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This is an archive article published on October 4, 2011
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Opinion Kabul gameplan

Why Dr Singh and Karzai will have to be attentive to nuance?

October 4, 2011 02:18 AM IST First published on: Oct 4, 2011 at 02:18 AM IST

As Afghan President Hamid Karzai sits down this week with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and reviews the recent developments in the region,Pakistan will loom large. Although the India-Afghanistan relationship has always had an independent bearing of its own,Dr Singh and Karzai will have to take into account the rapidly deteriorating relations between Kabul and Rawalpindi.

Whether Dr Singh and Karzai want it or not,the consolidation of the India-Afghanistan strategic partnership is bound to add a new layer of complexity to the triangular relationship between New Delhi,Rawalpindi and Kabul. The big challenge for the prime minister is to signal India’s determination to do all it can to strengthen Kabul’s capacity to preserve its independence while dispelling the widespread perception that Delhi is eager to compete with Rawalpindi in Afghanistan.

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With the United States set to end its combat role in Afghanistan by 2014 and the international forces beginning to hand over security responsibilities to Afghan national forces,Kabul is negotiating long-term strategic partnership agreements with a number of nations,including the US,Europe and India.

An Indo-Afghan bilateral strategic pact has been in the works for a while. During the visit of Dr Singh to Kabul in May,the two sides had declared their intent to elevate their multifaceted ties to the level of a strategic partnership. While the pact might cover a broad range of issues,including political,economic and social,it is the expanding security dimension that is likely to draw much regional and international attention.

This is inevitable given the many important changes that have taken place in and around Afghanistan since Dr Singh’s visit to Kabul less than two weeks after the US raid on Abbottabad.

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The execution of Osama bin Laden by the US Special Forces seemed to mark a definitive turn to the decade-long American war on terror against al-Qaeda. That the raid was conducted without the permission of the Pakistan army,underlined the US conviction that Rawalpindi was complicit in hiding bin Laden for so long.

Having put the Pakistan army on the defensive,the Obama administration laid down a series of benchmarks for Rawalpindi to demonstrate a change of course from its double-dealing on terror.

Most notable of these was the US demand that Pakistan act against the Haqqani network that has been at the forefront of Kabul’s destabilisation. The last few months have shown that the Pakistan army has had no intention of meeting this US demand.

Instead,Rawalpindi appears to have encouraged the Haqqani network to raise the pressure on the US by attacking its embassy in Kabul last month. The Pakistan army is not only nudging the US to the exits in Afghanistan but also opposing the establishment of any residual American military presence next door.

Although the Obama administration has gone public with the fact that the Haqqani network is a “veritable arm” of the ISI,Washington appears reluctant to follow through the logic and confront the Pakistan army’s double-dealing in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile,Rawalpindi has made no secret of its desire to install the Haqqani network and the Taliban to positions of power in the post-American political dispensation in Kabul.

If the impending US retreat from Afghanistan has emboldened Rawalpindi,the rise of China and Beijing’s growing interests in Southwest Asia appear to have boosted the Pakistan army’s belief that it can dominate the emerging scenario in Afghanistan.

Rawalpindi has also been successful in undermining the efforts of Washington and Kabul to engage the Taliban for power-sharing and political reconciliation within Afghanistan.

The Pakistan army sees itself as the lone broker in the negotiations between the Taliban,the US and Kabul. Frowning at Karzai’s independent engagement with the Taliban,the ISI has helped eliminate Kabul’s main interlocutor for peace,Burhanuddin Rabbani.

In its recent war of words with Kabul and Washington,Rawalpindi has made it clear that they have no option but to accept Pakistan’s intermediation and terms for any political settlement in Afghanistan.

Some in Washington might be tempted to offer Rawalpindi,the Taliban and the Haqqani network a decisive say in defining the political future of Afghanistan. Kabul,however,can’t accept that proposition.

Even if Karzai were prepared to go along with Rawalpindi,the large non-Pashtun minorities as well as important sections of the Pashtuns are bound to reject the notion that surrender is the only basis for negotiations with the Taliban and Pakistan.

Put simply,Karzai is coming to Delhi amidst growing uncertainty in Afghanistan. To cope with the prospect of American retreat and Pakistani advance in Afghanistan,Kabul needs solid,wide-ranging international support,including from India.

Delhi,in turn,has high stakes in preserving the sovereignty and political autonomy of Kabul and preventing the Afghan state from becoming a vassal of Rawalpindi,which is seeking strategic depth on its western frontiers.

If these converging interests form the basis for a strong bilateral strategic partnership,Delhi and Kabul are realistic enough to know that there can be no lasting peace in Afghanistan without a measure of Pakistan’s support.

Nearly 2,500 km of open border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the large Pashtun population,numbering more than 40 million and straddling the Durand Line,are geographic facts that can’t ever be forgotten by Delhi and Kabul.

As they consolidate the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership,Delhi and Kabul must also signal their willingness to accommodate the genuine interests of the Pakistani nation — for security within legitimate borders on its east and west.

Sensing major gains in Afghanistan,the Pakistan army may not be amenable at this stage to appeals from Delhi and Kabul for regional peace and amity in pursuit of their shared destinies in the subcontinent.

Nevertheless,it is only by offering to accommodate the legitimate interests of Islamabad that Delhi and Kabul can counter Rawalpindi’s unreasonable behaviour towards Afghanistan and India.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi
express@expressindia.com

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