Opinion The second life of Quad and the China factor

The Quad is currently enjoying a robust second life compared to its precarious and fleeting previous incarnation. During the Asian tsunami disaster of December 2004, four maritime democracies – Australia, India, Japan, and the US – were forced to coordinate their relief operations in a vast region that was yet to be conceptualised as the “Indo-Pacific”. In his quest to strengthen Japan’s position vis-à-vis China, Shinzo Abe, the late Japanese prime minister, touted the Quad as an “arc of freedom”. In effect, the quadrilateral initiative added India to a pre-existing security architecture consisting of three longstanding allies.

Given its perpetual quest for strategic autonomy, this was an uneasy fit for India although it did provide an immediate and tangible payoff: In the face of China’s opposition, Japan managed to get India into the East Asia Summit (EAS). The Quad initiative alarmed China, which issued a formal démarche against what it considered a US-Japan attempt to consolidate an anti-China alliance of democracies in Asia. In September 2007, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Sydney, the Quad countries and Singapore were involved in a major maritime exercise in the Bay of Bengal which they claimed had no military or strategic significance.

Nevertheless, after the September 2007 naval exercises, both Australia and India were reluctant to pursue the quadrilateral initiative. Neither country wanted to give the impression that they were trying to contain or encircle China. Both wished to further strengthen their strong economic relationships with China. The newly elected Labour government in Australia was led by Kevin Rudd, a Mandarin-speaking former diplomat who sought a strong relationship with Beijing. Due in part to coalition compulsions, the first UPA government under Manmohan Singh was also reluctant to persist with the Quad. And so, 15 years ago, the first Quad quietly collapsed.

Given its stillborn antecedents, why is the Quad alive and kicking today? What has changed since 2007? Most obviously, China itself. Xi Jinping’s rise to the supreme leadership of China in 2012 has fundamentally transformed China, both internally and as a regional player and global actor. Unlike in 2007, when it could convincingly play the aggrieved defensive card, China today is almost always on the offensive (“wolf warrior” diplomacy, salami-slicing tactics in Ladakh). It is often expansionist (South China Sea) and increasingly revisionist (using force to impede freedom of navigation).

In international politics, states get together either to aggregate their power or solve common problems, or build community. Although the four foreign ministers insisted in their recent meeting that the Quad is not a military grouping against China, its core purpose is indeed power aggregation in the face of persistent and continuing Chinese misbehaviour in the Indo-Pacific, and possibly as a hedge against future misadventure.

The rise of China is playing out against a backdrop of power transition, as US capabilities decline in relative terms. New power centres are emerging, but they still lack decision-making mass. The traditional centres of global dynamism are either in a situation of stasis or worse, in a state of crisis. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shattered expectations of great power behaviour in the nuclear age. The few mechanisms that exist for regulating global flows and networks are not working well, and the global pandemic and its aftermath have thrown up a bunch of new challenges. Multilateralism is largely dysfunctional, multipolarity is still a distant prospect. The sheer absurdity of the international institutional architecture can be gauged from the singular fact that the world’s largest country – India – is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

In contrast to the Quad, where does BRICS fit in India’s foreign policy? Being a part of BRICS moderates and levels out any supposed proximity to the US, rekindles old ties with Russia, builds a much-needed bridge to China, provides an alternate forum for both routine and high-level interactions with Brazil and South Africa and has a distinct impact on core issues of global governance. If strategic autonomy is the means and status transformation the goal, then BRICS has its place in India’s foreign policy.

India’s presidency of the G20 has been refreshingly original. Since 2008, G20 summits have been reasonably successful at dealing effectively with some pressing global problems, especially those relating to the world capitalist economy. During its presidency of G20, India is seeking to move the grouping beyond problem-solving to build a community of knowledge and empathy, a worthy but arduous aspiration.

In a period of extreme strategic uncertainty, India’s challenge is to enhance its strategic autonomy, sharpen its competitive edge, and preserve its unique identity in a world that is ever more interconnected, interdependent, and interpenetrated. Diplomatic dexterity alone can navigate the mutually contradictory Quad, G20, and BRICS groupings.

The writer is Professor School of International Relations, JNU