In one of the biggest blows to security forces since April 2023, suspected Maoists blew up a police vehicle on Monday (January 6) in Bijapur, killing the driver and eight District Reserve Guards (DRG) of the Chhattisgarh police. They were returning following an encounter in the Abujhmad region on Saturday, where five Maoists were gunned down and a DRG was killed. On April 26, 2023, Maoists similarly blew up a DRG vehicle, killing 10 people (nine security personnel and one driver) in the Maoist stronghold of Dantewada. Between the two attacks, security forces have pushed hard against the Maoists in their core area, killing 217 Naxal fighters last year alone. Monday’s attack in the forests of Kutru is an example of the Maoists’ classic guerilla warfare tactics and marks the first major retaliation in over one-and-a-half years. How do security personnel ensure their safety in Maoist zones? In a conflict zone as complex as the jungles of Central India, with guerilla fighters on the other side, avoiding casualties remains a challenge for security forces. That said, there are well-laid-out standard operating procedures (SOPs) for forces operating in Maoist zones to avoid casualties. In most cases, from the 2010 Chintalnar massacre to the 2023 Dantewada ambush, major or minor errors have led to setbacks for the forces. While SOPs are regularly revised and can differ from one conflict zone to another, the general SOPs for forces operating in Maoist zones include avoiding movement in vehicles as much as possible; keeping movements unpredictable, like not returning from an operation by the same road and maintaining secrecy about movement; making most movements cross-country either by foot or on bikes; sending trackers and Road Opening Parties (ROP) ahead of vehicular movement; preferring civilian vehicles for vehicular movement; and finally reading signs, trusting one’s instincts and being alert to signs of Maoist movement. These are not sacrosanct, though. Commanders are sometimes advised to make decisions depending on their situation and not follow SOPs blindly. Apart from this, having a robust local intelligence network and the support of technical intelligence and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) surveillance can help. However, security establishment officers say casualties can happen despite following all the SOPs, given the challenges of the jungle terrain. Generally, what kind of errors are made? In most cases, failure to adhere to some general thumb rules has led to forces walking into an ambush. For example, in the 2010 Chintalnar massacre, a huge contingent of CRPF soldiers chose to return by the same route they took for an operation in Dantewada. The Maoists set up an ambush in the Tadmetla forests and when the CRPF convoy reached there, it faced Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blasts and ballistic attacks from over 300 Maoists. It was one of the worst cases of Maoist violence, leading to the deaths of 76 soldiers. The May 2013 Jhiram Ghati massacre was no different. A Congress party convoy on the Jagdalpur-Sukma highway came under attack from Maoists, leading to 27 deaths. Almost the entire leadership of the Congress, including former Union minister Vidya Charan Shukla, former state minister Mahendra Karma and then Congress state unit chief Nand Kumar Patel, was wiped out. Investigations revealed the forces had failed to carry out a road opening exercise — where security personnel first check the route for Maoists or IEDs — for the convoy’s movement. However, the March 2017 Bheji attack in Sukma showed that ROPs are among the most vulnerable to attacks. An ROP of the CRPF was targeted while securing a road under the Bheji police station, killing 13 security personnel. In March 2018, nine CRPF soldiers travelling in a mine-protected vehicle were killed in an IED blast in Sukma. Following the incident, the commandant of the battalion involved was transferred for negligence and insubordination. It turned out that senior officers had instructed him not to make any movements on that day as Maoist presence had been confirmed, with an encounter in the area. The commandant, however, is said to have come under pressure from then Sukma Superintendent of Police, who insisted on going to Palodi from Kistaram village and sought CRPF support. Since the DRG had conducted a road opening exercise, the commandant felt confident. It was later found that the DRG had failed to conduct the exercise on both sides of the road. Even in the April 2023 attack in Dantewada, small mistakes led to tragic consequences. The convoy not only took the same route to return from an operation but also failed to notice that the village enroute had suddenly emptied. Some children who put up barricades to collect donations for a function were absent when they returned. These were tell-tale signs of Maoist presence. Would mine-protected vehicles (MPVs) have saved lives? Given how powerful the Monday blast was, it is unlikely that an MPV would have saved lives. MPVs are by and large designed to withstand ‘pressure’ IEDs that use 5-7 kg of explosives and are best suited for urban warfare. Maoists, however, target them with ‘trigger’ IEDs, stuffed with at least 20-30 kg of explosives. The Bijapur attack reportedly used 60-70 kg of explosives. A 50 kg IED was found to have been used in the March 2018 attack in Sukma. It completely wrecked the CRPF MPV, killing all occupants. Such a large IED can toss even these massive vehicles several feet into the air. Even if the MPV remains intact after such a blast, its occupants can die of concussions and neck fractures. In 2011, K Vijaykumar, then CRPF DG, described the MPVs as “coffin on wheels”. How do Maoists prepare for such attacks? Having operated for decades in regions lacking administrative presence, Maoists are known to maintain a robust network of jan militia – mainly local villagers who provide logistical support out of fear or for ideological reasons. They are also a great intelligence source on the movement of security forces and can be utilised for quick action. Maoists are also known to rig most roads in their strongholds with IEDs. In many cases, they have buried IEDs underground before roads are metalled. These IEDs can be exploded when required several months later as well. They can also quickly insert an IED under a road by digging a foxhole. The wires from these IEDs have at times run up to 100m inside the jungles. Police sources said the nature of the latest operation suggests the Maoists had good knowledge of the movement of the forces. The Maoists are suspected to have simply waited in the jungles for the DRG convoy to arrive and triggered the IED planted several months ago. Though an ROP was conducted for the movement, it clearly missed the wires. What makes Abujhmad an enduring stronghold of the CPI(Maoist)? The hills and forests of Abujhmad sprawl over an area of about 4,000 sq km in the Bastar region of southern Chhattisgarh, mainly covering the districts of Narayanpur, Bijapur and Dantewada. The difficult terrain, the absence of road infrastructure and state administration, and the presence of armed rebels have ensured that 90% of this area – bigger than the state of Goa – remains unsurveyed by the government. These jungles, including parts of the Indravati National Park in Bijapur district, are used both as a haven and a transit corridor by Maoists to travel between Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Odisha via Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district.
