Opinion The Kabul game

Ashfaq Parvez Kayani,has set the stage for the final battles of what some Indian strategists have called the Fourth Afghan War,the outcomes of which will define the subcontinent’s geopolitics for decades to come.

It might be recalled that the British Raj fought three Afghan wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries as part of its effort to consolidate its north-western frontiers.

The prolonged Fourth Afghan War began with Pakistan trying to destabilise Afghanistan in the late 1970s. To protect the left-wing regime in Kabul,the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The anti-Soviet jihad launched from Pakistan by extremist groups was orchestrated by the ISI and supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia. After ousting the Soviet Union from Afghanistan at the end of the ’80s,the ISI installed the Taliban in Kabul in the mid-’90s.

When bin Laden,a child of this jihad,turned against the West and attacked New York and Washington,it was America’s turn to invade Afghanistan. The American success in Afghanistan depended entirely on persuading Pakistan to unwind the terror machine it had nurtured.

The unilateral American action against bin Laden,who was in a shelter under the very nose of the Pakistan army,revealed to the American public what has been known in Washington all along — Rawalpindi’s double-dealing

on terror.

Any expectation in Washington that the Pakistan army,caught red-handed in the bin Laden affair,might either show contrition or change course now stands belied. By whipping up anti-Americanism,Kayani successfully avoided internal political scrutiny of the army’s complicity in protecting bin Laden and its incompetence in preventing the US raid on Abbottabad.

Kayani has got Pakistan’s political class to authorise the army to review the current security cooperation with Washington and consider cuttting off much-needed supplies to the American and international forces in Afghanistan if the US persists with drone attacks.

If the American public is angry at Pakistan army’s duplicity and sections of the US Congress are demanding cuts in the aid to Pakistan or at least making them conditional,a defiant Kayani is threatening to make life even more miserable for the US in Afghanistan.

That’s not all. Even before bin Laden was killed,Kayani was pulling out the China card. Barely two weeks before the raid on Abbottabad,Kayani and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani were in Kabul demanding that the Afghan President Hamid Karzai dump the United States in favour of China. Gilani’s visit to China starting Tuesday is expected to demonstrate how far Beijing is willing to go — beyond verbal support — in protecting Pakistan against the United States.

Meanwhile,the president of Pakistan,Asif Ali Zardari,travelled to Russia to build the basis for a new relationship with Moscow. Russia is preparing for the incipient change in US policy towards Afghanistan and sees deeper engagement with Pakistan of some value.

For Washington,the question is not really about evidence of the Pakistan army’s complicity in promoting terror. The US has tonnes of it and then some,gathered during the raid on bin Laden’s home in Abbottabad. There will be even more in the public domain,when David Coleman Headley will testify in a Chicago court on Monday on the ISI’s support to his plotting of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008.

In the past,Washington often blinked when confronted with Pakistan’s brinkmanship. Even now there are some in the Obama administration who argue that pushing Kayani too hard might be counterproductive. But the past is not necessarily a guide to the future,especially after the killing of bin Laden which has had an effect on the US domestic debate on

Af-Pak issues.

While Kayani has shown the China card,it is not clear if Beijing wants to be played against Washington in the utterly crude manner that Kayani has done. At their strategic and economic dialogue in Washington a few days ago,the US and China agreed to begin a bilateral dialogue of their own on Afghanistan. The next few weeks and months will show if Kayani has overreached in his defiance of the United States or got his sums right on Pakistan internal dynamics and regional geopolitics.

On its part,India now has options and resources that it did not have when the Fourth Afghan War began. That India is aware of the post-bin Laden opportunities is reflected in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Afghanistan last week. By announcing additional economic aid of $500 million and agreeing to begin security cooperation as part of a new strategic partnership with Kabul,the PM has signalled India’s determination to raise its independent profile in Afghanistan.

In the coming weeks and months,India will need to do more. For one,they need to step up the engagement with all the major powers — including Washington,Beijing and Moscow — and the regional actors,especially Iran and Saudi Arabia,on the unfolding situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

For another,India must also maintain its current dialogue with the government of Pakistan and keep open channels of communication with all the major political forces there.

For India,this is not a moment for posturing against Pakistan,but for quiet activism. Delhi needs to position itself to influence the outcomes in the Fourth Afghan War and as a constructive player in helping bring positive change to Pakistan. The Fourth Afghan War has seen Pakistan promote violent religious extremism under the shadow of its nuclear gun. If India plays it right,it has a chance to reverse the brutalisation of the subcontinent during the last three decades.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi