Opinion On fighting the BJP, lessons for the Opposition from Bihar
Developments in the state make it plain to all non-BJP parties that they cannot move forward without the Nitish-Lalu pair

Ashraf Nehal writes
Upendra Kushwaha, chairman of the JD(U) parliamentary board and MLC, recently provided some unexpected insights into the state of Bihar politics, as well as what to expect in Bihar in light of a potential merger between the Janata Dal (United) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal. The JD(U) leader’s criticism of the deal between the JD(U) and the RJD resonated with the BJP. According to BJP leader and former deputy chief minister Sushil Modi, RJD’s Tejashwi Yadav, planned to take over the coalition’s leadership before the next assembly elections while Kumar focused on national politics. The JD(U) and RJD must merge in order to form an impenetrable administration that would hold 125 of the 243 seats available under the anti-defection statute. Intriguingly, chief minister Nitish Kumar had already indicated in December that he intended to transfer control to his younger deputy, Yadav.
Bihar has been going through an unusual political dynamic since the 2020 Vidhan Sabha elections; the coalitions that took part and afterwards made up the government saw significant changes. The three primary coalitions were the Mahagathbandhan, the Grand Democratic Secular Front, and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Currently, the Mahagathbandhan is the only coalition in the government.
On January 6, the Bihar government initiated the first stage of the state’s caste-based census. The survey will give socioeconomic information on an estimated 12.70 crore people in the 38 districts of Bihar, and will also document the economic standing of households. A proposal to conduct a caste-based census in the state of Bihar was approved by the Bihar cabinet on June 2, 2022. The Union government informed the Supreme Court on September 23 that a nationwide caste census would be “administratively complex”, but Bihar moved ahead with the plan.
Bihar’s political parties have long campaigned in favour of a caste-based census. The Bihar legislature unanimously supported motions for caste-based censuses in 2019 and 2020. On both occasions, every BJP lawmaker had backed a caste-based census. However, now the BJP is seen as being on the opposite side of this political scuffle from the coalition government of the state, which is mostly made up of political groups from the Mandal era led by OBCs.
According to the Mahagathbandhan, a caste-based census that may identify the precise number of the state’s OBCs could support proposals for policies like higher quotas. In addition to the fact that caste equity is the fundamental ideology of a party like the RJD, a sizable portion of their voters come from this group. But the BJP wishes to stay away from a caste census since it may be politically damaging and reveal a lower population of upper castes and a higher population of OBCs, which would eventually lead to calls for the lifting of the 50 per cent reservation. The BJP is thought to have the strongest support among the higher castes.
When the JD (U) and the BJP were allies until August, disagreements erupted over proposals for such an experiment made by Chief Minister Nitish Kumar. In order to push for a caste-based census, a 10-member delegation led by Kumar met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in August 2021. The notion of a caste-based census had been proposed by Tejashwi Yadav, and it had received unanimous support, according to Nitish Kumar, who notified the prime minister of this. The leaders of both parties came together on the caste census, for the first time after years of hostility, and this cooperation was what allowed for the establishment of Mahagathbandhan 2.0.
In addition to the caste census, it is intriguing to speculate on how Bihar politics is developing in favour of the JD(U)-RJD merger or alliance. After gaining 75 seats in the state’s 2020 legislative elections, the RJD outperformed all other parties to take the top spot as the largest party in Bihar. With 74 seats, the BJP came in second. After three Vikassheel Insaan Party (VIP) MLAs switched parties in March 2022, the BJP eventually won the majority, nonetheless. The All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), which had a sizable presence in the state’s Seemanchal area in the 2020 elections, saw the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) reclaim four of its five MLAs on June 29.
After Dalit stalwart Ram Vilas Paswan’s death before the 2020 elections, a catastrophe hit the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP). Despite being a steadfast NDA member, the party departed the coalition in the 2020 elections and won just one seat, but ended up being a stumbling block for Nitish Kumar’s party. The lone LJP legislator joined the JD(U). Later, the LJP split into the Chirag Paswan-led Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) and the Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party, led by Pashupati Paras, Ram Vilas’ brother. Fascinatingly, both still proclaim their allegiance to the BJP. The idea of a young, progressive Lalu-Ram Vilas nexus was nurtured by the opportune Tejashwi-Chirag friendship, but it now appears to be an erroneous notion.
The Grand Democratic Secular Front suffered the most after 2020. The coalition’s leader, Upendra Kushwaha, ultimately merged his party with the JD(U), his former party, within months after the election. The alliance won six seats: one from the BSP, and five from the AIMIM, four of which switched to the RJD.
Analysing how the AIMIM MLAs switched their allegiance just two months before the new Mahagathbandhan government is crucial in light of chief minister Nitish Kumar’s decision to step down as the NDA’s leader in Bihar on August 9, 2022. To buttress his claim to form the government, Nitish Kumar submitted a letter of support from 160 lawmakers in the coalition led by the RJD.
Kumar’s JD(U) did poorly in the 2020 Assembly elections, winning only 43 seats as opposed to 75 in the previous election. Even though Upendra Kushwaha’s Rashtriya Lok Samata Party (RLSP) merged with the JD(U), his history of defecting from the party and recent close engagement with the BJP posed a threat.
Former union minister RCP Singh had already proven to be a threat for the JD(U), and Kumar couldn’t afford to deal with another. On December 25, 2020, six of Arunachal Pradesh’s seven legislators joined the BJP, while the lone JD(U) MLA followed suit in August 2022, effectively ending the party’s existence. In Manipur, five of the party’s six MLAs merged with the BJP in September 2022, making it evident that the party was at loggerheads with the former alliance partner. If the same occurred again in Kumar’s political career, his reputation would be irreparably damaged.
Despite its flaws, the JD(U) continued to benefit the most from Bihar’s defectors, whether it was the lone Raj Kumar Singh of the LJP or Jama Khan of the BSP. Former Bihar chief minister and Hindustani Awam Morcha (HAM) president Jitan Ram Manjhi also joined Kumar in switching from the NDA to the Mahagathbandhan; why, then, did the AIMIM MLAs not choose the dominant party at the time, the JD(U)?
The BJP’s alliance with the JD(U) has prevented reports of AIMIM MLAs joining the JD(U) or supporting Kumar from becoming reality. Considering that the floor leader and Amour MLA Akhtarul Iman had previously belonged to Nitish Kumar’s JD(U), joining the party would not have been a hurdle.
Kumar would gain more MLAs if the intended outcome were to be reached, but over time, he would also be more vulnerable to the BJP. Second, with the AIMIM MLAs entering the RJD and the subsequent union of the two parties, Kumar even managed to maintain his secular credentials, which greatly advantages Bihar politics in the Muslim-Yadav combination. Lalu is without a doubt his fiercest rival, but now that Lalu is practically absent from the political scene, Kumar has taken on the role of a guardian, guiding Tejashwi Yadav to greater heights and protecting his own office from the BJP.
However, in Bihar, it is evident that the state is inseparable from the Lalu-Nitish alliance for now, and other sects have intense competition in the market to establish themselves against caste and community numbers.
This writer is postgraduate scholar of South Asia at SOAS University of London