Opinion Xi the Successor
Some may see him as a potential Chinese Gorbachev. The party will ensure he isnt
Some may see him as a potential Chinese Gorbachev. The party will ensure he isnt
Succession in authoritarian regimes has never been easy,as the recent downfall of a powerful party boss in China,Bo Xilai,shows. For a while,Bo was viewed as a sure bet to become one of the top new leaders the ruling Communist Party will select this fall.
The reason for the difficulty in picking rulers in autocracies in general,and for the dramatic political demise of Bo in particular,is not hard to fathom. In such regimes,transfer of power is not governed by transparent or credible rules,and the contest for political supremacy among the duelling elites is typically settled by purges or worse. In the case of China,Mao Zedong,who ruled from 1949 until his death in 1976,did not even want to part with his power. He had a habit of picking a successor only to cashier him a few years later. After he died,a palace coup,backed by the Chinese military,determined who was to be Maos immediate successor. But that particular individual did not last very long. Within two years he was pushed out by Deng Xiaoping.
Deng did not have better luck than Mao in managing his own succession. The first two successors he chose turned out to be politically too liberal,and were purged. The third one,Jiang Zemin,a consensus candidate who rose to the top after the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989,fared better. Against all odds,Jiang accomplished a historic feat succeeding Deng without much of a power struggle. But he had to pay a price. Deng wanted to reserve the privilege of naming Jiangs successor to himself. In 1992,Deng put Hu Jintao,then only 50 and relatively junior in terms of experience,on the Communist Partys Politburo Standing Committee and cemented his status as Jiangs successor.
To everybodys relief,this succession arrangement worked. The passing of the baton from Jiang to Hu in 2002 was the least disruptive in the partys history (even though Jiang kept his position as the commander-in-chief of the Chinese armed forces for two more years). Unlike Deng,Jiang did not have enough authority to name his own successor. So when Jiang retired in 2002,there was no front-runner to succeed Hu in 2012.
In 2007,after Hu completed his first term,the partys top elites fought an intense battle behind the scenes to pick his successor. Hu favoured his protege,Li Keqiang,who worked with him in the Chinese Communist Youth League. But Hus rivals resisted. The deadlock was broken by a straw poll conducted among the members of the Central Committee of the party. The winner of the straw poll,it was alleged,was Xi Jinping,then the party boss of Shanghai. (Li is now slated to be the next premier.)
As the party is poised to inaugurate Xi as its next leader this coming fall,the question on most peoples minds is whether Xi is going to make dramatic policy changes.
Xis personal background is intriguing enough to spark speculations. A so-called princeling (a child of a top official),Xi is the son of one of the founding fathers of the Peoples Republic. But Xis childhood was not one of privilege. His father,a vice premier,was purged by Mao in 1962 and spent 16 years in jail. After he was politically rehabilitated in 1978,Deng sent him to Guangdong to lead its economic reforms. Later,the elder Xi was credited with championing major changes in Chinas legal system. As a teenager,Xi Jinping was sent to work in the farm fields in one of the poorest areas in China. What apparently strengthened Xis credentials as a future leader of the party was his extensive experience in local government. He started his political career as a leader in a peoples commune and worked his way up from administering a county to overseeing large coastal provinces (as governor and party boss of Fujian,Zhejiang and Shanghai).
Xis family background and résumé may suggest that he probably is more reform-minded than the current leadership. But the truth is that nobody knows. While Xis formative years were spent in political turmoil and his fathers influence on his outlook must have been considerable,there is nothing in Xis own background to give us reliable indications as to what he wants to do once installed as the partys general secretary.
In any case,Xi may find his ability to initiate significant policy changes severely circumscribed by the current system. While Xi will be nominally the partys top official,he actually is first among equals. To prevent the re-emergence of a domineering dictator like Mao,the Communist Party in the last three decades has instituted collective leadership. The partys top decision-making body is the Politburo Standing Committee,which at the moment has nine members. In the leadership transition scheduled for this fall,seven new members of the standing committee will be selected. Major decisions are arrived at through consensus. The standing committee is said to seldom force a vote if there is a lack of consensus among the nine members. So whether Xi can implement a new political agenda really depends on how many of his political allies get to be appointed to this all-powerful committee. According to the partys succession plan,Xi will be the party general secretary and the president of the state. There is some uncertainty whether Hu will immediately retire from his position as the commander-in-chief. If Hu keeps this position for two extra years,as Jiang did,Xi will not be able to assume full authority immediately.
Even if Xi takes over all the key positions smoothly and has enough political allies on the standing committee,he will face a daunting challenge in changing the direction of the Communist Party. For the last 20 years,the party has followed a strategy of economic growth and political repression. The result today is rampant crony capitalism,endemic corruption,rising inequality,economic imbalances and widespread social discontent. Ensuring Chinas future growth and stability requires adopting bold economic reforms and political change. The cruel reality is that the Communist Party itself is the most powerful entrenched interest group whose power and privileges will be the target of such reforms.
Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev reformed the Soviet Union into oblivion,many in the West have been rooting for his Chinese incarnation. Some today may see Xi as a potential Chinese Gorbachev. The Chinese Communist Party will make sure he isnt.
The writer is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in the US
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