Is there a China angle in Sanae Takaichi not being appointed Japan’s first woman PM?

First, why are Chinese commentators sceptical of Takaichi’s candidacy?

It can be attributed to three main issues:

*Her views on Japan’s conduct during World War 2 (1939-45), when the country attacked China as part of the Axis powers, have been criticised. She has downplayed Japan’s military aggression, echoing narratives long-rejected by China, the two Koreas, and the international community. In general, their history has often cast a shadow on China-Japan ties.

Her visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, including this year, are seen as provocative acts that reopen old wounds in the region. A shrine for Japan’s war dead, the countries that Japan attacked during WW2 see the site as a symbol of glorification of war criminals. Thus, these visits are not private gestures of remembrance but political statements that glorify a certain version of history.

*Then there is Takaichi’s combative tone toward China. While she pledged during her campaign to engage in dialogue with Beijing on the Taiwan question (since China lays claims to the island), her actions may have crossed the red line for the Chinese government.

Two examples are often cited: (i) Takaichi visited Taiwan in April, where she advocated “cooperation with Taiwan to jointly address defence challenges,” and (ii) she reiterated her longstanding support for Taiwan one week after being elected the LDP president.

*Finally, there is her stance on constitutional revision, which signals a decisive break from Japan’s post-war pacifist identity. Takaichi has made no secret of her desire to revise Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which renounces war as a means of settling international disputes — a direct result of its loss in 1945.

She has also proposed renaming the Self-Defence Forces as a “National Defence Army.” This would not only alter Japan’s domestic legal framework but also have profound implications for the security architecture of East Asia, intensifying an already fragile regional balance of power, as per Chinese security affairs experts.

They have also highlighted several of Takaichi’s “regressive visions” on Japan’s domestic issues, including her hawkish views on economic policy and push to reduce dependence on China in the semiconductor and rare earths sectors. The latter is viewed in China as politically motivated.

One commentator wrote for the state media channel CGTN, “Despite being a woman in a leadership role, she opposes female imperial succession, same-sex marriage, and even the right of married couples to have separate surnames.” In line with other conservative politicians, she has also advocated for strict policies on immigration.

But is there a “China factor” in her assuming power?

Interestingly, soon after most political analysts expected Takaichi to win a majority backing in the Diet, the Japanese parliament, her prospects were in jeopardy. Some politicians within the LDP and other political leaders accused China of preventing her elevation.

At the centre of the claim is the Komeito Party, a coalition partner of the ruling LDP since 1999. Its leader, Tetsuo Saito, suddenly announced they were withdrawing support from the LDP in early October.

Because the Komeito Party has been advocating friendship with China for decades, Haruo Kitamura, a conservative House of Representatives member, claimed the withdrawal of support from the ruling coalition was “directed by China.” Other conservative Diet members further stated the withdrawal was aimed at “blocking Sanae Takaichi from taking office.”

After Saito categorically denied acting on behalf of China, Kitamura and others cited a meeting between him and the Chinese ambassador to Japan, Wu Jianghao, on October 6 in Tokyo, as evidence. Saito responded that as leader of the Komeito Party, he maintained close relationships with ambassadors from over 30 nations. Dismissing the allegations, he said the meeting was scheduled in advance.

A report in Japan’s widely read Asahi Shimbun, a newspaper viewed by many as supportive of the Komeito Party’s decision to withdraw support, reported that the LDP and the Komeito Party have been at odds over issues such as “political corruption” and “black money in politics.”

Before the Komeito Party ended the partnership on October 10, the coalition enjoyed a strength of 220 (LDP 196, Komeito 24) seats in the 465-member House of Representatives —13 short of a majority (did they have outside support to make up for the remainder?). The LDP must now reach an agreement with opposition parties. An extraordinary parliament session may be convened in the next few days to elect Japan’s next prime minister.

An article in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpiece Global Times recently cited professor Da Zhigang, a well-known Japanese affairs expert, as saying that the “anti-China” perspectives stem from entrenched inter-party conflicts in Japan, and linking it to diplomatic issues is a “calculated political manipulation.”

What is the Komeito Party’s history with China?

Since its founding in 1964 by Daisaku Ikeda, a leader of the Soka Gakkai Buddhist religious movement, the Komeito Party has consistently prioritised improving Sino-Japanese relations.

In 1999, the LDP-Komeito Party alliance formed its first government, which lasted until 2009. In 2012, the coalition returned to power, but collapsed with the withdrawal of support this month.

Described as a self-proclaimed party of “humanitarian socialism,” during its alliance with the conservative LDP, Komeito acted as a moderating force over security and military policies. In foreign policy, the party advocates for a more pacifist diplomacy.

The Asahi Shimbun stated that the party has long served as a bridge between the Chinese and Japanese governments. Even as Japanese politics has shifted rightward since the Shinzo Abe administration, Komeito delegations have continued to visit China almost annually.

Hemant Adlakha, formerly a professor of Chinese at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, is Vice Chairperson and an Honorary Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), New Delhi.