Opinion Best of Both Sides: Rivalry with China need not mean conflict
Better ties with China can help India build its own economic and military strength.
EAM Jaishankar with Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Delhi. (X/Jaishankar) 
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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India this week comes against the backdrop of volatile geopolitical headwinds: The US tariff squeeze on India over oil purchases from Russia, but a temporary tariff reprieve for China. Wang also called on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after which the latter announced that he will meet President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, adding that “stable, predictable and constructive (New Delhi-Beijing) ties” will help “global peace and prosperity”.
The US has long pursued Britain’s age-old grand strategy of preserving “balance of power”, with just one objective: Maintaining global preeminence. To this end, it has struck down, by forming a coalition, any rising power that became unmanageable. During World War II, the US allied with the USSR and the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) nationalists. In the closing years of the war, while exploiting Soviet military predominance in Eastern Europe, it prevailed upon the Europeans to enter into the Bretton Woods Agreement (July 1944). As World War II ended, the US turned on its former ally, the USSR, and started to rebuild relationships with its former enemies, Japan and Germany, which it had firebombed and nuked into rubble.
After the People’s Republic of China was established (1949), the US, worried about the emergence of a powerful USSR-China communist bloc, sided with the KMT (which fled to Taiwan) and supported Taiwan’s recognition as the “real China” at the UN. It also trained Tibetan fighters against China. But its inability to break the Soviet Union finally led it to align with China through the 1972 Pakistan-led rapprochement, before which it ensured China replaced Taiwan (ROC) at the UN. The cases of Iran and Afghanistan, too, underline the risks of allying with the US.
India could have avoided turning its ties with the US into a loud, personalised affair. History tells us that such personalisation has never ended well, as leaders not only get replaced, but are always drawn back to primary strategic issues. The priority of both the Joe Biden and Donald Trump administrations has been to manage Russia and China.
The Russian economy is heavily dependent on energy exports, and its economic growth is contingent on high energy prices. From 2014, the US had tried, unsuccessfully, to push down oil prices to starve the Russian economy. Now, Trump wants to end the Russo-Ukrainian war, and as part of this endeavour, he demands that India stop purchasing Russian oil. India’s refusal to do so has miffed him, prompting tariffs.
On the other hand, the US wants to keep China’s economic might, technological capabilities and geopolitical influence in check. But given the US’s dependence on rare earths, certain supply chains, trade ties, and treasury holdings, there are limits to the risks Washington will expose itself to. If the US can arrive at a strategic understanding with China, it can de-emphasise its relationship with India. Further, the US’s hope that India would emerge as an alternative economic-industrial destination and supply chain source vis-à-vis China didn’t pan out.
Can India, then, turn towards China? The reality is that, barring isolated incidents (1967 Nathu La and Cho La clashes; 1987 Sumdorong Chu and the 2017 Doklam stand-offs; 2020 Galwan skirmish), the Line of Actual Control (the line since the 1962 war) has been quiet.
The Himalayas, stretching for about 2,400 km, are about 500 km wide in Kashmir and 200 km in Arunachal Pradesh. The Trans-Himalayas, the Great Himalayas and the Lesser Himalayas together constitute a very formidable obstacle and influence military operations, particularly logistics and land movement. While there’s potential for skirmishes, limited land-grabs, and aerial and missile attacks, neither India nor China can conduct a full-scale, all-theatre war across the Himalayas, occupy large chunks of territory, and then sustain large forces over extended periods in occupied lands.
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Since the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, China has studiously avoided war. It has focused on building its economy and infrastructure. War is no longer a lucrative venture. China gains nothing by going to war with a near-peer competitor like India. China stands to lose economically, politically and militarily even if it “wins” a war. A war with India will also upset China’s focus on “great power” status vis-à-vis the US. The Communist Party is well aware that its legitimacy is linked to its ability to deliver continued prosperity to China’s citizens.
The UPA I and II governments invested a lot of political capital in convincing China to de-hyphenate India from Pakistan in its foreign policy. Even PM Modi had cultivated good relations with China. It, therefore, does make sense for India to have a rapprochement with China and pursue a mutually beneficial economic relationship. This will also allow India to build its economic strength, and by corollary, military strength. While India and China are geopolitical rivals, that rivalry need not descend into bitter conflict. If the two can manage their differences, the outcome can be stability, gradual normalisation and prosperity.
The writer, a retired Army officer, was principal director in the National Security Council Secretariat
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