Opinion Modi-Biden meet: India, US and the China anxiety

These developments have led to similar apprehensions in each country about the other — that they portend a broader strategic reset with China, one that will leave partners high and dry. Commentators in the US and India have criticised the other country’s China outreach as signalling weakness or desperation. They are worried that to secure a dialogue with Xi, or stabilise ties for political or economic reasons, the US or India will make unilateral concessions to Beijing. In India, there’s related speculation about the Biden administration holding back on tougher export controls; in the US, about India not participating in Australia’s Talisman Sabre exercise as expected.

In some ways, the reemergence of G2-A2 concerns is not surprising. One reason is history. Observers rarely remember US-India cooperation to balance China during the Cold War. Better remembered in India is the Sino-US rapprochement in 1971, which put paid to earlier American assurances of mutual consultations in the event of a Chinese attack on India. In the US, observers are more likely to recall Sino-Indian cooperation in the 1950s that was a thorn in Washington’s side in Asia.

Another reason is the belief that the other partner has held back in the region to further its own interests with China. In India, it’s not uncommon to hear the view that Washington didn’t do enough to deter China’s militarisation of the South China Sea; in the US, that the desire not to provoke China made India shy away from the Quad for a decade. The Trump-Xi and Modi-Xi summits between 2017-2019 also bolster these apprehensions.

So does Beijing’s reputation as a wedge-creator — even though recently it has served more as a matchmaker vis-à-vis the India-US relationship.

But perhaps the most crucial reason is the stakes involved: For Delhi and Washington, the other’s China choices matter. Even though India-US ties are broad-based, shared concerns about China have been a key driving force in the partnership, as well as the development of the Quad. And there’s anxiety that if the other strikes a grand bargain with China, it will serve as a brake on India-US ties, and also constrain Delhi or Washington’s options in the Indo-Pacific and globally.

Yet such a strategic shift is unlikely. The Sino-US and Sino-Indian rivalries reflect structural differences that will not be resolved anytime soon, and might even intensify. Both Washington and Delhi perceive China as their primary rival, one whose behaviour adversely affects their interests and strategic space. They even see their other rivals — in India’s case, Pakistan; in the US case, Russia — in part through a China prism. Moreover, this is not a partisan concern in either country — if anything, those in opposition call for even tougher China policies.

Rather than a G2 or A2 deal, both India and the US seem to be trying to set a floor to their relationships with Beijing, and reduce the risks of their competition with China spilling over into crisis.

There’s also considerable evidence that both are persisting with that competition – for instance, the range of economic and technology restrictions that Delhi and Washington have imposed. In addition, in the last few months, the Biden administration has doubled down on AUKUS, hosted a historic trilateral summit with South Korea and Japan, signed a defence cooperation agreement with Papua-New Guinea, and approved a $500 million arms sale to Taiwan. The Modi government, in turn, has welcomed Japanese and French naval ships to the strategically located Andaman Islands, deployed a submarine to Australia for the first time, signed a coast guard agreement with the Philippines, and called for Beijing to respect the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea. Moreover, via recent India-US and Quad summits, Delhi and Washington have continued to deepen their own defence, security, and technology cooperation.

Nonetheless, it’s better to address rather than dismiss G2 or A2 concerns. Otherwise, it won’t be their China outreaches but doubts about each other that will limit India-US ties — reliability concerns will lead to a reluctance to deepen cooperation that, in turn, will lead to more reliability concerns. Delhi and Washington should follow a no-surprises rule, regularly briefing each other on significant interactions with China. There should also be better public messaging, so that Beijing is not the one setting the narrative about Sino-Indian and Sino-American interactions. There should be a focus on trends rather than individual data points, which would benefit from greater investment in understanding each other’s past and present assessment and approach towards China and Asia. These steps would facilitate India-US ties — as would efforts to strengthen the non-China drivers of the partnership.

The writer is Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution