Opinion Less than meets the eye

Despite the paucity of new agreements,some in both countries have called for raising the profile of the bilateral relationship either through a “group of two”(G-2) or,more recently,a “new relationship among major powers”. While officials and analysts are free to adopt any label for the US-China relationship they want,transforming it into a real partnership requires more than a rhetorical fix. It necessitates a much greater commonality of priorities,policy approaches and political values.

The fact is that there is a dearth of real accord between the US and China on how to understand and address many of the relationship’s most pressing problems. While both agree on the need to bring North Korea back from the nuclear brink,for example,the US places a priority on forcing North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme,while China places a priority on stability in the Korean Peninsula. Very different policies emerge from such different priorities. The US is far more willing to ratchet up the level of sanctions to try to force North Korea’s hand,while China expresses less urgency,stressing the value of talks and bringing everyone back to the negotiating table to talk.

Intellectual property theft is another case in point. While it sits near the top of the Washington’s agenda in US-China bilateral discussions,the official Chinese news agency Xinhua refers to it as “a boilerplate topic” and expressed relief that it was not much discussed at this year’s S&ED. Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang wrote in a July Wall Street Journal opinion piece that many Chinese use Microsoft; some in the US would argue that what he really should have said was that many Chinese use pirated versions of Microsoft. Washington similarly turns a deaf ear to Beijing’s repeated pleas to lift the US ban on dual-use high-tech exports. While improving the US-China bilateral trade deficit is a priority for Washington,even the symbolic gesture of releasing the ban on technologies that China can already access elsewhere has proved too difficult for the US government to manage.

Much of the failure of Beijing and Washington to deepen their relationship over the past decades rests in a desire for each to see the other change. The US would like to see China change at home,and China would like to see the US change abroad. From Washington’s perspective,broader Chinese political and economic reform to improve transparency,official accountability and the rule of law would provide greater opportunities for US business,enhance political ties and,most importantly,improve the general situation of the Chinese people themselves.

China,in turn,would like the US to change the way it does business abroad. As China develops its economic and military prowess,it seeks to define the international rules of the game,such as setting technical standards,defining geographic borders and reforming the world’s international monetary system. Yet,Beijing constantly encounters formal and informal rules of the game — often established and enforced at least in part by the US — that appear to constrain it. The US has traditionally served as the chief guarantor of maritime security globally and portrays its pivot or rebalance in Asia as a renewed commitment to helping preserving peace and stability in the East and South China Seas; the Chinese government,in contrast,views it as an effort to contain China.

There is a lot of pressure on the US-China relationship. Commentators inside and outside the two countries argue that significant cooperation between the two countries is essential to meeting the global challenges of the 21st century,such as climate change,proliferation and poverty reduction. They would be wise,however,to keep their expectations low. If the past five years of the S&ED are any indication,such cooperation will be rare,hard won and far from sufficient to meet the tasks at hand.

Elizabeth Economy

The writer is C.V. Starr senior fellow and director,Asia Studies,Council on Foreign Relations,Washington DC