Opinion The views from DC
Obama arrives next week. Heres a peek into the very different perspectives optimistic,ambivalent and pessimistic offered by leading American scholars on the past,present and future of Indo-US relations.
On the stalling of relations post-Bush:
George Perkovich,Toward Realistic US-India Relations,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: The Bush administration offered more and asked less of India than it did of any other country,save perhaps Israel. However,the special treatment of India was unrealistic and therefore unsustainable. The United States would be wise to continue such a tilted relationship only if American national interests coincided closely with Indias preferences… Careful analysis of US and Indian interests does not show such a close convergence.
Ashley J. Tellis,Obama in India: Building a Global Partnership: Challenges,Risks,Opportunities,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Policy Outlook,2010: The lack of US attention to India has less to do with Obamas attitude toward Asia at least presently than is often supposed. Rather,this change is ironically a function of Indias success… For an administration that may be best described as Problems R Us, India is not a problem that rises to the level of many of its neighbours.
Richard Armitage,Nicholas Burns, and others,Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,Centre for a New American Security,October 2010: Many prominent Indians and Americans,however,fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete,few new ideas have been embraced by both sides,and the forward momentum that characterised recent cooperation has subsided.
On the China factor in Indo-US ties
Perkovich: A US-India partnership should not be conceptualised as a means to contain or contest China,…a notion that many self-proclaimed realists in America and India wish to project on to the relationship… Sometimes India and China will stand together in opposition to the United States,as with climate change and World Trade Organisation negotiations.
Teresita C. Schaffer,The United States and India 10 Years Out,Centre for a New American Security,Working Paper,October 2010: The China connection has always been an unspoken foundation of US-India relations. Both countries want to engage China and neither wants to treat it as an enemy,but both see it as a potentially dangerous strategic competitor. If New Delhi sees Washington as responding to Chinas forward thrusts with quiet firmness,Chinese assertiveness could result in closer and more candid strategic coordination between India and the United States. On the other hand,if the US is seen as enhancing Chinas international stature or giving it special standing in the management of world problems the Indian shorthand for this is creating a G-2 India will work hard to put more substance into its relations with Japan and Russia,to create other balancing relationships in Asia.
Tellis: The poorly drafted US-China joint statement on the occasion of Obamas first visit to Beijing which appeared to legitimise a Chinese oversight role in South Asia and confirmed Indian fears about an emerging G-2 precipitated further shock waves… Either because of Beijings growing strength,US financial indebtedness to China,or a loss of American political confidence,New Delhi remains anxious that Washington will not resist Beijings highhandedness as firmly as it should.
On a joint Af-Pak strategy:
Armitage et al: The United States and India should deepen their dialogue on those two countries [Pakistan and Afghanistan,recognising that we may continue to differ on elements of our respective approaches. The aim of these discussions should be not only to increase mutual understanding,but to identify specific areas of common action. This is particularly important in the case of Afghanistan,with which India has historic ties and to which it has provided substantial development aid. The US should work with India to identify further potential contributions taking into consideration other regional sensitivities to the international effort in Afghanistan.
Schaffer: A crisis between India and Pakistan could all too easily become a crisis between the United States and both countries. Both countries will be looking for US sympathy; both will be quick to claim that the United States is hypocritically ignoring their security concerns. If the United States is to have a significant influence on Indias policy in a future crisis,it will need to make an investment now in working closely with India on terrorism issues,including those that involve people working from Pakistan against India.
Tellis: The continued American financial and military assistance to Pakistan… also confounds New Delhi,especially given Obamas expressed determination to hold Pakistan to account. The repeated failure to match words with deeds has exacerbated New Delhis nervousness about US policies that,when viewed against developments in Afghanistan,only promise increased threats levelled at India.
On the relationships future direction:
Armitage et al: In order to chart a more ambitious US-India strategic partnership,we believe that the United States should commit,publicly and explicitly,to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged UN Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment,beginning with a bilateral investment treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organisations,a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalise US export controls,including the removal of ISRO subsidiaries from the US Entity List.
Schaffer: The concept of strategic autonomy,the idea that India must not allow any other country excessive influence over its foreign policy… runs deep in India. Indias domestic preoccupations and its philosophical commitment to strategic autonomy should become [if trends continue easier to reconcile with a strong relationship with the US. Externally driven contingencies (China,Pakistan) would push India in the other direction. This would not bring the relationship back to the level of the 1950s and 1960s: The economic development that has taken place in the interim practically rules that out.
Tellis: Indias strategic direction is already evolving towards greater convergence with the US. In the present hiatus,it is easy to lose sight of this fundamental fact… The US has a vital stake in maintaining an Asian balance of power that favours freedom at a time when managing Chinas rise is certain to be the most important strategic challenge facing DC.