Opinion The signal through the noise
NCTCs role in sifting through the intelligence data glut
After the Pune attack,as with every terrorist strike,a debate emerged: how to process intelligence for better ground action. Every country experiments with new processing arrangements to extract focused intelligence from a mass of information. Mike McConnell,former US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) said in 2007 that sixteen US intelligence agencies collected one billion pieces of information daily.
We have a similar situation in India. A recent press report indicated that Mumbai Police received 140 terror alerts in 2009,many vague but requiring massive deployment of manpower. Unfortunately,this cannot be avoided when terrorism continues to be our top threat. During the 26/11 enquiry we found that strands of intelligence received during the preceding three years by Maharashtra had,in fact,come true on 26/11. On hindsight,the mode of attack and targets were correctly conveyed without an exact date. This is often the dilemma.
Do we take ground action on intelligence even if it appears to be mere rumour? Intelligence wings and implementing agencies spar over this. In the late 1980s,RAW and SPG had a spat whether uncorroborated information on the prime ministers security should be passed on to SPG.
Viewed from the other end,such incomplete intelligence creates serious difficulties for ground personnel. That is where better intelligence processing comes in. In the US,this was previously done by inter-agency committees under the National Security Council (NSC). In the UK,it was done by the intelligence coordinator and joint intelligence committee under a 1994 law. In India too,it was handled by our joint intelligence committee. When terrorism became the biggest security threat,all these were found inadequate. New methods of processing started all over the world.
In 2004,the US created the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) to do strategic operational planning for counter terrorism and assign roles to lead departments with no power to direct the execution of any resulting operations. This is done by the department of homeland security (DHS),charged with the legal responsibility of protecting the mainland from terrorism. The DHS,which issues colour-coded alerts,has its own collection methods for domestic terrorism which it then communicates to different agencies. NCTC intelligence is communicated by the DHS through 72 fusion centres. Twenty-seven of them can directly receive secret intelligence through secure communication networks. All legally empowered agencies including the FBIs 106 counter-terrorism task forces carry on their own independent activities while DHS coordinates.
The same pattern is followed for Britains counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST). The multi-agency Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) under MI5 integrates terrorism intelligence from different agencies including national and territorial police and issues colour-coded alerts without any oversight functions.
The home ministers proposals on NCTC go beyond these models,with an overarching responsibility to perform functions relating to intelligence,investigation and operations for preventing,containing and responding to terror attacks. Departments like the NIA and NSG will be brought under its direct supervision and it will also expect control over intelligence agencies. Such a body chartered to carry out intelligence integration with operational responsibility throws up a great challenge in a vast country like ours. Following the Christmas airline plot,America is debating whether the 2004 internal security reform which created the NCTC and other organs resulted in the generation of a huge volume of data,beyond interpretation capacity. Inputs from 30 different systems have swelled the NCTC suspect index from four lakhs in 2007 to five and a half lakhs in 2009. It is argued that the CIA alert on Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was not communicated to the US airline security system,much the same way they failed to detect 9/11 conspirator Khalid al-Mihdhar in August 2001 despite prior input. Our NCTC,which should have representatives from other services,including the state police,can be a great help in interpreting this mass of intelligence for precise action. However,it will be beyond its capacity if we overload it with investigation and operational supervision.
Do we still need the NSC and NSA? Yes. Apart from the Russian and American models often quoted,such security councils exist with varying charters in China,Iran,Israel,Japan,Malaysia,North Korea,Pakistan,Romania and Sri Lanka,for coordinated policy making. Security policy has now become very complex as traditional threats are enmeshed with terrorism,non-state actors and non-traditional security issues like migration,climate change,epidemics and water. The onus of final decision-making rests with the head of the government. To discharge this responsibility he needs mature advice from those who understand the nuances.
The writer is a former special secretary,Cabinet secretariat and was part of the two-member panel inquiring into the police response to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
express@expressindia.com
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