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This is an archive article published on March 19, 2012
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Opinion Xi the Successor

Some may see him as a potential Chinese Gorbachev. The party will ensure he isn’t

March 19, 2012 12:11 AM IST First published on: Mar 19, 2012 at 12:11 AM IST

Some may see him as a potential Chinese Gorbachev. The party will ensure he isn’t

Succession in authoritarian regimes has never been easy,as the recent downfall of a powerful party boss in China,Bo Xilai,shows. For a while,Bo was viewed as a sure bet to become one of the top new leaders the ruling Communist Party will select this fall.

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The reason for the difficulty in picking rulers in autocracies in general,and for the dramatic political demise of Bo in particular,is not hard to fathom. In such regimes,transfer of power is not governed by transparent or credible rules,and the contest for political supremacy among the duelling elites is typically settled by purges or worse. In the case of China,Mao Zedong,who ruled from 1949 until his death in 1976,did not even want to part with his power. He had a habit of picking a successor only to cashier him a few years later. After he died,a palace coup,backed by the Chinese military,determined who was to be Mao’s immediate successor. But that particular individual did not last very long. Within two years he was pushed out by Deng Xiaoping.

Deng did not have better luck than Mao in managing his own succession. The first two successors he chose turned out to be politically too liberal,and were purged. The third one,Jiang Zemin,a consensus candidate who rose to the top after the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989,fared better. Against all odds,Jiang accomplished a historic feat — succeeding Deng without much of a power struggle. But he had to pay a price. Deng wanted to reserve the privilege of naming Jiang’s successor to himself. In 1992,Deng put Hu Jintao,then only 50 and relatively junior in terms of experience,on the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee and cemented his status as Jiang’s successor.

To everybody’s relief,this succession arrangement worked. The passing of the baton from Jiang to Hu in 2002 was the least disruptive in the party’s history (even though Jiang kept his position as the commander-in-chief of the Chinese armed forces for two more years). Unlike Deng,Jiang did not have enough authority to name his own successor. So when Jiang retired in 2002,there was no front-runner to succeed Hu in 2012.

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In 2007,after Hu completed his first term,the party’s top elites fought an intense battle behind the scenes to pick his successor. Hu favoured his protege,Li Keqiang,who worked with him in the Chinese Communist Youth League. But Hu’s rivals resisted. The deadlock was broken by a straw poll conducted among the members of the Central Committee of the party. The winner of the straw poll,it was alleged,was Xi Jinping,then the party boss of Shanghai. (Li is now slated to be the next premier.)

As the party is poised to inaugurate Xi as its next leader this coming fall,the question on most people’s minds is whether Xi is going to make dramatic policy changes.

Xi’s personal background is intriguing enough to spark speculations. A so-called “princeling” (a child of a top official),Xi is the son of one of the founding fathers of the People’s Republic. But Xi’s childhood was not one of privilege. His father,a vice premier,was purged by Mao in 1962 and spent 16 years in jail. After he was politically rehabilitated in 1978,Deng sent him to Guangdong to lead its economic reforms. Later,the elder Xi was credited with championing major changes in China’s legal system. As a teenager,Xi Jinping was sent to work in the farm fields in one of the poorest areas in China. What apparently strengthened Xi’s credentials as a future leader of the party was his extensive experience in local government. He started his political career as a leader in a people’s commune and worked his way up from administering a county to overseeing large coastal provinces (as governor and party boss of Fujian,Zhejiang and Shanghai).

Xi’s family background and résumé may suggest that he probably is more reform-minded than the current leadership. But the truth is that nobody knows. While Xi’s formative years were spent in political turmoil and his father’s influence on his outlook must have been considerable,there is nothing in Xi’s own background to give us reliable indications as to what he wants to do once installed as the party’s general secretary.

In any case,Xi may find his ability to initiate significant policy changes severely circumscribed by the current system. While Xi will be nominally the party’s top official,he actually is “first among equals”. To prevent the re-emergence of a domineering dictator like Mao,the Communist Party in the last three decades has instituted collective leadership. The party’s top decision-making body is the Politburo Standing Committee,which at the moment has nine members. In the leadership transition scheduled for this fall,seven new members of the standing committee will be selected. Major decisions are arrived at through consensus. The standing committee is said to seldom force a vote if there is a lack of consensus among the nine members. So whether Xi can implement a new political agenda really depends on how many of his political allies get to be appointed to this all-powerful committee. According to the party’s succession plan,Xi will be the party general secretary and the president of the state. There is some uncertainty whether Hu will immediately retire from his position as the commander-in-chief. If Hu keeps this position for two extra years,as Jiang did,Xi will not be able to assume full authority immediately.

Even if Xi takes over all the key positions smoothly and has enough political allies on the standing committee,he will face a daunting challenge in changing the direction of the Communist Party. For the last 20 years,the party has followed a strategy of economic growth and political repression. The result today is rampant crony capitalism,endemic corruption,rising inequality,economic imbalances and widespread social discontent. Ensuring China’s future growth and stability requires adopting bold economic reforms and political change. The cruel reality is that the Communist Party itself is the most powerful entrenched interest group whose power and privileges will be the target of such reforms.

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev reformed the Soviet Union into oblivion,many in the West have been rooting for his Chinese incarnation. Some today may see Xi as a potential Chinese Gorbachev. The Chinese Communist Party will make sure he isn’t.

The writer is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in the US
express@expressindia.com

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