Internal security has been among the top priorities of the Narendra Modi government since it came to power in 2014. Over the past nine years, the two Home Ministers, Rajnath Singh and Amit Shah, have helmed the government’s response to the internal security challenges presented by Islamist terrorism, the insurgencies in Left Wing Extremist (LWE) zones and the Northeast, and the security situation in Jammu and Kashmir.
In all these theatres, the government has had both hits and misses.
In the LWE theatre overall violence has reduced significantly over the past decade, but Chhattisgarh continues to remain a Maoist stronghold where security forces still suffer casualties.
In J&K, the government has succeeded on the public order front, but the infiltration of foreign terrorists continues, civilians have been targeted, and there is a resurgence of terrorism in Jammu.
The Northeast has seen a prolonged period of peace under the Modi government, and multiple ceasefire and peace agreements have been signed with insurgent groups. But the government has failed to seal the Naga Peace Accord, and the ongoing deadly ethnic clashes in Manipur are a cause for serious concern.
The LWE Theatre
In April 2006, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called Naxalism “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced” by India. The Modi government inherited a security regime in India’s LWE zones that was already geared to challenge Maoists in their strongholds and was constantly pushing into their core areas. In fact, by 2014, Maoism had either been virtually finished or was on its last legs in states such as West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar and Odisha. Andhra had already pushed them out.
The NDA government embarked on what it called “the final push” against the Maoists. This not only involved intelligence-based operations in core Maoist areas such as Bastar in Chhattisgarh and Gadchiroli in Maharashtra, but also the setting up of camps deep in the jungles to ensure the presence of the state. This was coupled with the building of roads, setting up of mobile phone towers, and helping state police forces to modernise and to train them to fight the Maoists. All this required close coordination with state governments, which took the lead and cooperated.
The result has been that the government has reduced the number of LWE-affected districts from 96 in 2010 to just 46 in 2021. According to Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) data, deaths in this period dropped from 1,005 to 147, and violent actions by LWE actors fell from 2,213 to 509.
According to the Ministry, the Modi era has seen a reduction of 50% in violent acts by LWE actors compared to the UPA regime. Related deaths in these incidents have fallen by 66%, and deaths of security forces have fallen by 71%. This has coincided with a 140% increase in the surrender of Maoists.
However, pushed from all sides, the Maoists have concentrated themselves in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh, which remains a challenge for the security forces. According to government data provided to Parliament, in the five years from 2018 to 2022, there were 1,132 “violent incidents perpetrated by Left Wing Extremists” in which 168 security forces personnel and 335 civilians lost their lives. Chhattisgarh has accounted for more than a third of all Maoist-related violence in this period but, more worryingly, has had a share of 70-90% of deaths.
The violence graph in Chhattisgarh in this period has been up and down: the Maoists mounted 275 attacks in 2018; 182 in 2019; 241 in 2020; 188 in 2021; and again, 246 in 2022. Until the end of February 2023, Maoists had carried out 37 attacks in the state, in which 17 people were killed, including 7 security forces personnel.
The J&K Theatre
From announcing a Rs 80,000 crore package in 2015 to fighting the 2016 Burhan Wani crisis, from extending an olive branch to dissenting youngsters through an interlocutor to putting Hurriyat leaders behind bars, and from running a government in alliance with the PDP to bifurcating the state into two Union Territories and snatching away its special status, the Modi government has remained administratively and politically occupied with Jammu and Kashmir.
Arguably the most significant legislative decision of the Modi government has been the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, which was passed by Parliament in August 2019. While the Opposition and Kashmir leaders called it an injustice and a breach of trust by the Indian government, Home Minister Amit Shah argued that Article 370 had bred corruption and secessionism in Kashmir, and it was very important to remove it to finish terrorism in the state.
With an unprecedented number of security forces in Kashmir, and tough action taken by central agencies such as the NIA, incidents of stone-pelting in the Valley have virtually fallen to zero, and terrorist incidents have witnessed a decline.
According to government data, “acts of terrorism” have declined by 32% since August 5, 2019 (up to June 6, 2022) as compared to the same period preceding those major decisions. Deaths of security forces have seen a drop of 52%, and those of civilians, 14%. A reduction of 14% has also been recorded in infiltration of terrorists from across the border.
Despite these successes, a spate of killings of civilians, particularly of Kashmiri Hindus and non-Kashmiri residents of the Valley, has exposed the fragility of Kashmir’s security scenario. More than 50% of all civilians killed in the Valley since August 5, 2019, have been killed in the past eight months.
This has coincided with attempts by militants to attack Hindu-dominated areas in Jammu, which saw such attacks last in the early 2000s. In 2021, J&K Police arrested almost 20 militants and recovered multiple IEDs that were aimed at targeting Hindu areas. The year 2022 started with the killing of Hindu civilians in Jammu, something not seen in this division for years. The Jammu border also saw frequent infiltration and gunfights with the Army, in which more than a dozen armed forces personnel were killed, even as the attackers remained elusive.
The Northeast
The Modi government made its priorities regarding the Northeast clear in its initial years with the announcement of its “Act East” policy. The government focused on signing peace agreements with insurgent groups and bringing them to the negotiating table, even as it rolled out a comprehensive surrender and rehabilitation policy for militants.
Over the past nine years, the government has signed agreements with Bodo groups, United People’s Front (UPF) and Kuki National Organisation in Manipur, the Karbi Anglong groups in Assam, National Liberation Front of Tripura, and Karbi Longri N.C. Hills Liberation Front, among others.
In the wake of the Assam-Mizoram border conflict of 2021 in which five Assam Police personnel were killed by Mizoram Police, the government speeded up boundary negotiations between various states in the Northeast. Talks on the Assam-Arunachal boundary, pending since the 1970s, have been concluded, and the Assam-Meghalaya boundary dispute has been partially resolved.
According to the government, there has been a decline of 68% in violent incidents, and a 60% decline in deaths of security forces and civilians in the Northeast during the Modi regime compared to the UPA period.
The most significant step taken in the Northeast by the government has been removal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) from various districts of all the states in the region.
While Tripura and Meghalaya are now completely free of AFSPA, 60% of Assam’s geographical area is not under the statute. In Manipur, the government has removed AFSPA from 15 police stations of six districts, and in Nagaland it has been removed from 15 police stations of seven districts. In Arunachal, AFSPA is in force in only three districts, and in two police stations of one district.
However, 13 innocent civilians were tragically killed by the Indian Army in Mon district of Nagaland in December 2021. Justice is yet to be delivered in the case; in April this year, the Centre refused sanction to prosecute 30 Army officers involved in the killing.
For all its agreements with insurgent groups, the government has failed to ink the most important one: the Naga Peace Accord. Despite announcing it way back in 2015, the government has failed to make any progress. Until recently, when Naga interlocutor R N Ravi was in Nagaland, the negotiations had degenerated into a public spat between Ravi and NSCN(IM) chief Th Muivah.
Manipur continues to burn for over a month now — despite personal intervention by Home Minister Shah.
Jihadist terrorism
By the time the Modi government came to power, the major Pak-sponsored group in mainland India, the Indian Mujahideen, had already been annihilated. As the new phenomenon of Islamic State took shape with some young Muslims from India joining the outfit in Syria and Iraq, the government took the approach of prevention over cure.
Agencies mounted surveillance on social media activity discussing Islamic State ideology, and counselled potential recruits out of it. Many attacks were prevented through such surveillance, after potential perpetrators were arrested at the stage of planning.
In this sequence, the government also took some controversial steps which included amending the NIA Act and the UAPA to allow the government to designate even individuals as terrorists. The recent ban on the Popular Front of India (PFI) has also been criticised.