The rush to join BRICS, the grouping that brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and represents 40 per cent of the world’s population and 23 per cent of global GDP, has sometimes been explained as triggered by FOMO, a fear of missing out. The geopolitical shifts in the world from the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have set off frenetic group shopping as middle-sized countries with decent economies in the global south look for both voice and leverage. Both are potentially possible in BRICS, made up of five regional heavyweights. More than 20 countries are in the queue. If media reports are correct, five applicants — Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, the UAE, Egypt and Argentina — may be granted membership this August at the Cape Town summit. While it is always desirable to have bigger groupings than small clubs, especially when the stated aim of the group is to project the interests of the non-monolithic global south, an increase in membership is also likely to weigh the group in favour of China, the world’s second largest economy. Other than the five possible new entrants this year, those waiting to join are also part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.
Inherent in this is the likelihood of such a grouping being projected as a Chinese-led anti-American bloc. Understandably, Delhi, which has in recent days demonstrated a new resolve in taking the bilateral relationship with the US to a new level, has been wary of expansion. Indeed, the long line of aspiring members is seen already as fuelled by China, with the tacit backing of Russia. Last year’s BRICS declaration reflects India’s concern that any addition of new members must follow the carefully thought out objective criteria for membership, mutually discussed among the present members, so that all are on the same page regarding the logic of expansion.
