition, then it could stake its claim as a national opponent of the BJP much more strongly by the end of this year. It could look at itself as the leader of a national coalition through a pre-election or post-election arrangement.

On whether the results in UP signal an Opposition failure

You could blame the Opposition to a limited extent because the Congress was already making as much noise as it could, even before the election. The blame perhaps lies at the doors of the Samajwadi Party (SP), which was not very active during the past five years, or at least that is what its critics have been saying. Also, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) went into hibernation. The absence of a continuous Opposition narrative over the last five years helped the BJP. Structurally too, both the Congress and BSP are virtually non-existent. So UP suddenly became a two-party contest in which the SP appeared inadequate to take on the BJP. The BJP didn’t win for what its leaders said during the campaign. It scored because of its low-intensity, low-volume campaign of five years, leading into what I have called the “exploitation of the Hindu-Muslim faultline.” Yes, there was a repressive regime, which would practically disallow its opponents to function normally. But other than that, brutal as it may sound, Opposition parties, including the SP, do not have a complete narrative of their own that contrasts the BJP’s consistently. You cannot play politics just around the elections. If you want to survive in this politics, you have to speak the same language, operate within the same framework that the BJP works in.

The only genuine challenge Opposition parties face now is fund crunch. They don’t have resources to mobilise cadres for five years and can just about manage their election campaigning. Perhaps this is why their voice falls silent.

On the BJP’s strategy

To take a very broad brush into the past, it all began in the 1970s when RSS chief Balasaheb Deoras aligned the organisation with politics on the one hand and expanded its caste base on the other. Govindacharya and “social engineering” came much later but it was Deoras who started the internal transformation of the RSS outlook. Besides, the Jana Sangh merged with the Janata Party experiment in the 1970s and the Right became a part of the mainstream. The second shift came in the 1990s when BJP leaders Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pramod Mahajan mooted the idea of a coalition to exercise power. So, this became an important aspect of the BJP’s politics with its leaders saying they would keep aside their core agenda and go along with concerns of coalition partners.

The present UP scenario was almost rehearsed in the 1980s in terms of the combination of the Thakur and Brahmin votes on the one hand and the lower OBCs and non-dominant OBCs on the other. Of course, the party stoked fundamental fault-lines on the basis of a communal majority. That was a common thread and added to the mobilisation politics. Then came Narendra Modi.

On the political culture that made BJP successful

I think the process started in the 1990s, or slightly earlier, along with the Ramjanambhoomi Andolan. That was the inflection point at which public opinion shifted. The middle ground changed in the 2002-2004 period and, therefore, it became possible for Modi to cultivate this changed public opinion in a very skillful manner over the last 10 years. This shift hasn’t happened overnight; there has been history of three decades.

On the yearning for a harder, sterner state

As students and observers of India’s politics, we definitely missed the possibility that in the chaos of the 1990s, there could have been a craving for a strong state. A strong state didn’t necessarily mean a repressive state. There were warning signals all along because we already had Indira Gandhi’s second regime of the 1980s, where she implemented various anti-terror laws. This entire discourse, about terrorism and anti-terror laws, or anti-terror jurisprudence laws for that matter, needs to be revisited. Some of these measures are now being used against citizens.

On Mandal vs Mandir

This victory shows that the electoral aspect of Mandal and its energy have now been completely or successfully absorbed by the BJP. And therefore, for SP, BSP or the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the currency of the Mandal factor is lost. The process had already happened during the ten years of Congress rule between 2004 and 2014. In contrast, the BJP’s perseverance ensured the resonance of the Mandir factor, even during the ten years of Congress rule. It was on the back-burner but it was simmering till majoritarianism came to the fore in 2014. My sense is that the BJP, before 2014, was really an active player in India’s politics though not as visible.

On being Muslims in UP

The question about what it means to be Muslims, poor, middle-class or privileged, is deeply disturbing. They are at a dead end. Not that their livelihoods will be taken away immediately, and probably never will, but their dignity has been trampled upon. As a community, Muslims could go back into the cocoon of their religiosity and thus become much more religious, inward looking and orthodox, not reformist. The other possibility is their acquiescence. They will settle for their second-class citizenship and live with as much space they can find in this situation. The third possibility will take a long time to materialise politically, which is to forget their status and align with various non-sectarian forces in different states. This was noticed fleetingly during the CAA and farmers’ agitations where all communities came together. There is no easy way out because minorities are continuously under suspicion.

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On whether India today is politically similar to Poland, Hungary, Turkey or Russia

In certain respects, we align with the global corrosion of democracy. Brazil and Philippines are two examples, India could be the third. India’s crisis is not just about Muslims but of a national majority claiming it owns the nation. Spain is undergoing the same crisis; France can face this anytime.

On reforms in the Congress

The question isn’t about the family controlling the party or not. It’s about what the family does to the party. Does its leadership deliver anything for the party? UP is an excellent example of this ambiguity and cluelessness. Having been out of power for so long, there was just no chance for the Congress to make major gains in UP. Instead of investing so much energy there, Priyanka Gandhi ought to have focussed on Uttarakhand, Punjab or Goa, smaller and manageable states.

On the difference between Congress and BJP regimes

The hard State was practised by the Congress only very briefly and in an infamous manner in the mid-1970s. The BJP has normalised the hard state. This is the fundamental difference.

On the rise of Yogi

I would like to believe that he was nurtured for the electoral advantage. The BJP, in its current form, is just not used to sharing of leadership or credit. You cannot have two leaders of the same psychological make-up who want the limelight only upon themselves. That co-existence is going to be a very tough call for the BJP.

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Audience Questions

On eliminating caste from electoral politics

Caste is not only a political factor, it is a pre-existing social reality. As long as that remains, it will always influence elections. Talking about caste becomes essential because social and economic disadvantages are faced by those belonging to the lower side of caste hierarchies. I would argue that talking of caste alone is never sufficient, but it is going to be an inevitable factor as long as our society is deeply divided.

On why politicians don’t talk about medical education and real issues

I think the simple reason is that welfarism is a plank that works and things given free pertain to the lives of much larger sections of society than talk about IITs or such centres of excellence. Education matters to a very minuscule section of voters. That’s probably an answer that one can think of.

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