It has been a curious quarter for Wonderla Holidays, India’s amusement park pioneer. The company’s Q1 FY26 numbers read like a tale of two halves.
Footfalls slipped 8% year-on-year to 9.17 lakh visitors, as an unusually early monsoon and cautious consumer sentiment weighed on crowds. Yet the guests who did show up spent more than ever before.
Average revenue per user rose 6% to Rs 1,775, with non-ticket spends on food, retail, and resorts climbing 11% to Rs 93 per head. Revenue from operations dipped 3% to Rs 169 crore, and net profit moderated to Rs 52.6 crore, still delivering a healthy 29% margin.
The story goes beyond one quarter’s numbers.
Wonderla seems to be in the middle of a strategic transition from being known just as a rides-and-slides operator to positioning itself as a broader leisure brand.
Its new luxury resort, The Isle in Bengaluru, is already clocking around 70% occupancy at double the room rates of its older hotel. Meanwhile, a Rs 600 crore bet on the upcoming Chennai park is set to expand its footprint to five cities by late 2025.
These suggest that management is playing for long-term growth, even as near-term numbers reflect the push-and-pull of weather, marketing spends, and the maturity of older parks.
At its core, Wonderla runs a business that is simple to describe but complex to execute: attract people to its parks, get them to spend on tickets, food, and merchandise, and keep them coming back.
In Q1 FY26, that equation showed both its strengths and its vulnerabilities.
The biggest vulnerability is seasonality. With operations concentrated in southern India, the weather can make or break a quarter. This year’s early monsoon cut into the critical summer holiday season, when families usually flock to parks.
Management admitted that adverse weather can slash footfalls by as much as 30-40% on a given day. The result was clear: established parks like Bengaluru, Kochi, and Hyderabad all reported lower visitors than last year, even though April had begun with double-digit growth.
But instead of chasing sheer volume, the company has focused on average revenue per user as a buffer. Ticket prices saw a 4% increase to Rs 1,281, while non-ticket spends grew 11% to Rs 493. Together, this lifted ARPU to Rs 1,775. In plain terms, even as 80,000 fewer people came compared to Q1 FY25, those who did show up spent more, enough to hold revenue nearly flat at Rs 169 crore.
That is the essence of Wonderla’s balancing act: fewer feet through the gates, but fatter wallets once inside.
Another lever is brand and marketing.
The company is deliberately spending more on promotions, events, and digital campaigns, which raised costs and weighed on EBITDA margins this quarter. Yet this is part of a conscious strategy to keep the brand aspirational and relevant. Hosting concerts, themed food festivals, and even festive décor may not show up immediately in earnings, but they build stickiness in an industry where customers always have alternative leisure options.
There is also a geographic dynamic at play.
Mature parks in Bengaluru and Kochi are approaching saturation, while newer sites like Bhubaneswar are still in ramp-up mode. In fact, Bhubaneswar turned EBITDA-positive within its first year – evidence that Wonderla’s playbook can travel to newer regions if land and regulatory support fall into place. For growth, therefore, the company is increasingly reliant on new assets and premiumisation rather than hoping for endless growth from its older parks.
Bengaluru remains Wonderla’s flagship park and the single biggest revenue driver. In Q1 FY26, it hosted 3.22 lakh visitors, down about 10% year-on-year. The decline came despite a strong April, as early monsoons in Karnataka cut into summer demand. Average ticket prices here rose to Rs 1,380, and non-ticket spends climbed 11% to Rs 513, lifting ARPU to Rs 1,893. This shows that even with lower footfalls, Bengaluru is able to squeeze more value out of each guest. The park is also gearing up for a new Rs 20 crore rollercoaster, an addition that should refresh interest and provide a short-term lift in attendance.
Kochi, the original park, had 2.37 lakh visitors in the quarter, about 14% lower than last year. Yet its ARPU rose 7% to Rs 1,648, with non-ticket spends up 11% to Rs 416. Kochi’s challenge is maturity; most locals have already experienced the park, so growth now comes more from repeat visits, seasonal events, and upselling. It remains a steady cash generator but is unlikely to post big spikes in footfalls.
Hyderabad, opened in 2016, continues to show why newer parks matter. Footfalls here were 2.62 lakh, down 13% YoY, but ARPU rose 6% to Rs 1,881. With average non-ticket spend at Rs 525, Hyderabad guests are spending more freely than before.
The city’s expanding middle class offers a large base, and management has plans to eventually add a resort here, turning it into a multi-day destination. For now, it sits between maturity and growth, not as saturated as Bengaluru or Kochi, but not as new as Bhubaneswar.
Bhubaneswar, launched in 2024, is still small but promising. It welcomed 96,000 visitors in Q1, up from 70,000 in its first month of operations last year. ARPU stood at Rs 1,398, with non-ticket spends averaging Rs 531, higher than Kochi and close to Hyderabad. Early adopters are spending generously, and the park even turned EBITDA-positive this quarter. For a park that is one-third the size of Bengaluru, this is a strong start.
Taken together, the parks illustrate Wonderla’s operating reality: mature sites are stabilising, while new ones must drive incremental growth. This mix requires a constant refresh of offerings, steady investment, and sharper segmentation of customer experience. It is no longer just about running rides; it is about managing a portfolio of destinations, each at a different stage of its lifecycle.
Wonderla’s most striking pivot this year has been its move into upscale hospitality. The launch of The Isle in Bengaluru, a boutique resort built at a cost of about Rs 39 crore, signals management’s intent to diversify beyond rides.
With 39 glamping-style units offering private pools, hammock suites, and nature-inspired design, the property is positioned closer to a five-star experience than a family lodge. Early results are encouraging: occupancy is running at 60-70%, higher than initial expectations, and average room rates are almost double those of Wonderla’s existing Bengaluru hotel.
This matters because it deepens the company’s non-ticket revenue stream.
In Q1, per capita non-ticket spend rose 11% to Rs 493, now contributing around 28% of ARPU. Management has stated a long-term goal of reaching a 60:40 split between ticketing and non-ticket revenue. Resorts, premium F&B, and merchandise will be the levers to get there.
The Isle is already showing more profitability than Wonderla’s earlier resort, and plans are in motion to revamp the older 84-room Bengaluru property to a similar premium standard by year-end. Over time, Hyderabad and possibly other parks may also see integrated resorts, turning Wonderla into a fuller leisure destination rather than just a day-trip amusement park.
The Q1 numbers show how this transition is being financed. EBITDA fell 9% year-over-year to Rs 87.5 crore, while margins compressed to 48.9% from 54% last year. Profit after tax came in at Rs 52.6 crore, a 17% drop, with PAT margin easing to 29.4%.
The squeeze came from two fronts: lower footfalls and a sharp step-up in marketing spend as Wonderla doubled down on brand building.
Notably, the company absorbed these costs without resorting to debt.
Other income, largely interest from bank deposits and gains on mutual funds, added Rs 6 crore in the quarter, cushioning the bottom line. This reflects a conscious treasury strategy: cash raised via a Qualified Institutional Placement for expansion is being temporarily parked in interest-bearing accounts until deployed, earning returns in the meantime.
The biggest draw on that cash is the upcoming Chennai park, Wonderla’s most ambitious project yet. With about Rs 480 crore already spent and another Rs 120-130 crore to go, the total investment will exceed Rs 600 crore.
The park is slated for a soft launch in December 2025, with a full-scale opening by summer 2026. If successful, it will expand Wonderla’s footprint to five cities and tap into a large metro with minimal direct competition. Management expects the new park to gradually scale towards one million visitors annually, providing the next leg of growth as Bengaluru and Kochi plateau.
Alongside Chennai, the company is in talks with state governments for at least two more parks, likely in northern India. Smaller annual capex of about Rs 10 crore per park is also planned for ride upgrades, including a new rollercoaster at Bengaluru. Despite this heavy pipeline, the balance sheet remains debt-free, positioning Wonderla to absorb the upfront costs typical of theme parks without overstretching finances.
Wonderla’s investment case rests on a simple premise: India’s leisure market is still in its early innings. The domestic amusement park industry is a tiny fraction of the global market, but the ingredients for growth are aligning: a young population, rising disposable incomes, urbanisation, and a growing appetite for experiential spending. With over 46 million cumulative visitors served since inception, Wonderla has built trust and recall that are not easy to replicate. Add to this its ability to expand into new geographies with government support, as seen in Bhubaneswar, and the runway appears long.
The structural barriers to entry in this business are high. Acquiring 50 to 60 acres of land near a metro, investing upwards of Rs 500 crore in rides and infrastructure, and then running it safely with consistent profitability is not a challenge many players can take on. This makes Wonderla’s moat stronger, especially since global giants have been cautious about entering India due to the scale of investment required versus local spending capacity.
Yet the risks are equally clear.
The business is capital-intensive and heavily exposed to externalities: weather, consumer sentiment, and regulatory hurdles can all derail a quarter or a project. Footfalls at mature parks show that saturation is real, and without new launches, the growth curve flattens quickly.
Rising costs from wages to maintenance to marketing will also pressure margins unless ARPU growth continues. For now, Wonderla’s strategy of premiumisation and diversification into resorts provides a buffer, but execution will be tested as more projects come on stream.
Unlike most real estate or hospitality plays, Wonderla trades more like a consumer brand. Investors assign it a premium because of its high margins, debt-free balance sheet, and strong brand equity. On conventional metrics, the stock is not cheap as it tends to trade at multiples closer to consumer discretionary companies than asset-heavy infrastructure peers.
The bull case is straightforward. If the Chennai park scales as expected, if The Isle sustains high occupancy, and if ARPU keeps compounding in high single digits, earnings could grow meaningfully over the next three to five years. In that scenario, today’s valuation may look justified, even conservative.
The bear case is also easy to imagine. Any delay or cost overrun in Chennai, prolonged footfall weakness at mature parks, or inability to sustain premium pricing could quickly compress earnings. With expectations already built in, the margin for error is thin.
Wonderla’s Q1 FY26 showed both sides of its story. Footfalls slipped, but ARPU climbed. Profits softened, but the balance sheet stayed robust. Resorts and new parks are adding promise, even as weather and costs bring uncertainty.
For investors, the stock remains a bet on execution and patience. If Wonderla can keep its projects on track and its guests spending more, it could well turn out to be India’s dark horse in leisure, rewarding those who stay strapped in for the long ride.
Note: This article relies on data from annual and industry reports. We have used our assumptions for forecasting.
Parth Parikh has over a decade of experience in finance and research and currently heads the growth and content vertical at Finsire. He holds an FRM Charter and an MBA in Finance from Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies.
Disclosure: The writer and his dependents do not hold the stocks discussed in this article.
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