Opinion The good,the bad,and the ugly
There is a widespread impression in India that this country was marginalised in the London conference on Afghanistan and the...
There is a widespread impression in India that this country was marginalised in the London conference on Afghanistan and the Indian view,that the Taliban had no good or bad sections,was ignored. It was decided to negotiate with the Taliban that will come forward to collaborate with the Karzai government,and substantial funds were earmarked to win over the possible collaborative sections of the Taliban. This course of action was advocated jointly by leaders of Afghanistan,Pakistan and Turkey who met earlier to finalise the recommendation. The idea also had the support of the UK and the EU. While the US strategic establishment was not united on the issue,the Iraqi model of winning over the Anbar Sunnis greatly influenced the American commanders thinking. It is to be recalled that US Vice-President Biden was a strong advocate of counter-terrorism strategy focused on Pakistan,with the underlying assumption that counter-insurgency was relatively manageable in Afghanistans territory. While the categorisation of the Taliban into those that can be absorbed in the mainstream and others beyond the pale is yet to begin,US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has made it clear that Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura are not acceptable. They figure in the list of five entities which are to be disrupted,dismantled and defeated.
Therefore the question arises: who are the acceptable the Taliban? A number of journalists,observers and even military officials have asserted that a majority of people who fight as the Taliban in Afghanistan,are not necessarily motivated by the extremist religious ideology of Mullah Omar and his associates. It is said that the majority of the Afghans are not in favour of the Taliban. Yet they fight along with the Taliban and go under the name of the Taliban for a number of reasons. While the Afghan army pays only six dollars a day,the Taliban gives its fighters twenty dollars a day which is a lot of money in a country with high unemployment. The tribal chieftains command the loyalty of the tribe and they are prepared to align themselves with the Taliban opportunistically for pecuniary considerations. The same applies to drug lords who need the Talibans support to ply their trade. These categories of people who go under the label the Taliban are purchasable. In fact,when the Taliban — supported by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) — overran Afghanistan during 1994-96,they were able to purchase most of the governors and tribal chieftains and they had to do very little fighting in those days. It is therefore logical for those who are planning the new surge of US forces to fight the main campaign against the five jehadi organisations to try out the strategy of buying out the pseudo-Taliban — those fighting mostly for monetary gain and a tribal way of life who go by the label of the Taliban. If the decision is understood against this background,India has no cause to complain that it has been marginalised.
The real issue is whether this will work. Will the Pakistani army and the ISI permit it to succeed? That depends on the course of the campaign the US will launch on completing the surge operation. The purpose of buying up the pseudo-Taliban is to pacify Afghan territory as the US forces will move closer to the Durand line and intensify their attacks on the jehadis on the Pakistani side with their drones. In his recent State of the Union speech,Obama asserted he is not a quitter. For him this is a just war which no previous war was since the Second World War. He has also made it clear that if,after getting actionable intelligence,Pakistanis do not take action against the jehadi elements,then the US will. He has also warned that any ambiguous relations between the Pakistani army and the five jehadi groups will not be ignored. That moment of truth is not far away just three months off. The latest US Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) says: The first (objective) is to prevail in todays wars the first time this objective has appeared in a QDR. Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the institutional militarys budgeting,policy,and programme priorities. We now recognise that Americas ability to deal with threats for years to come will depend importantly on our success in the current conflicts.
When that moment of truth arrives,the Pakistani army and the ISI have to decide whether they will go along with the US or stay out. If they stay out,the US drone offensive will intensify against all five jehadi elements. The latest QDR also mentions stepping up the armed drone effort by 75 per cent. That may unleash jehadi anger against the Pakistani army and the state,as it did in respect of the Pakistani Taliban for permitting US logistics through Pakistani territory and the operation of drones. If the Pakistani army opposes US action,that will result in a break-off of US aid,both civil and military as well as from the international community. If the army decides to go along with the US,the jehadi groups are likely to target the Pakistani cities and the army itself. There are reports of a successful drone strike killing the new leader of the Pakistani Taliban Hakimullah Mehsud as it did his predecessor and there are expectations of a serious retaliatory strike on a Pakistani city or army target. Faced with these alternatives,there is a distinct possibility of the Pakistani army getting yet another terrorist act perpetrated in India to provoke an Indian military response which can be used as an excuse to dodge responding to the US demand for action against the jehadis. That is why US Defence Secretary Robert Gates warned about an Indo-Pakistan war being provoked. Though he attributed it to the Lashkar-e-Toiba,he is quite aware that LET operates under the direction of the Pakistani army and the ISI.
The most important issue for India today is not the purchasing campaign for the pseudo-Taliban,but how to deal with the likely Pakistani provocation to trigger an Indo-Pakistan war in order to dodge action against the jehadis. The recent US travel advisories are indications of this rising risk. On this it is to be hoped that consultations at the highest levels,along with follow-up collaborative action at the level of the security services,are taking place with the US without publicity. Unfortunately in India,emotional conclusions based on past memories tend to override sober and sound assessments based on careful analysis of current facts carried out by professional intelligence specialists.
The writer is a senior defence analyst
Share
