Opinion The Great Game Folio

If the US and its allies signalled weakness by seeming too anxious for talks,what strategic purpose,it may be asked,does the Helmand offensive serve? Why would the Taliban want to fight the Americans if it is convinced that they are about to cut and run?

Those kinds of questions are unlikely to be answered when a large army is all dressed up and ready to go. Decisive use of force,however,has a way of changing not just the battlefield but also the big political picture. That was precisely the purpose of General Stanley McChrystal’s long-planned military offensive against the Taliban in Helmand province.

Amidst the friction generated by an army on the rampage,all preconceived propositions about the war vapourise into thin air. If the US and its Afghan partners come out of this battle regaining territory in the Helmand province — and more important,by winning over some important Pashtun tribes — there might yet be a small chance for the international coalition to regain the political momentum.

It is a big IF indeed. In the event that the offensive is seen as a failure,Washington’s options will rapidly shrink. For the moment though,it is best to reserve one’s judgement on who is winning the war in Afghanistan until the results from Helmand are in.

Pindi’s record

Although it might be premature to declare that the Taliban has won the war in Afghanistan,there is no denying the triumphalism at the Pakistan army’s GHQ in Rawalpindi. The Pakistan army leadership has convinced itself that it is winning big in Afghanistan. Unflinching support for the Afghan Taliban over the last few years,Rawalpindi believes,is about to pay off handsomely.

Having got the US and the international coalition to see the folly of fighting the Taliban,the argument goes,Pindi now holds all the aces in the Afghanistan endgame. Pindi,we are told,will cash this “royal flush” into specific international concessions — acceptance of Pakistan’s case for strategic depth in Afghanistan,pressure on India to deliver on Kashmir,and treating it on par with Delhi when it comes to global nuclear rules.

Must India be worried? No. For three reasons. One,the Afghan drama is by no means over. For the Great Game never stops; it moves from one play to another. The last word on Afghanistan has not been spoken in London; it merely set the stage for another round.

Two,Pindi’s record on winning wars is not an impressive one. If it has not won a single war since Partition,the betting man would calculate that Pindi can’t convert the historic opportunity that it now has into an enduring benefit.

Three,the best evidence for the Pakistan army’s strategic incompetence (it always has been brilliant tactically) comes from Afghanistan. After Soviet troops agreed to leave Afghanistan in 1988,Pindi had a full 13 years,until September 2001,to establish its dominance over Kabul. It failed spectacularly.

If it could not gain control of Afghanistan then,how could it win now? And there was no India in Afghanistan then,to blame as Pindi does now.

Delhi’s hand

India’s biggest card in Afghanistan — hold your breath — is the Pakistan army. For those who forget how much India matters in Pakistan,it was General Ashfaq Kayani who reminded the world that his army remains “India-centric”. The real strategic opportunity for Delhi lies in leveraging Pindi’s India obsession. Instead of objecting to the persistent stalker that Pindi is,Delhi must learn to hold its nerve and play a few mind games of its own. Agreeing to talk with Pakistan is only the first step. It should not be the last in a long list of surprises that Delhi can serve up to Pindi. One way of becoming unpredictable is for the government to stop responding to every statement that comes from across the border. It is not obliged to.

The writer is Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress,Washington DC