What Operation Sindoor tells us about the nature of escalation, and India’s changing approach

In terms defined by the American military strategist and thinker Herman Kahn’s 44-step “escalation ladder”, the situation can be seen as having begun with the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22 — the “Ostensible Crisis” — and gone up to the stage of “Dramatic Military Confrontations” before being paused by the ceasefire of May 10.

Kahn’s escalation ladder

The idea of escalation began to appear in strategic literature in the years after the end of World War II, in part as a reaction to the idea of “all-out” war.

Kahn, a futurist and military strategist who co-founded the Washington DC think tank Hudson Institute with the vision of “thinking about the future in unconventional ways”, was the preeminent Western theorist of the ‘structure’ of escalation.

Kahn’s metaphor for escalation was a ladder, each rung of which denoted a rising level of conflict.

In 1962, Kahn proposed a 16-step ladder of escalation from “Subcrisis Disagreement” to “Aftermath”. Three years later, he published On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (1965), in which he developed a more detailed, 44-step ladder of escalation — with “Ostensible Crisis” as Step 1, and “Spasm/ Insensate War” as Step 44.

The India-Pakistan escalation

The Pahalgam terror attack can be described as “Ostensible Crisis” — Step 1, in which 26 civilians including 25 tourists and one local Kashmiri were killed by Pakistan-backed terrorists on April 22.

This led to Step 2, “Political, Economic and Diplomatic Gestures” — India’s decisions from April 23 onward can be labeled as such. These include the decision to keep the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, cancelling the visas of Pakistani nationals, stopping trade and postal services, closing India’s air space for Pakistan’s aircraft, not allowing Pakistan-flagged ships to dock at Indian ports, etc.

Then came Kahn’s Step 3 — “Solemn and Formal Declarations”. India’s top leadership declared the intent to avenge the killings of the tourists at Pahalgam — Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to “pursue the terrorists and those who shelter them to the very end”. And Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif promised a “crushing reply to any Indian misadventure”.

Kahn’s Step 4 is the “Hardening of Positions — Confrontation of Wills”. India blamed Pakistan for not taking action against terrorist groups, while Islamabad asked for evidence of India’s accusation. It also said that India’s position on the IWT would be deemed as an “act of war”.

Step 5, Kahn’s rung of “Show of Force” was seen as the Indian Navy on April 27 carried out multiple anti-ship missile firings, underlining its preparedness for long-range offensive strikes. On May 3, Pakistan test-fired Abdali, its surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a 450-km range.

Step 6 — “Significant Mobilisation” — was quick and stealthy, and from May 7 onward, the escalation quickly reached rungs 8 (“Harassing Acts of Violence”) and 9 (“Dramatic Military Confrontations”). India struck at nine terror locations in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and successfully thwarted Pakistani drone attacks along the western border.

The two militaries remained at Step 9 for four nights before they agreed to stop military action — this is where Kahn’s escalation ladder was aborted.

2016, 2019: change of doctrine

In Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy, former National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon concluded the chapter on the 26/11 terror attacks (‘Restraint or Riposte? The Mumbai Attack and Cross-Border Terrorism from Pakistan’) with the sentence: “…Personalities matter. With a different mix of people at the helm, it is quite possible that India would have chosen [to act] differently [in the aftermath of the attacks]. In fact, if India is forced to make a similar choice in the future, I am sure it will respond differently.”

The book was published in November 2016. Weeks earlier, on September 29, Indian special forces had crossed the Line of Control to carry out surgical strikes on terrorist launchpads in PoK.

That October, Prime Minister Narendra Modi told a gathering in Mandi, Himachal Pradesh: “Earlier Israel used to be spoken of like this (in the context of carrying out targeted military strikes against its enemies). Now everyone knows our Army can do it too and is no less capable.”

A little over two years later, in February 2019, the Prime Minister said in Hindi at a public meeting in Churu, Rajasthan: “I swear by this soil that I won’t let the nation be destroyed, I won’t let the nation be stopped. It is my promise to Bharat Ma that I won’t let her head be bowed.”

In these two speeches, the Prime Minister mentioned neither the surgical strikes nor the Balakot air strikes of February 26, 2019, but the change in India’s doctrine of response to terrorism was clear.

Operation Sindoor and new red lines

In his address to the nation on May 12 this year, Modi articulated the elements of India’s current doctrine against terrorism: a befitting response on India’s terms; zero tolerance for Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail; and no distinction between terrorist leaders and state sponsors of terrorism.

He also made it clear that India had only “suspended” its military action, and underlined that for New Delhi, this was the “new normal” now.

India’s new policy is qualitatively higher in aggression. Targeting the Pak establishment that has long used cross-border terrorism as an instrument of policy means the military and government of that country are not off-limits for future retributive actions.

By linking Pakistan-based groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed to major terrorist attacks in the US and UK, Modi framed Operation Sindoor as India’s war on terrorism, similar to what NATO launched in Afghanistan after 9/11.

The PM also painted Pakistan as a country that protects, rather than going after, terrorists, and laid down the red lines on resuming the bilateral dialogue that has been suspended since 2016.

Takeaways, outlook going forward

New Delhi has its task cut out — politically, diplomatically, and militarily.

LOWER THRESHOLD FOR ACTION: India’s “new normal” has lowered the threshold of response in case of a major terrorist attack in future.

In terms of Kahn’s ladder of escalation, this could mean India’s response will begin from Step 3 (Solemn and Formal Declarations) and could very quickly escalate to Steps 9 (Dramatic Military Confrontations) and 10 (“Provocative Breaking off of Diplomatic Relations”). Step 12 (“Large Conventional War”) would be very much on the horizon.

DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE: Pakistan has been trying to project itself as the victim before the international community. New Delhi is concerned at the false equivalence between the two countries that some in the West have suggested, along with a re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan.

The multi-political party outreach by the Indian government, where bipartisan political delegations are currently travelling the world, explaining to countries that India was the original victim in Pahalgam, and that it responded in self-defence.

THE DONALD TRUMP FACTOR: President Trump’s claim of a “US-brokered ceasefire” has created a challenge for India, which has always rejected any third-party involvement in India-Pakistan issues.

Trump’s view of the May 10 ceasefire as a success for American diplomacy and the first “military confrontation” that he has been able to stop from escalating presents Indian diplomacy with a delicate task. New Delhi has to navigate Trump’s unpredictable statements and posts on social media, pushing back with tact and conviction.

NEW FRONTIERS OF WAR: Besides upgrading its military prowess to dominate in the air, at sea, and on land, India will have to also build capacity in the new frontiers of war where evolving and improving technology is changing the rules very rapidly.