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This is an archive article published on October 29, 2010
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Opinion NATO 2012

If it’s true that history is indeed cyclical,that must be the reason why irony never stays out of it.

October 29, 2010 02:26 AM IST First published on: Oct 29, 2010 at 02:26 AM IST

If it’s true that history is indeed cyclical,that must be the reason why irony never stays out of it. A Russian president at a NATO summit,that too on the invitation of the West? Although he’s temporarily not in the big office,Vlad still controls the Kremlin. Yet,Dmitry Medvedev will be going to Lisbon for NATO’s “Strategic Concept” summit on November 19-20. Medvedev is expected to declare himself NATO’s saviour from the Afghanistan quagmire,at a moment when the alliance is gripped by its worst existential crisis. It’s not a sudden turn of events. Last month,Anatoly Serdyukov was the first Russian defence minister to enter the Pentagon for a meeting with US Defence Secretary Robert Gates,where he discussed some of the details of what Medevedev is expected to spell out in Lisbon.The Russians are relishing the irony of returning — of being begged to return — to the land they were driven out of by the mujahideen armed by those urging Moscow to help now. But bringing Medvedev on board is a triumph not just for the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis. It’s also a success for Barack Obama’s attempt to “re-set” ties with Moscow,in which cause he’s already dropped the missile-defence shields for Poland and the Czech Republic. In Lisbon,however,if anybody smiles triumphantly,it’ll be Medvedev. For,this is a quid pro quo from which Russia stands to make strategic gains for tactical support. Afghanistan lies right beyond its “backyard” and a stable government in Kabul is vital to Moscow’s interests. The umbra of Af-Pak geopolitics falls over Central Asia as it does over Kashmir and India’s western border. What’s Moscow to give? It’s already made a dispatch of Mi-17 helicopters to Poland; NATO now wants more Russian helicopters for the Afghan forces,along with their training. Moscow will also allow the transport of arms and ammunition from the Latvian port of Riga through Russian territory via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. That’ll compensate for the increasingly unusable Pakistani route. Moreover,Russia will send in engineers to build/ re-build infrastructure. There’s,of course,no question of Russian troops on Afghan soil,again. And what’s Moscow to get? Tactically,border security against the export of narcotics and terror from Afghanistan. Strategically,NATO’s silence on Georgia,and a moratorium on its eastwards expansion. Russia’s perceptively hardening attitude to Iran and Syria and its desire for Middle Eastern stability have helped the West warm up further. The bottomline remains enlightened self-interest — Moscow,nervous about the North Caucasus,knows Islamist terror is a common ground. If the current threat environment (including cyber warfare) is drawing Russia and NATO closer,there’s the energy factor and the economy for EU-Russia bonding. Framing these developments — which,if allowed to realise their potential,will mean a major global geopolitical realignment — are also the rise of China and the perceived decline of US power.

NATO’s Afghan endgame has long been reduced to a largely

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stable Kabul,a deal with the least unpalatable Taliban factions (forget human rights and the plight of Afghan women) and an access to crush terror if it exports itself again. There’s no way out without Russian help. The focus now is NATO’s much-awaited introspection at what will be only its third Strategic Concept since the Soviet collapse. Cold War certainties,fearful as they were,pre-determined NATO’s mission blueprint with a common,clearly defined foe. Ever since 1991,despite interventions/ invasions in the Balkans and elsewhere,NATO has witnessed its identity fragment and its self-confidence fall,in a mutating threat environment.

Currently,NATO is split three ways — Germany and France,EU powerhouses and “Core European” powers,along with Mediterranean states,want closer ties with Russia,stringent parameters for deployment outside Europe,defence cuts,and a smaller alliance. The US and Canada,along with the UK,the Netherlands and Denmark (“European Atlanticists”),emphasise non-European theatres and new-age threats,and demand more Core European commitment — although the Dutch have pulled out of Afghanistan. “NATO 2020”,a strategy released last May by

former US secretary of state Madeleine K. Albright,is distinctly an “Atlanticist” document. Finally,the former Soviet satellites and the Baltic states (the “Intermarum”) who,very suspicious of Moscow,want a revalidation of Article 5 (NATO’s gospel of collective security,which “NATO 2020” too stresses),continued expansion eastwards (to increase their buffer against Russia),and re-focusing on the European theatre.

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This split was foretold once the post-9/11 concentration and commitment dissipated. How NATO should proceed is now determined by individual threat perceptions of member states — from Islamist terror to the very Russia that’s being co-opted. Ultimately,even continued Russian cooperation hangs on what happens to Medvedev in the 2012 election,and whether Vladimir Putin,no friend of NATO,cuts the rope. At the Lisbon summit,NATO has to begin by asking itself whether it should continue to exist. And,if so,how it should remain relevant. Before that,Obama would have come to India and gone. There’s a clue for NATO in how the still indispensable US behaves. Washington will not jettison NATO,but part of the recasting of the American strategic vision is its exasperation with Core Europe. It’ll look to consolidate and offload security on its new strategic alliances,closer to its preferred theatres,even as NATO fractures or fades. That can be the post-NATO Ostpolitik.

sudeep.paul@expressindia.com

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