Our Constitution mandates a clear division of responsibility between the executive,legislature and the judiciary,with the sole responsibility of governance and day-to-day administration vested in the executive. However,the nature of parliamentary democracy creates a de facto fusion of roles,with the executive drawing legitimacy and sustenance from parliamentary majorities notwithstanding the de jure separation. Not only do parliamentary majorities ensure passage of legislation but also provide the executive with moral legitimacy to become the key driver of policy choices in terms of content and implementation.
Some of these institutional certainties driven by majoritarianism that were a given in the first four decades of the Republic have come under strain in the past two decades,resulting often in policy paralysis. While the undermining of parliamentary and legislative institutions,unfortunately by elected members,has got a good deal of attention in the national discourse,the erosion of executive authority has not been commented upon,presumably because the executive once was so powerful that it has created a residue of permanent antipathy.
Since the 1990s,centrifugal tendencies coupled with political fragmentation have resulted in a systematic erosion of both the mystique and omnipotence of a strong Centre. Coalitional strains on cabinet collegiality and cohesion,along with the stretching of the collective responsibility of the council of ministers beyond Parliament,have resulted in a situation whereby the capacity of the Centre as the driving dynamic of programmes and initiatives,even in the conduct of international relations,is hobbled. While the advent of coalition governments may have rejuvenated certain federal principles,it has weakened the unitary paradigm,thus presenting a profound challenge to the twin imperatives of governance and administration.
The second reason is the institutionalisation of an innovation known as judicial activism. The power vacuum created by unstable coalition arrangements has impelled the judicial establishment to try and fill this vacant national space. The diffidence of the executive and the legitimate impatience of the people have resulted in judicial intervention in areas which the Constitution had intended as an exclusive executive preserve. Judicial activism,initially forged as a benign instrument to rein in a belligerent executive from disregarding checks and balances,has now appropriated for itself the role of being the driver of executive processes.
The third reason for the weakness of the executive has been the resistance to any worthwhile reform of the colonial administrative structure that is antiquated and straining at the seams. The excuse trotted out by the bureaucracy that any tinkering with the steel frame of governance may lead to a complete collapse,obviates the reality that the system is unfit to respond to contemporary expectations. The permanent establishment has stymied attempts at a holistic overhaul. While legislation like the Right to Information has empowered people,it has exposed the inability of the system in dealing with the expectations unleashed. More often than not,government finds itself incapacitated if not overwhelmed by the deluge. The answer lies in looking afresh at the structure of the administrative system,from recruitment to retirement.
The fourth reason undermining the institutional autonomy of the executive is the tendency of certain non-governmental organisations to insist upon making laws on the streets rather than in Parliament. Their utterances cannot mask their contempt for democracy even if they cloak their actions under an obtuse ideological construct called direct democracy,which is only a sure-shot recipe for anarchy.
Notwithstanding institutional infirmities that have weakened the executive,the reality is that under our constitutional scheme the sole responsibility for protecting national sovereignty,ensuring political stability,maintaining internal security,preserving communal amity,deciding economic policy and conducting international relations is the executives, and it is accountable principally,if not only,to Parliament.
The next two decades are critical for Indias growth trajectory. The imperatives of internal consolidation and increasing international responsibilities can only be surmounted by a strong and relatively autonomous executive. Given that decentralisation of power would keep throwing up coalition governments,thereby rendering the Centre susceptible to institutional weakness,and that this political reality may be here to stay,any attempts to hobble the executive further by creating statutory structures and oversight mechanisms that compel it to look over its shoulder before taking any decision would have ominous implications.
As the government prepares to move the Lokpal bill,and Parliament to debate it,it must be borne in mind that what India needs are laws that resuscitate and reform that strengthen the executive,not weaken it.
The writer is a lawyer and Congress MP. Views are personal
express@expressindia.com
