Military Digest | When Nehru objected to Sikh, Dogra troops in Kashmir

Documents regarding the accession of Kashmir to India in national archives contain the details of the military operations which were planned at the highest level of the government in the immediate aftermath of the Pakistani invasion. A perusal of these documents shows that 1/5 GR was the originally chosen battalion but was not despatched due to objections from the Governor General Lord Mountbatten.

Research into these archival documents reveals that meeting of the defence committee was held on Sunday October 26, 1947 in New Delhi on the issue of Kashmir. Among those present were the Governor General, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Defence Minister, Finance Minister, Commander-in-Chief of Army, Air Marshal Commanding Royal Indian Air Force, Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy and several other senior persons.

Also present was Lt Col (later Field Marshal) Sam Maneckshaw who was then posted in the Operations Directorate of the Army Headquarters and who had flown to Srinagar the previous day with VP Menon and some air force officers. He informed the meeting that minor attacks in Kashmir had started in the Poonch area in early October with the idea of withdrawing the Kashmir State Forces reserves and deploying these there. Lt Col Maneckshaw added that weak elements of Kashmir forces which were besieged in Poonch and Mirpur were asking for supplies to be airdropped to them. To this the Commander-in-Chief General Rob Lockhart said this was being examined.

It was later in the meeting that General Lockhart reported that the First Battalion of The Sikh Regiment could be made available although it was at the moment in Gurgaon. (Express archives)

The question of rushing an Indian Army battalion to Srinagar, which was facing an attack by Pakistani invaders from Uri-Baramulla axis, was then discussed and the difficulty in keeping the battalion supplied once it was flown over was also taken up as the road link to the valley was closed.

At this point the minutes of the meeting note that the unit which had been earmarked for this operation was 1/5 GR. “The Committee agreed that despite the fact that Nepal had offered to make available to India its resources and help in any way that might be required, it will be better to use an Indian battalion for the task envisaged. Furthermore, there was a possibility, although this was not considered very likely, that an objection to the use of British officers, of whom there were a number in the 1/5 GR might arise,” the minutes of the meeting note.

It was later in the meeting that General Lockhart reported that the First Battalion of The Sikh Regiment could be made available although it was at the moment in Gurgaon. It was agreed that the unit should be sent as soon as possible.

Documents in the archives also contain correspondence exchanged between the PM Jawaharlal Nehru and Deputy PM Vallabhbhai Patel in which the latter explicitly mentions that Lord Mountbatten had raised objections over sending a Gorkha Battalion to Kashmir.

In this meeting on October 26, Nehru stated that despatching a battalion to Srinagar will help with the local morale and the object of the unit should be to expel invaders from Srinagar and from Srinagar vale as far as possible. At this point General Lockhart asked to what extent the Kashmir situation was vital to India. To this Nehru and Patel both replied that future of Kashmir was vital to India’s very existence.

On October 28, another meeting of the Committee was held where General Lockhart informed that 329 men of The Sikh Regiment had been flown to Srinagar and had secured the Srinagar airfield.

The archives also contain a Demi-Official letter from Nehru to Patel on October 30 with regard to the communal situation in Jammu region and where the Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan and RSS volunteers were reportedly being mobilised against Muslims. Nehru also mentioned to Patel that propaganda was being carried out in Frontier Province and West Punjab in Pakistan that Indian government had sent Sikh troops to exterminate Muslims in Kashmir.

Nehru told Patel that “we should at least try to stop, in so far as we can, activities of the RSS and Hindu and Sikh refugees in this direction. Probably the Akali Dal is also functioning in the same way”.

Nehru further wrote that the whole Kashmir position will crack up if in Jammu province an anti-Muslim drive takes place. Nehru further added that as far as Indian troops were concerned, efforts should be made to send non-Sikh and non-Dogra troops to the region.

“Regarding our troops that are to be sent there, it would be advisable, as far as possible to send non-Sikh and non-Dogra troops, though of course if there are some Sikh troops among a large number, it need not matter much. The Commanding Officer should preferably not be a Sikh. I do not wish to interfere with military arrangements, but I thought I might mention this to you so that you could convey it to Baldev Singh [then defence ministers] and the military authorities for their consideration,” Nehru wrote.

Sardar Patel replied to Jawaharlal Nehru’s letter on October 30, 1947 itself where he agreed that the RSS should not be allowed to conduct its “usual activities” in Kashmir state. He agreed with Nehru on keeping Sikh troops away from the Kashmir region but added that it would be wrong to encourage people to express a like or dislike for particular elements within the Army.

“As regards Sikh troops, you know the circumstances in which we had to send the only force which was immediately available and that was the Sikh battalion from Gurgaon. In the position in which we were placed, one could hardly pick and choose. It would also be wrong, in my view, to encourage the tendency among the various sections of the people to express their like or dislike for a particular element of the Army,” wrote Patel.

He further added that he agreed that in the peculiar situation of Kashmir state “we should avoid sending any more Sikh troops”.

“Actually I feel we should send Gurkhas [old spellings of Gorkha] now, who are more seasoned and experienced in hilly warfare. I was of this view even earlier, but somehow Lord Mountbatten was not keen on it. From all accounts, it seems we shall now have to rely on those who are used to hilly topography and warfare. As far as I can see, there is little chance of any more Sikh troops being going, and I feel we had better not raise this matter with Baldev Singh or the military authorities unless it becomes necessary,” wrote Patel.